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ABSTRACT 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established by Article 12 of the Kyoto 
Protocol to promote sustainable development in developing countries and, at the same time, 
assist developed countries to achieve their emission reduction commitments in a cost-
effective way. The CDM appears to have been successful in its delivering its cost-effective 
objective but it is debatable if it has been as successful in promoting sustainable development 
in developing countries. Previous research studies have shown that overall, the CDM is not 
contributing a great deal to sustainable development. This is because, inter alia, there is no 
system in place for the effective implementation and supervision of the CDM’s sustainable 
development objective, either at the international or national levels. 
  
Proposed CDM projects are required to fulfil validation and registration (V & R) 
requirements as a prerequisite for their registration as CDM projects. The effective fulfilment, 
implementation and supervision of these should, presumably, contribute to the achievement 
of the CDM’s sustainable development objective in CDM host countries. This is because 
some of these requirements, such as stakeholder participation and environmental impact 
assessment are generally regarded in international law as key tools for promoting sustainable 
development. 
 
 The overall aim of this thesis is to consider the broad question of why the CDM is failing to 
achieve its sustainable development objective. To answer this question, this thesis focuses 
specifically on the fulfilment, implementation, and supervision of the V & R requirements for 
CDM projects, and their role in helping the CDM achieve this objective. None of the 
previous research studies examined the suitability of the V & R requirements and the 
fulfillment, implementation and supervision of the V & R requirements, to address the broad 
xiv 
 
question of why the CDM is failing to achieve its sustainable development objective. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to fill this gap by answering two main questions: to what extent 
are the V & R requirements suitable for promoting sustainable development?; how are the V 
& R requirements for CDM projects fulfilled, supervised and implemented in practice, and 
has the practical application of the V & R requirements helped or hindered the promotion of 
sustainable development? 
 
To answer these two main questions, the thesis undertakes an assessment of the V & R 
requirements for CDM projects in order to determine if the requirements are well-suited to 
promote sustainable development in the CDM. To answer the second part of the main 
question, the research assesses selected registered and rejected projects. The projects were 
assessed in order to come to a conclusion on whether the V & R requirements for CDM 
projects are being fulfilled by project participants, and implemented and supervised by the 
CDM institutional bodies in a manner that can contribute to the sustainable development 
objective of the CDM. 
 
The findings from the research show that the V & R requirements for CDM projects, as they 
are currently framed in the rules governing the CDM,  are not suitable to promote sustainable 
development in CDM host countries and do not assist the CDM achieve its sustainable 
development objective. The research also shows that the V & R requirements are not being 
effectively fulfilled, implemented and supervised in a way that enhances the ability of the 
CDM to meet its sustainable development objective. This thesis concluded that this is as a 
direct result of the lack of minimum standards and guidelines for the fulfilment of the 
requirements, which also impacts on the way in which the requirements can be implemented 
and supervised by the CDM’s institutional bodies. Therefore, this thesis argues that effective 
xv 
 
fulfilment, implementation and supervision of the V & R requirements will contribute to 
sustainable development in CDM host countries. However, in order to achieve this, minimum 
standards and guidelines are required to guide the effective fulfilment, implementation and 
supervision of the V & R requirements.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 “…climate change is not just an environmental issue but is also a fundamental development 
issue” - former UN Secretary - General Kofi Annan1 
1.1 Introduction 
Climate change and sustainable development are linked and inseparable.
2
 As will be 
highlighted later in this chapter and discussed further in Chapter 2, climate change is one of 
the key challenges to maintaining and achieving sustainable development, especially in 
developing countries, and sustainable development is one of the measures for addressing 
climate change.
3
  In recognition of this fact, sustainable development is one of the recurrent 
themes of the climate change regime (CCR).
4
 However, as later chapters will show, 
mainstreaming sustainable development into policies, decisions and institutions that drive the 
response to climate change has not yet been very successful. 
  
This chapter is divided into two parts: the first introduces the background to the research, sets 
out the research questions, justification and the contributions of the research; and the second 
                                                 
1 B. Muller ‘The North-South divide and climate change divide’ in P. Hayden et al. (eds.) Debating 
Environmental Regimes (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 37 at pg. 43. 
2
 See: K. Halsnaes et al, ‘Framing issues’ in B. Metz et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate 
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2007), 119 at pg. 121; J. Gupta and N. Grijp, ‘Climate 
change, development and development cooperation’ in J. Gupta and N. Grijp (eds.), Mainstreaming Climate 
Change in Development Cooperation: Theory, Practice and Implications for the European Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3 at pg. 16; T. Banuri and H. Opschoor, ‘Climate change and sustainable 
development’ DESA Working Paper No. 56, October 2007, 7. 
http://www.globalcitizen.net/Data/Pages/1291/Papers/20090715144951705.pdf ( UN Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (DESA) Website, 16/6/2011); K. Halsnaes and J. Verhagen, ‘Development based climate 
change adaptation and mitigation - conceptual issues and lessons learned in studies in developing countries’ 
(2007) 12(5) Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change  665 at pg. 673;and K. Baumert et al. 
(eds.), Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate (Washington D.C.: World Resources 
Institute , 2002), 62. 
3
 K. Halsnaes et al, ‘Framing issues’ in B. Metz et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate 
Change, 121. 
4
 This is discussed further in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 
2 
 
part provides an overview of the CDM as a foundation for the discussion in the remaining 
chapters. 
  
1.2 Background to the Research 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change as “... 
change in the state of the climate that can be identified, (e.g. using statistical tests), by 
changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. Changes in climate can be due to natural variability or as 
a result of human activity.”5 Changes as a result of natural variability are inherent, and it 
creates a balance in the atmosphere. However, the international community is concerned 
about the changes occurring as a result of human activity. There is general consensus that the 
effects of climate change,
6
 as a result of human activity, on humans, the environment and 
ecological processes are negative and will continue to be so.
7
 Some of these include, inter 
alia: an effective doubling of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere and a consequent 
increase of global mean temperature, as well as extreme weather conditions, which can 
reduce agricultural crop yield and aggregate food production.
8
 Scientists also agree that 
developing countries are likely to suffer more from the adverse impact of climate change than 
                                                 
5
 R. Pachuri and A. Reisinger (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Synthetic Report Contributions of Working Groups 
1, 11 and 11I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva: 
IPCC, 2007), 30. 
6
 For literature on climate change generally see: M. Parry and T. Carter, Climate Impact and Adaptation 
Assessment: A Guide to the IPCC Approach (London: Earthscan, 1988), 5; J. Houghton et al. (eds.), Climate 
Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); A. Dessler and E. 
Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate 2
nd
 edn. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); G. O'Hare et al., Weather, Climate and Climate Change (Harlow: Prentice 
Hall, 2005); and F. Drakes, Global Warming: the Science of Climate Change (London: Arnold, 2000). For a 
critique of the science of climate change, see V. Gray, The Greenhouse Delusion: A Critique of Climate Change 
(Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing, 2002). 
7
M. Maslin, Global Warming: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3. 
8
 Some of the effects include: sea level rise; human health impacts such as increased incidence of vector-borne 
diseases, severe heat waves and poor air quality. See W. Tegart et al. (eds.), Climate Change: The IPCC 
Impacts Assessment (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990), 1.  
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developed countries.
9 
This is because they have less capacity to mitigate and adapt to its 
negative effects and are therefore most vulnerable, although they have contributed the least to 
the problem.
10
 
 
As a result of these undesirable effects, it became necessary to deal with climate change. The 
United Nations (UN), in several resolutions leading up to UN Resolution 44/207,
11
 declared 
that there is a need to address with urgency the question of climate change.
12
 In culmination 
of this, the CCR was established. The regime comprises two international treaties, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
13
 adopted in 1992 and the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP)
 14
 adopted in 1997.  
1.2.1 The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
 
The UNFCCC establishes the overall framework for inter-governmental efforts to address 
climate change. Although the UNFCCC does not commit Annex I Parties
15
 to binding 
                                                 
9
 See: B. Wilson and M. Spannagle, The Complete Guide to Climate Change, 97; and H. Bulkeley and P. 
Newell, Governing Climate Change (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 29. See also: C. Okereke, Global Justice and 
Neoliberal Environmental Justice: Ethics, Sustainable Development and International Co-operation (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 119. 
10
 J. Ayers and S. Huq, ‘Supporting adaptation to climate change: what role for official development assistance? 
(2009) 27(6) Development Policy Review 681.  Also see: N. Beg et al., ‘Linkages between climate change and 
sustainable development’ (2002) 2 Climate Policy 132; and J. Roberts and B. Parks, A Climate of Injustice: 
Global Inequality, North –South Politics and Climate Policy (Massachusetts: MIT Press Books, 2007). 
11
 A/RES/44/207, 85
th 
Plenary Meeting, 22 December, 1989. Also see D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ (1993) 18 Yale Journal of International Law 451 
at 465. 
12
 See for example, A/RES/43/53, 70
th 
Plenary Meeting, 6 December, 1988. 
13
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York) 9 May 1992, in force 24 March, 
1994. Reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 849. Hereinafter referred to as UNFCCC. The Convention enjoys near 
universal membership, currently, there are 194 Parties (193 States and the European Union) to the Convention. 
See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php  (UNFCCC 
Website, 20/9/ 2010). 
14
 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto) 11 December 1997, in 
force 16 February, 2005. Reprinted in (1998) 37 ILM 22. Hereinafter referred to as Kyoto Protocol (KP). 
15
 Annex I countries are developed countries and countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy. They include Australia, Austria,  Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark,  European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of 
4 
 
emission reduction targets, it sets the groundwork for binding targets and commitments for 
Green House Gas (GHG) emission reductions for Annex I Parties. For instance, Article 2 
states that the ‘ultimate objective’ of the Convention is to achieve the stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous human interference with the climate system. Article 2 further emphasises that the 
stabilisation of GHGs should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. Article 3 provides that the 
international law principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, sustainable 
development, as well as the precautionary principle will guide the CCR. There are two 
aspects to the concept of common but differentiated responsibility. The first is that the 
contribution to global environmental degradation is unequal and the second, that contribution 
towards mitigation must be commensurate with the different levels of financial resources and 
technologies that countries command.
16
 The precautionary principle is based on the theory 
that lack of scientific proof should not be a reason for postponing necessary action to protect 
the environment.
17
 As will be discussed in Chapter 2 below, sustainable development is 
widely accepted as a global policy and as an integral part of international environmental law.  
 
The following terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis: ‘Annex I Parties’ 
and ‘developed countries,’ as well as, ‘non-Annex I Parties’ and ‘developing countries’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
America. Every other country not included in this list is a non-Annex I country for the purpose of the UNFCCC.  
16See: S. Chowdhury, ‘Common but differentiated state responsibility in international environmental law: from 
Stockholm (1972) to Rio (1992)’ in K. Ginther et al. (eds.) Sustainable Development and Good Governance 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijoff Publishers, 1995), 322 at pg. 333.   
17
 Principle 15 of the Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The Rio Declaration forms one of the non-
binding texts that were adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. UN DOC.A/CONF.151/26/REV.1, Vol. I, 12 August 1992. De Sadeleer states 
that the precautionary principle is “a public measure meant to counter ecological damage. Not only has the 
damage not yet occurred, but there is no irrefutable proof that it will occur.” N. De Sadeleer Environmental 
Principles: from Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 91. 
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‘Parties’ refer to developed and developing countries that have signed and ratified the 
Convention and the Protocol. Where necessary, Parties will be distinguished by whether they 
are Annex I Parties or non-Annex I Parties. 
 
At the first Conference of the Parties (COP 1) to the UNFCCC in March 1995, a new round 
of talks was launched to reach agreement on stronger and more detailed commitments for 
Annex I Parties to address their GHG emissions. Its outcome, popularly called the Berlin 
Mandate, concluded that the general commitments under the UNFCCC were not adequate for 
addressing climate change, and it called for a strengthening of the commitments of Annex I 
Parties.
18
 This process resulted in the KP, which was adopted unanimously at COP 3 in 
Kyoto, Japan, in 1997.
19
 KP went several steps further than the UNFCCC by establishing 
binding emission reduction commitments for Annex I countries in its Annex B.
20
 KP commits 
Annex I Parties to an average reduction of emissions by 5.5% below their 1990 emissions 
level by the year 2012.
21
 To achieve the required reduction, Parties can either use domestic 
actions only or a mixture of domestic actions and one or more of the Protocol’s flexibility 
                                                 
18
Decision 1/CP.1, The Berlin Mandate: Review of the Adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b), of the 
Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up, FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 6 
June 1995.  Paragraph 2 states that the aim of the Berlin Mandate is to strengthen the commitments in Article 
4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other Parties included in Annex I through policies and 
measures, as well as to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 
2005, 2010 and 2020, for their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. 
19
 For an overview of the negotiation process of the Protocol, see: Grubb et al., The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide 
and Assessment; D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds.) Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and F. Yamin and J. Depledge, The 
International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), Chapter 3.  
20
 Annex B countries are the 39 emissions-capped industrialised countries and economies in transition listed in 
Annex B of the KP. The emission reduction commitment of each country varies from country to country. The 
average emission reduction commitment is 5.2% below 1990 emission levels. 
21
 The GHGs regulated by KP are CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). See Annex A, KP.  
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mechanisms. The flexibility mechanisms are Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
is the focus of this thesis, Joint Implementation (JI),
22
 and Emissions Trading.
23
 
 
Article 12 of the KP established the CDM, and it is the only flexibility mechanism that 
directly involves non-Annex I countries in the efforts to address climate change. It states in 
Article 12 (2) that 
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties 
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist 
Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3. 
 
It should be noted that the KP’s Article 12 is the only provision in the CCR that ties the 
promotion of sustainable development to a specific action, i.e. through the implementation of 
CDM projects in developing countries.
24
 The reasons for the dual objectives of the CDM and, 
particularly, the importance of sustainable development as an objective of the CDM are 
examined in Section 1.4 below.  
  
                                                 
22
 The basic principles of Joint Implementation are defined in Article 6 of the KP. JI allows an Annex I country 
with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the KP to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) 
from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex I country. The ERUs earned can be 
counted towards meeting its Kyoto target. In practice, JI operates like the CDM because it allows more 
developed countries to invest in countries in transition.  
23
 The basic principles of Emissions Trading are defined in Article 17 of the KP. Emissions Trading allow 
countries or entities to sell carbon credits. Carbon is now tracked and traded like any other commodity in what is 
known as the carbon market. 
24
 Although other provisions in the UNFCCC and KP acknowledge and refer to sustainable development as one 
of the guiding principles of the CCR and it enjoins Parties to both, to promote sustainable development. See 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
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1.3 Aim of the Study  
Although the CDM was established to promote sustainable development in developing 
countries and, at the same time, help developed countries achieve their emission reduction 
commitments in a cost-effective way, research has shown that while the cost-effective 
emission reduction objective of the CDM is being achieved, the sustainable development 
objective is not.
25
 There are, however, validation and registration requirements for CDM 
projects (hereinafter referred to as V & R requirements), which should presumably contribute 
to the achievement of the CDM’s sustainable development objective. This is because 
individually, some of these requirements are regarded nationally and in international law as 
tools for achieving sustainable development.
26
 For example, the V & R requirements for 
stakeholders’ participation and EIA are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable 
development in international law. Notwithstanding these requirements, the CDM’s 
sustainable development objective is still not being fulfilled, and this suggests that there may 
be some inadequacies, either with the requirements themselves, or challenges with the 
process for fulfilling, implementing and supervising them. Therefore, this thesis undertakes 
an analytical study of the V & R requirements for CDM projects and, thereafter, conducts an 
assessment of selected CDM projects.
27
  
 
Ultimately, this thesis is hinged on the premise that the CDM has the potential to foster 
policy reforms that will promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. This can be 
achieved through the effective fulfilment, implementation and supervision of the V & R 
                                                 
25
 Several researchers have come to the conclusion that the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable 
development. See Section 1.3.2 infra. 
26
. See Rio Declaration, Principle 10, Reprinted in 31 ILM 874 (1992). Also note that although the V & R 
requirements are generally regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development, the sustainable 
development achieved by CDM projects can be on a global or national scale.  For instance, the reduction of 
GHGs will contribute to sustainable development, albeit, globally, while stakeholder participation will 
contribute directly to the host country and community’s sustainable development. 
27
 See Section 1.3.4 infra for the structure of the thesis. 
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requirements, which will, in turn, transform institutions in the host country that implement 
these requirements.
28
 For example, in order to effectively implement the requirement for 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), a CDM host country that does not have policies 
and institutions to administer the EIA processes will have to put institutional structures and 
policies in place, if it is desirous of hosting CDM projects.  
 
Note that the terms ‘fulfil’, ‘implement’ and ‘supervise’ will be used throughout this thesis as 
follows. CDM project participants fulfil the V & R requirements, the Designated National 
authority (DNA)
29
 implements the requirements, while the Designated Operational Entity 
(DOE),
30
 and the CDM Executive Board (EB) and its working group supervise the fulfilment 
and the implementation of the V & R requirements.  
1.3.1 Research Question 
 
This thesis seeks to answer two main questions: to what extent are the V & R requirements 
suitable for promoting sustainable development?; how are the V & R requirements for CDM 
projects fulfilled, supervised and implemented in practice, and has the practical application of 
the V & R requirements helped or hindered the promotion of sustainable development?
31
 
The following sub questions are relevant for answering the main research questions.  
1. What is the meaning of sustainable development in international law and the CCR? 
                                                 
28
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1 for discussions on how the CDM can foster policy reforms in CDM host 
countries. See: J. Sépibus, ‘Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate technology transfer’ 
Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) Working Paper No 2009/42 (2009), 3.  
http://phase1.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP6/CDM%20and%20technology%20transfer%2020%20october%20finalf
inal.pdf  (NCCR Trade Regulation Website, 20/10/ 2010); and M. Wara and D. Victor, ‘A realistic policy on 
international carbon offsets’ Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) 
Working Paper #74 (2008), 15.  
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf   (The Freeman Spogli Institute for International 
Studies Website, 20/10/ 2010). 
29
 The national agency in charge of CDM activities, see Chapter 4 for further discussions on the DNA. 
30
 The DOE is an independent assessor contracted by project participants to validate proposed project and report 
compliance with V & R requirements. See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5 for further discussions on the DOE.   
31
 See Chapters 3 and 5 for relevant discussion of the V & R requirements, their fulfilment and supervision.  
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2. Do the rules confer sufficient authority on the CDM’s institutional bodies to 
effectively implement and supervise the V & R requirements?  
1.3.2 Justification and Contribution of Research 
 
Previous research has shown that the CDM is not adequately fulfilling its sustainable 
development objective.
32
 These studies have primarily focused on determining, through 
sustainability assessments of projects, whether proposed and registered CDM projects will 
contribute to sustainable development in CDM host countries. This present study differs from 
previous studies because none of those studies involve an in-depth study of the V & R 
requirements for CDM projects, to determine if they are suitable for promoting the 
sustainable development objective of the CDM. Furthermore, none of those previous studies 
considers if these requirements are being fulfilled, implemented and supervised in a way that 
enhances the ability of the CDM to fulfil its sustainable development objective.   
 
Several of the studies have conducted sustainability assessments of registered CDM projects 
to assess the contributions of the CDM to sustainable development. However, despite 
adopting different sustainability assessment tools to examine whether the CDM is fulfilling 
its sustainable development objective, most of the studies conclude that: left to market forces, 
the CDM does not significantly contribute to sustainable development in CDM host 
countries; the CDM’s contribution to sustainable development for the 2008-2012 crediting 
period will be minimal; trade-offs exist between the dual objectives of the CDM in favour of 
its cost-effective reduction objective; and the market structure of the CDM and its focus on 
                                                 
32
 See Footnote 35 infra. 
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cheap emission reduction credits results in minimal sustainable development benefits for 
CDM host countries.
33
  
 
For instance, studies by Sutter and Parreno, Ellis et al., Pearson, and Olsen and Fenhann  
assessed different registered CDM projects in different host countries, and they each gave 
different but connected reasons why the implementation of CDM projects is resulting in 
trade-offs between its twin objectives. According to these studies, the CDM is resulting in 
trade-offs because there are no international standards for assessing sustainable development 
and the structure of the CDM as a market mechanism would contribute to a trade-off in 
favour of the CDM’s cost-efficient objective.34 Although the CDM is well-placed to stimulate 
transfer of technology and other socio-economic benefits to the host country, it is unlikely to 
do so in significant levels in its current form, because the CDM is a market mechanism with 
greater supervision of its cost-effective emission reduction objective than its sustainable 
development objective.
35
 Furthermore, the architectural structure of the CDM as a market 
                                                 
33
 See the following: C. Sutter and J. Parreno ‘Does the current Clean Development Mechanism deliver its 
sustainable development claim: An analysis of officially registered CDM projects?’ (2007) 84(1) Climate 
Change 75-90; J. Ellis et al., ‘CDM taking stock and looking forward’ (2007) 35 Energy Policy 15-28; B. 
Pearson, ‘Market failure: why the Clean Development Mechanism won’t promote clean development’ (2007) 
15(2) Journal of Cleaner Production, 247-252; K. Olsen and J. Fenhann, ‘Sustainable development benefits of 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects: a new methodology for sustainability assessments based on text 
analysis of the project design documents submitted for validation’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 2819-2830. 
See also the following literature on the CDM and sustainable development:  A. Olhoff et al., CDM Sustainable 
Development Impacts (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development,  2004); 
and  K. Olsen and J. Fenhann (eds.), A Reformed CDM – including new Mechanism for Sustainable 
Development (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, 2008), 1-185; 
P. Nussbaume, ‘On the contribution of labelled certified emission reductions to sustainable development: a 
multi-criteria evaluation of CDM projects’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 91-101; M. Wara, ‘Measuring the Clean 
Development Mechanism’s performance and potential’ (2007) 55 UCLA Law Review 1759 -1803; C. Figueres, 
‘Sectoral CDM: opening the CDM to yet unrealized goal of sustainable development’ (2006) 2(5) McGill 
International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 5 at pg. 5. 
34
 Sutter and Parreno assessed 16 registered CDM projects for their contributions to employment generation, 
equal distribution of CDM returns and improvement of local air quality in the host countries. Sutter and Parreno, 
(2007), 76. 
35
 Ellis, et al., (2007), 24. 
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mechanism is designed to attract cost-effective emission credits without rewarding projects 
that provide sustainable development benefits.
36
 
 
In two slightly different studies, Olsen and Paulsson reviewed existing literature to assess the 
state of knowledge on how the CDM contributes to sustainable development, including 
poverty alleviation.
37
 According to Olsen, the conclusion from these research studies 
indicates that the initial assumption of ‘synergies’ and ‘win–win’ opportunities for project 
participants does not hold up when projects are assessed for their sustainable development 
contributions.
38
 Olsen and Paulsson each concluded that the common thread that runs through 
all the literature is that although the CDM is working well as a market mechanism for 
providing cost-effective emission reduction credits, the market structure of the CDM and its 
focus on cheap emission reduction credits results in a lack of sustainable development 
benefits for CDM host countries.
39
 
 
Taken together, the conclusions of the various research studies on the contribution of the 
CDM to sustainable development in CDM host countries confirm Grubb’s position in 1999 
that “[t]he conventional view of the CDM in most OECD countries is that it should be 
primarily a way of minimizing the costs to them of the Kyoto commitments, by allowing 
investments in emission-avoiding activities to generate credits wherever it is cheapest to do 
so.”40 From the assessment of the literature on the contribution of the CDM to sustainable 
                                                 
36
 B. Pearson, (2007), 249 
37
 See K. Olsen, ‘The Clean Development Mechanism's contributions to sustainable development: a review of 
the literature’ (2007) 84(1) Climate Change, 59-73; and E. Paulsson, ‘A Review of the CDM Literature: from 
Fine-tuning to Critical Scrutiny’ (2009) 9 Int. Environ Agreements 63-80. 
38
 K. Olsen, (2007), 64. 
39
 K. Olsen, (2007), 67 and Paulsson, (2009), 76. 
40
M. Grubb et al., The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment (London: The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs and Earthscan, 1999), 226. 
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development in CDM projects and the assessment of registered projects in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, that position still exists in the CDM.  
 
Thus, the first main contribution of this thesis is to conduct an analytical study of the V & R 
requirements to determine if they are suitable to promote the sustainable development 
objective of the CDM. The second main contribution of this thesis is to consider if these 
requirements are being fulfilled, implemented and supervised in a way that enhances the 
ability of the CDM to achieve its sustainable development objective. Thirdly, the subject of 
this thesis is important at this time because the commitments of Annex I Parties will expire in 
2012 and negotiations are currently on-going to determine their future commitments in the 
post-2012 period. These negotiations are being carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the KP (AWG-KP). The AWG-KP has 
agreed that the flexibility mechanisms should continue to be available to Annex I Parties as a 
means to reach their emission reduction objectives after 2012.
41
 As part of the on-going 
negotiations, the AWG-KP is considering ways to improve the CDM.
42
  Separately and in 
harmony with the AWG-KP’s efforts, it is a useful exercise at this time to examine other 
ways of improving the CDM to ensure achievement of its sustainable development objective.  
 
 
                                                 
41
 See paragraph 22 of Report of AWG-KP-6 (FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/8, 4 February 2009). The commitment 
period for the KP expires in 2012 and there are on-going negotiations on a post 2012 climate regime. Paragraph 
22 states that “[t]he AWG-KP noted that emissions Trading and the project-based mechanisms, as well as 
measures to limit or reduce GHG emissions and to enhance removals from land use, land-use change and 
forestry (LULUCF) activities, should continue to be available to Annex I Parties as means to reach their 
emission reduction objectives...” Also see Decision CP.13, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. In 2007, COP 13 adopted 
the Bali Roadmap. Under the roadmap, a new negotiating process, ‘the Bali Action Plan,’ was launched to 
address such issues as mitigation and reduction commitments, including the use of markets to promote 
mitigation actions.  
42
 See Consideration of further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, Revised proposal by 
the Chair (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/CRP.4/Rev.4, 10 December 2010), Chapter III paragraph 17.  
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1.3.3 Methodology 
 
This thesis undertakes an analytical desk study of relevant documents necessary to draw 
inferences and conclusions on the V & R requirements and CDM projects.
43
 It does not 
explore in any wider context, the normative status of the CDM. Also, a desk study is deemed 
appropriate for this thesis because it is impossible to do a field study of the V & R 
requirements. Although a field study could be conducted for the registered and rejected 
projects assessed, it would prove impossible in view of the funds required to conduct site 
visits of all the CDM projects located in different countries in the world, and the time 
allowed to conduct a PhD thesis will not be sufficient for this. Furthermore, the required 
documents are readily available on the UNFCCC website and online, therefore, valid 
inferences and conclusions can be reached from the analysis of available documents.   
 
For the assessment of the fulfilment and supervision of the V & R requirements, this thesis 
selects and evaluates 100 registered CDM projects and 84 rejected projects. At the time of 
project selection in January 2008, there were over 1000 registered CDM projects in the 
UNFCCC project pipeline and this thesis selected 10% (100) of those.
44
 For the project 
selection, this thesis selected from projects registered between November 2004, when the first 
CDM project was registered, and December 2007, which is the cut-off date selected for this 
thesis.
45
 Each year (that is, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) was divided into four quarters (that 
is: January through March; April through June; July through September; and October through 
                                                 
43
 For literature on research methods, see: N. Williman, Research Methods: The Basics (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011); J. Bell, Doing Your Research Paper: A Guide for First-Time Researchers in Education, Health and 
Social Science 5
th
 Edn. (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2010); and K. Krippendoff, Content Analysis 
(London: Sage Publications, 1980), 21. Krippendoff defines content analysis as a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from data to their context.  
44
 This thesis chose 10% of the 1000 registered CDM projects in the UNFCCC project pipeline as of December 
2007 in order to allow for project assessment and analysis and the presentation of findings in the thesis within 
the time allowed for a PhD thesis. 
45
 December 2007 was chosen as the cut-off date in order to allow for project analysis and the presentation of 
findings in the thesis within the time allowed for a PhD thesis.  
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December) and at least one project was randomly selected from each month in each quarter.
46
 
In the selection process, projects were selected as a representative sample from all the 
sectoral scopes
47
 that had projects registered under them in the selection period (that is, 
November 2004 to December 2007). This was done to ensure that at least one project is 
selected from each month and quarter of the year, in order to obtain a fair representation of all 
projects over time, as well as to cover all sectoral scopes in the CDM project pipeline. A 
practical problem with this method of selection is that not all months and quarters had enough 
projects. For example, there is only 1 registered project in 2004. This thesis resolved this 
problem by selecting the available projects and spreading out the excess over the other 
quarters.  
 
To assess how the requirements are fulfilled, the Project Design Document (PDD) for each of 
the selected projects was examined. PDDs are official documents that project participants are 
required to submit to the DOE. The PDD contains a detailed description of the proposed 
CDM project and how it has fulfilled the V& R requirements. It contains information on the 
methodology used to establish the project baseline, how the additionality test procedure was 
fulfilled, the monitoring plan for the project and the monitoring methodology employed. It 
also includes the environmental impacts of the project and a section confirming whether an 
EIA was deemed necessary by the host country or the project participants, as well as the 
procedure adopted to conduct stakeholder participation. Consequently, the PDD is the main 
                                                 
46
 Note that the number of project registered in each month differs and some months in the divided quarters did 
not have registered CDM projects. In such instances, the selection was carried over to the next month. Also, 
where only one project was registered in a month that project was selected. However, where a month had more 
than one registered project, then CDM projects were randomly selected from the available projects.  
47
 There are fifteen sectoral scopes for CDM projects.  The list of sectoral scopes is based on the list of sectors 
and sources contained in Annex A of the KP. See Chapter 5, Table 5.1 for a list of the scopes. A CDM project 
could be registered under one sectoral scope or more. See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html  
(UNFCCC Website, 12/12 2010). 
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source of information used in the assessment.
48
 In addition, the PDD of 84 rejected CDM 
projects are assessed and analysed. An analysis of the reasons for the rejection was conducted 
to determine the extent to which the institutional structures overseeing the CDM effectively 
supervise the requirements. The cut-off date for the rejected CDM projects was December 
2008 and as at this date, there were 84 rejected projects, so, all the rejected projects were 
selected.  
 
The research was carried out in five stages entirely as a desk study. The first stage of the 
research involved a background research on the CCR and an examination of the CDM in 
order to serve as a foundation for the rest of the chapters. The second stage of the research 
involved carrying out a study of the V & R requirements, as contained in the ‘Modalities and 
Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism’ (hereinafter called the CDM rules)49 and 
the ‘Clean Development Mechanism Validation and Verification Manual’ (hereinafter called 
the CDM Manual)
50
  in order to determine if the requirements, as they are currently framed, 
are suitable to promote sustainable development. In conducting the study on the V & R 
requirements, the ‘Gold Standard Requirements’ (hereinafter called the GS requirement)51 are 
compared with the V & R requirements. This is because the Gold Standard (GS) is known to 
register and certify high quality emission reduction projects that also make positive impacts 
on sustainable development.
52
 This stage also reviewed the institutional structure of the CDM 
                                                 
48
 See footnote 59 infra. 
49
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism 
(FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 30 March 2006), hereinafter referred to as the CDM rules. This Decision 
established the Modalities and Procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the 
KP. The Decision forms part of an agreement of 39 decisions which facilitated the prompt start of the CDM and 
the other flexibility mechanisms in the Protocol.  
50
 Clean Development Mechanism Validation and Verification Manual (Version 01.2), CDM-EB-55, Annex 1. 
Hereinafter referred to as the CDM Manual. 
51
 Available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/GSv2.1_Requirements-11.pdf  
(12/4/2012).  The Gold Standard requirements provide the requirements and the rules of Gold Standard 
certification for proposed projects, for use by validators and project developers. 
52
 See Section 1.7 infra for further discussion on the GS. 
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and the authority of the institutions and bodies to effectively supervise the V & R 
requirements.
53
 A new regulatory framework is currently being implemented for the CDM. 
As a result of this, an addendum of the analysis of the new relevant regulatory framework has 
been added to Chapters 3 and 4 below.  
 
The third stage involved a pilot study of 12 registered CDM projects. The main reason for 
undertaking this pilot study was to test if the required materials were easily accessible and 
cost free, and whether the materials available are sufficient to come to a reasonable 
conclusion about the fulfilment and supervision of the V & R requirements, without having to 
carry out on-site visits and conduct interviews with relevant CDM actors and institutions. The 
results of the pilot study established that necessary project documentation and other relevant 
documents are readily available on the UNFCCC website and elsewhere online. Importantly, 
the results show that these documents are sufficient to reach a conclusion regarding the 
fulfilment and supervision of the requirements. The first project registered for each sectoral 
scope that had a project registered under it at the time of project selection was chosen for the 
pilot study. Furthermore, the pilot study was conducted to determine how much time was 
needed to assess projects, particularly whether the assessment can be carried out within the 
timeframe allowed for a PhD research.  
 
The fourth stage of the research involved the assessment of the selected projects. Here, an 
assessment and analysis of the 100 registered CDM projects and 84 rejected projects were 
undertaken. The research method used was the textual analysis of the documents relevant for 
the validation and registration of the CDM projects, specifically, the PDDs. All selected 
                                                 
53
 The CDM’s institutional structure includes the EB, DOE and the DNA, as well as other working groups, 
committees and panels. See Chapter 4 for further discussion on their roles and functions. 
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CDM projects were analysed for their fulfilment of the V & R requirements. The study 
assessed only the PDDs of the projects chosen for this study. This is because the pilot showed 
that it was unnecessary to assess the validation report for each PDD, since the validation 
report basically repeats what is contained in the PDD.
54
 Furthermore, because of the new 
regulatory framework mentioned earlier in stage two, this thesis considered it necessary to 
conduct a follow-up assessment of recently registered CDM projects in order to establish if 
there has been an improvement, as a result of the new regulatory framework, on how project 
participants fulfil and how the CDM’s institutional bodies implement the V & R 
requirements.  
 
Regrettably, it was not possible to assess projects registered under the new regulatory 
framework because none of the projects registered on the UNFCCC’s website as at July 2012 
adopted the new regulatory framework in fulfilling the V & R requirements.
55
 However, to 
determine if there has been an improvement in the way the V & R requirements have been 
fulfilled and implemented over time, the author elected to assess 20 registered CDM projects 
from January to May, 2012. These projects are the latest projects registered on the 
UNFCCC’s website as of July 2012 when the projects were selected. Similar to the 
methodology used to pick registered projects in 2007, 20 registered projects were selected 
from 1
st
 January, 2012 to 21
st
 May, 2012. Every other project after this date was at the final 
stage of project registration. To allow for uniformity, the first four projects were selected 
from each month. The analysis from this assessment is presented in Chapter 5 below. 
Additional assessment of rejected projects was not conducted for this thesis.
56
 
 
                                                 
54
 See Chapters 5 for an expanded justification of this decision.  
55
 This is because on the average, it takes about two years for proposed CDM projects to pass through the 
validation and registration stages of the CDM.   
56
 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2 for justification of this decision. 
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The fifth and final stage of the research involved a general analysis of the research findings as 
a whole, as well as the thesis conclusions and recommendations. Conclusions were drawn 
from the findings and recommendations made, based on those findings.  
1.3.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One provides background information on the 
research and it introduces the CDM. Chapter Two explores the relationship between 
sustainable development and the CDM. Chapter Three reviews the validation and the 
registration requirements of the CDM, analysing their suitability for promoting sustainable 
development.
57
 Chapter Four presents an overview of the institutional structure of the CDM. 
Chapter Five analyses the projects (registered and rejected) and Chapter Six presents the 
conclusions and recommendations of the thesis. The next section provides an overview of the 
CDM as a foundation for the discussion in the remaining chapters. 
1.4 CDM: Reasons for its Dual Objectives 
 
 One of the key arguments made by developing countries is that historically, they are not 
responsible for the problem of climate change and as such, they should not be burdened with 
the responsibilities for mitigating it. However, apart from the fact that its negative effects are 
not location specific, it is predicted that the GHG emissions of developing countries, notably 
China and India, will overtake those of developed countries in decades to come.
58
  In fact, 
                                                 
57
 Note that the analysis of the V & R requirements for CDM projects, contained in the CDM rules, will be 
analysed alongside the CDM validation and verification Manual. 
58
 See the following: D. Freestone, ‘The international climate change legal and institutional framework: an 
overview’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and 
Beyond,  3 at pg. 15; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBDR), International Trade and 
Climate Change: Economic Legal and Institutional Perspectives (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2004), 46; 
A. Olhoff et al., CDM Sustainable Development Impacts (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate 
and Sustainable Development), 10;  B. Metz et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2001: Mitigation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 19; House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Reaching an 
International Agreement on Climate Change: Sixth Report of Session 2007 – 2008 (London: Parliamentary 
House of Commons, 2008), 14; and L. Parker and J. Blodgett, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Perspectives on the 
Top 20 Emitters and Developed Versus Developing Nations’ http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32721.pdf  
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China, despite being categorised by the UNFCCC as a developing country, currently has the 
highest GHG emission levels globally, ahead of all other countries including Annex I,
59
 
although its per capita emissions are below those of most developed countries.
60
 Therefore, it 
is considered imperative that both developed (North) and developing (South) countries 
participate in the response to climate change. The term ‘North’ and ‘South’ is synonymous 
with rich and poor countries; it is the socio-economic and political division that exists 
between the wealthy developed countries, known collectively as ‘the North’ and the poorer 
developing countries known as the ‘South’.61  
 
The North-South stalemate on climate policy can be traced to the long-standing dispute on 
the environment and development.
62
 The North sought to address global environmental issues 
such as ozone depletion, habitat loss and climate change, in isolation of developmental issues, 
while the South maintained that development issues, such as provision of safe drinking water 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Federation of American Scientist Website, 16/12/2010). 
59
 See World Resources Institute’s Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 7.0. (Washington DC: 
World Resources Institute, 2010). Also see K. Baumert et al., Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data 
and International Climate Policy (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2005), 12. 
60
 K. Baumert et al., Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy, 22. 
61
M. French, The Impact of Globalisation on Less Developed Countries and the Role of Intergovernmental 
Multilateral Organizations in Promoting Development in Less Developed Countries, 2. A thesis submitted to the 
Webster Graduate School of Webster University, available at 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bPr7W9KgLRoC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false .  
62
 J. Roberts and B. Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North –South Politics, and Climate Policy 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press books, 2007), 6. According to the authors, “[t]he issue of reconciling social justice 
with environmental protection has surfaced at every major international meeting since the first environment and 
development conference at Stockholm in 1972…” at page 2. See also:  Mathy et al., (2001), 1; B. Muller, Equity 
in Climate Change: The Great Divide (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2002). For instance, the 
1972 Stockholm conference is regarded as the starting point for international response to growing concern in the 
North over environmental issues, however most of the countries in the South had just got their independence 
and they were more concerned with other issues such as social and economic issues. Therefore, they saw the 
conference as an opportunity to discuss aspects of social development and justice. Participants in Stockholm 
therefore arrived with different priorities but with a common goal of elaborating global measures that would 
bring about positive changes to address their specific concern. See also: A. Kallhauge et al., ‘The multilateral 
process for sustainable development: past, present and future’ in A. Kallhauge et al. (eds.), Global Challenges: 
Furthering Multilateral Process for Sustainable Development (Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2005), 16 at pg. 
17; and D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: a commentary’ (1993) 
18 Yale Journal of International Law 451 at pg. 479. For instance, developing countries through the Group of 
77 (G-77) and China insisted that the developed counties bore the main responsibilities for tackling the problem 
of climate change, citing their historical responsibility. 
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and access to energy, food and healthcare, are of greater importance to them.
63
 In fact, 
Chancellor Luiz Felipe Lampreia of Brazil is quoted as saying during the negotiations leading 
to the KP, that, “[w]e cannot accept limitations that interfere with our economic 
development.”64 Therefore, while the North has always maintained that environmental 
protection has to be addressed by all, the South has maintained that the response to 
environmental protection should not limit their development aspirations.
65
  
 
The eventual creation of the CDM with dual objectives is an attempt to address these issues. 
The inclusion of sustainable development as one of the objectives of the CDM fulfils the 
development desires of developing countries and it elevates climate change policies from 
being perceived as a burden to be avoided (especially by developing countries), to being seen 
as supporting national development priorities. Consequently, the CDM came with the implicit 
assumption that synergies and win-win opportunities for both developed and developing 
countries would constitute the basis for its acceptance.
66
 From the developing country 
perspective, the benefits of the CDM arise from its promotion of sustainable development in 
the host country, inter alia, through increased investment flows that would finance clean 
technology and contribute to achieving the host country’s sustainable development goals. 
Such sustainable development goals include generation of clean energy, reduced local air 
pollution, employment generation, and private/public sector capacity development. In 
addition to promoting sustainable development, the CDM also helps developing countries to 
                                                 
63
 J. Roberts and B. Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North –South Politics, and Climate Policy , 
6.  
64
 Ibid. at 4. Chancellor Luiz Felipe Lampreia was Brazil's Minister of State for Foreign Relations from 1995 to 
2001. 
65
 K. Halsnaes and P. Shukla, ‘Sustainable development as a framework for developing country participation in 
international climate change policies’ (2008) 13(2) Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 
105 at pg. 116. Also see A. Markandya and K. Halsnaes, ‘Climate change and sustainable development: an 
overview’ in A. Markandya and K. Halsnaes (eds.), Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Prospects 
for Developing Countries (London: Earthscan Publications Limited, 2002), 1 at pg. 1.    
66
K. Olsen, (2007), 66.  
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contribute to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.
67
 On the other hand, the win-win 
opportunities for developed countries would be achieving their emission reduction and 
compliance commitments in a cost-effective manner and contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the CCR.  
 
Therefore, the CDM has been described as the ultimate instrument of North-South climate 
justice because although climate change has been the result of uncontrolled GHG emissions 
in the North, its worst consequences will be suffered by the South, especially the least 
developed countries.
68
 Developed and developing countries had high expectations for the 
CDM,
69
 and, theoretically at least, sustainable development was seen as a main driver for 
developing country interest and participation in the CDM.  
 
However, research studies have sounded a note of caution about the CDM and Article 12. For 
instance, Michaelowa and Michaelowa have suggested that the dual objectives of the CDM 
present some challenges in promoting sustainable development. According to them, Article 
12(2) of the KP unwittingly assumes that there would be an automatic synergy between the 
twin objectives of the CDM.
70
   
 
Another challenge for sustainable development in the CDM is that Article 12 of the KP 
creates a marriage of two ideologies that are at extreme ends of a spectrum. By forcing 
                                                 
67
 Recall that Article 12(2) of the KP states that “[t]he purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to 
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention.”  
68
 H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change, 29. See also: C. Okereke, Global Justice and 
Neoliberal Environmental Justice: Ethics, Sustainable Development and International Co-operation (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 119. 
69
 K. Olsen, (2007), 61. 
70
 A. Michaelowa and K. Michaelowa, ‘Does climate policy promote development?’ (2007) 84(1) Climate 
Change 1 at pg. 2.  “…this line of thought is reflected in the double target of the CDM which says that projects 
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capitalist objectives to co-exist with socialist objectives, it is clear that the stronger capitalist 
objective of the CDM will dominate, unless the socialist objective is actively governed and 
implemented.
71
 This is because, more likely than not, CDM investors are more interested in 
the cheap credits and higher rate of returns that CDM affords them and they are less 
interested in ethical issues such as sustainable development and reducing poverty, which are 
more expensive to implement. Pearson rightly stated that the CDM is a market mechanism 
and not a development fund and that it is bound to exhibit capitalist tendencies.
72
  
 
According to Cosbey et al., “[f]ully exploiting the CDM’s potential for a development 
dividend requires a careful integration of two different sets of objectives: those of the private 
sector, guided by the bottom line, and those of developing countries, guided by their 
development priorities and emphasis on poverty eradication. Without that integration, the 
success of the CDM and its contribution to the wider objectives of the UNFCCC will be 
undermined.
73
 Finally, from the author’s interaction with CDM participants, investors and 
promoters, it is safe to say that sustainable development is not always one of the key 
considerations of CDM investors, but is only an incidental benefit of implementing CDM 
projects.
74
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1.5 Characteristics of the Mechanism 
The twin objectives of the CDM are one of its most important characteristics. Secondly, 
another feature of the CDM is that it is a flexibility mechanism because it affords Annex I 
Parties with emission reduction commitments, or their entities, the opportunity of choosing 
how, and where, to reduce their GHG emissions. They can do so locally through national 
programmes and initiatives or through the CDM by investing in emission reduction or 
removal projects in non-Annex I countries and earning Certified Emission Reduction (CER) 
credits for the reductions achieved. CERs are equivalent to the volume of emission reductions 
achieved by a CDM project, calculated as one CER for every tonne of CO2 reduced or 
avoided. The emission reductions achieved through CDM projects in non-Annex I countries 
are usually cost-effective for Annex I Parties because if such projects were to be implemented 
in Annex I countries, they would be more expensive.
75
 This is because non-Annex I Parties 
often adopts less efficient technologies and thus, there are more opportunities for Annex I 
Parties to introduce efficient technologies to non-Annex I host countries through CDM 
projects and earn CERs for such projects. In addition, the labour and resources required to 
implement CDM projects are relatively cheaper in developing countries.
76
  
 
A third characteristic of the CDM is that it is an offsetting mechanism. For each tonne of CO2 
equivalent reduced or avoided, a CDM project earns CERs which the Annex I Party can use 
to contribute to its emission reduction commitments.
77
 As a result, Annex I Parties or their 
entities can either increase their domestic emissions by the amount of CERs they have earned 
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 Meijer and Werksman, ‘Keeping it Clean – Safeguarding the Environmental Integrity of the Clean 
Development Mechanism’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds.) Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto 
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76
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or, more realistically, lower the domestic emission reductions they have to make to achieve 
their emission reduction commitments by virtue of the CERs they have earned. Therefore, the 
emission reductions achieved by CDM projects are used to offset emission reductions that 
Annex I Parties should achieve, enabling these Parties to achieve their emission reduction 
targets at a lower cost.
78
  
 
Lastly, the CDM is also characterised by the fact that it functions as a market mechanism 
which by operation allows CERs earned by CDM projects to be transferred to an Annex I 
Party’s account or purchased in the carbon market at the prevailing market price.79 The price 
of the CERs earned from CDM projects is decided between buyer and seller, although the 
price is also affected by the economic principle of demand and supply.   
 
The characteristics of the CDM could be perceived as its strength and its weakness hindering 
it from achieving its dual objectives. For instance, the CDM’s characteristic of being a market 
mechanism has been identified by research as one of the reasons why trade-offs exist between 
the dual objectives of the CDM in favour of its cost-effective emission reduction objective.
80
 
On the other hand, the CDM’s dual objectives can be seen as a strength. This is because the 
effective implementation of CDM projects in developing countries will promote sustainable 
development and foster policy reforms in such countries.   
 
Having said the above, it is also important to place the CDM in the wider context within 
which it operates. This is because the CDM project does not exist in isolation; it is influenced 
                                                 
78
 See ‘CDM Watch statement on quality restrictions on the use of industrial gas offsets in the EU ETS.’ 
http://www.cdm-watch.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/CDM-Watch-statement-on-quality-
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by economic, political, legal and socio-economic issues and challenges that prevail in the 
host country.
81
 Some of the specific issues impacting the implementation of CDM projects in 
host countries are: taxation and financial services regulation, such as the classification of the 
CERs generated from the implementation of the project and whether it is classified as a 
security or a commodity,
82
 taxation of CERs generated by projects, whether discriminatory or 
not, and taxation on revenue from CER sales;
83
 domestic environmental laws such as 
environmental approvals required during the construction and operation of the project and the 
liability of project participants for environmental harms caused by the implementation of the 
project;
84
 and domestic property laws such rights, conditions or restrictions with respect to 
the land on which CDM projects are built, and customary land title and restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land.
85
 In addition, implementation of CDM projects will be negatively affected 
if the host country lacks strong and functional institutional and infrastructural structures such 
as stable government, rule of law, and access to court to seek redress. For example, the tax 
regime of the host country almost entirely translates into higher cost of project 
implementation. Therefore, if the tax regime of the host country is perceived by CDM 
investors and participants as being too rigid, it may discourage investors.  
 
The challenges to the successful implementation of CDM projects can be classified as CDM 
specific barriers or general national barriers. CDM specific barriers such as delays in national 
CDM approval processes can be resolved by, for example, removing the bottlenecks in host 
                                                 
81
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country approval procedure.
86
 However, national barriers that are general to project 
implementation, such as political and economic stability are more difficult to overcome by 
host countries.
87
  
 
The above are issues that are beyond the control of the CDM and are entirely within the 
control of the host country. Obviously, the CDM can only provide tools, such as the V & R 
requirements, that can lead to policy reforms and promote sustainable development within 
host countries, but, it cannot solve fundamental issues and challenges which are specific to 
host countries, and are not connected to CDM projects. Furthermore, this thesis 
acknowledges that the CDM is not the exclusive solution to promoting and achieving 
sustainable development in developing countries. There are other international efforts such as 
national action plan on achieving sustainable development and national strategies to reduce 
poverty.
 88
 In addition, there are other international treaties that aim to promote sustainable 
development in developing countries, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
deplete the Ozone Layer (protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer). The Convention and its Protocol are designed to protect the ozone layer, by phasing 
out the production of substances believed to be responsible for ozone depletion. This 
encourages the transfer of environmentally safe and sound technology (EST) to developing 
countries, which in turn promotes sustainable development.
89
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1.6 The CDM Project Cycle  
1.6.1 Eligibility to Participate  
 
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties to the KP can participate in the mechanism.
90
 To 
participate, both the Annex I Party and the non-Annex I Party must participate voluntarily, 
have ratified the Protocol and have designated a national authority, known as the DNA.
91
 In 
addition, private and public entities of both Parties can participate and acquire CER credits 
from CDM projects.
92
  
1.6.2 Rules Governing the CDM 
 
The rules governing the CDM are contained in the CDM Rules. It establishes the procedure 
for fulfilling the V & R requirements and the implementation of the CDM. For example, the 
CDM Rules outline the V & R requirements for proposed CDM projects, as well as the role 
and functions of CDM actors.  
1.6.3 Key Actors Involved in the CDM and the CDM Registration Process
93
   
 
The CDM is supervised by the EB, which is under the authority and guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol (COP/MOP).
94
 
The DOE is an independent body that acts on behalf of the EB. It validates and recommends 
that proposed projects be registered as CDM projects. The DNA is the national agency in 
charge of CDM activities and project approval.
95
 Annex I and non-Annex I Parties must 
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 Article 12(3) KP.   
91
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establish a DNA in order to participate in the CDM.
96
 The CDM registration process and the 
institutional bodies responsible for each of the steps are outlined in Figure 1.1.below. 
Figure 1.1: The CDM Project Cycle 
 
Source: A. Kollmuss, 2008
97
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1.6.3 (i) CDM Project Registration Process 
 
Validation is the process of independent evaluation of a project by a DOE against the V & R 
requirements,
98
 and registration is the formal acceptance by the EB of a validated project as a 
CDM project. The process of validation and registration is the prerequisite for the 
verification, certification and issuance of CERs related to a CDM project.
99
  
 
There are three documents required for the validation and registration of a proposed CDM 
project: the PDD; the validation report; and the LoA from the DNA of the host country 
confirming that the proposed CDM project will assist it in achieving sustainable 
development.
100
 To validate a project, the DOE selected by the project participants conducts a 
desk review of the PDD and other supporting documents, as well as a site visit, if deemed 
necessary. If the DOE is not satisfied with the fulfilment of the V & R requirements, it may 
request further action and an amendment to the PDD or it may refuse to validate the proposed 
project. Refusal to validate a proposed project is very rare. Although there is no evidence for 
this statement, this author speculates that it is because the DOE is paid by the project 
participants for its validation services. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the DOE will work 
with project participants to ensure that proposed CDM projects are validated. The research 
for this thesis has not discovered any instance where the DOE has refused to validate a 
proposed project.
101
 Upon the completion of the desk review (and site visit where 
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100
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 See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5 for further discussion on the possible conflict of interest situation that could 
30 
 
undertaken), the DOE will issue a validation report. The validation report contains 
confirmation that the V & R requirements for CDM projects have been fulfilled by the 
project participants.
102
  
 
The final validation report is submitted to the EB with a request that the proposed project be 
registered as a CDM project.
103
 Upon appraisal, the EB may approve the project for 
registration, request a project review, or reject the proposed project.
104
 A project will be 
considered registered 8 weeks after the date of receipt of the request for registration by the 
EB, unless a Party involved in the project or at least three members of the EB express 
concerns,
105
 in which event, the project enters a review phase. The EB must complete its 
review within 30 days.
106
 Once a project has been registered, it enters into the implementation 
and the monitoring stage.  
1.7 Alternatives to the CDM: Voluntary Emission Reduction (VER) 
Standards  
 
In addition to the CDM, there are other carbon standards that regulate emission reduction 
projects. The differences between these and the CDM are that: the projects implemented 
under the various standards are implemented voluntarily; some of the standards have stricter 
rules than the CDM; they require additional steps before a project can be registered or 
certified by them; and the credits earned from such projects cannot be used for compliance 
                                                                                                                                                        
result from this. 
102
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purposes. However, like the CDM, these projects earn credits for each tonne of CO2 avoided 
or reduced as a result of the implementation of the project. VER projects are usually 
undertaken voluntarily by businesses and entities.  
 
The various VER standards ensure quality and a robust programme of certification and 
verification for voluntary projects. The GS is a premium label for CDM projects and 
voluntary carbon offset that is committed to promoting sustainable development through the 
carbon offset markets.
107
 Furthermore, the GS is considered the highest level of VER 
certification.
108
 The process of certification under the GS involves the entire CDM V & R 
requirements, in addition to further steps that ensure that projects promote sustainable 
development.
109
 The GS certification of CDM projects is limited to energy efficiency and 
renewable energy projects.
110
 This is because these types of CDM projects are considered 
important for climate change mitigation and are more likely to promote sustainable 
development.
111
 A CDM project that wishes to be certified as a GS CDM project goes 
through the required CDM V & R process in addition to a strict set of guidelines stipulated by 
the GS Foundation, in order to achieve GS certification.
112
 Such certification is however 
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voluntary, but a CDM project certified as a GS CDM project commands a higher price in the 
carbon market.
113
 The GS requirements will be analysed comparatively against the CDM V & 
R requirements, in Chapter 3 infra.
114
 The following carbon standards also provide 
certification to VER projects. 
  
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) is a quality standard for voluntary carbon offset industry. It 
is based on the CDM and it establishes criteria for validating, measuring and monitoring 
voluntary carbon offset projects.
115
 The Social Carbon Standard certifies VER projects for 
their contributions to sustainable development.
116
 Green-e Climate programme is a 
certification programme for offsets offered by carbon brokers in the voluntary market. The 
programme complements the VER standards by ensuring that carbon brokers obtain and 
retire correct volumes and types of emissions reductions on behalf of customers.
117
 Green-e 
Climate is the first and only consumer protection programme for carbon offsets. Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) is a rigorous standard for evaluating land-
based carbon projects.
118
 The standard registers land-based climate change mitigation 
projects that simultaneously generate climate, biodiversity and sustainable development 
benefits. The next chapter examines sustainable development generally and in the context of 
the CDM. 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 This is because GS CER buyers are willing to pay a higher premium for high quality CDM projects that not 
only lead to reduction in emissions, but also sustainability benefits to the host community. 
114
 See Chapter 3 for justification. 
115
 http://www.v-c-s.org/ (VCS website, 16/4/2012). 
116
 http://www.socialcarbon.org/  (Social Carbon website, 16/4/2012). 
117
 http://www.green-e.org/about.shtml (Green-e website, 16/4/2012). 
118
 http://www.climate-standards.org/mission/index.html (CCBA website, 16/4/2012). 
33 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CDM 
 
“The biggest challenge for sustainable development in coming decades will be to 
operationalise it: to make it occur, or to make an effective transition toward it…”  
- John C. Dernbach119 
 
“If, however there is to be international accountability for achieving sustainability, whether 
globally or nationally, then it must be clear what the criteria for measuring this standard 
are…”  
- Boyle and Freestone120 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine sustainable development in the context of the 
CDM. However, in order to do this, it is important to: briefly explore sustainable 
development as a concept in international law. This Chapter answers the first sub-research 
question: what is the meaning of sustainable development in international law and the CCR? 
This Chapter is divided into 2 sections. Section 2.2 discusses the meaning and institutional 
framework for sustainable development and examines if, and how, sustainable development 
is being governed and implemented in international law. Section 2.3 examines the 
governance and implementation of sustainable development in the CCR and it explores the 
meaning of sustainable development in the UNFCCC and CDM. The term ‘governance’ is 
used in this thesis to mean the role of institutions, processes, structures, and guiding 
                                                 
119J. Dernbach, ‘Achieving sustainable development: the centrality and multiple facets of integrated decision-
making’ (2003)10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 247 at pg. 247.  
120
 A. Boyle and D. Freestone, ‘Introduction’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and 
Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
1 at pg. 7. 
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principles that provide an enabling framework for implementing commitments to sustainable 
development.  
2.2 Sustainable Development in a Changing World
121
 
The idea of sustainable development can be traced back to the United Nations Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment.
122
 The Conference adopted a ‘Declaration of 
Principles for the Preservation and Enhancement of the Human Environment’ and an ‘Action 
Plan’ consisting of 109 recommendations for environmental action at the international 
level.
123
 The conference reinforced national responsibility for environmental protection, 
officially recognised the need for cooperative international action and began to merge the 
environment into considerations for development.
124
 However, the conference did not suggest 
a way to reconcile the competing interest of development and environmental protection, 
which eventually emerged as sustainable development. 
 
Sustainable development emerged in 1987, when the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED) (hereinafter referred to as the Brundtland Commission) published 
its report ‘Our Common Future.’ The Commission defined sustainable development as 
                                                 
121
This chapter will not explore the different theoretical approaches and definitions of sustainable development. 
See following texts and articles on sustainable development: A. Dobson, Green Political Thought 4
th
 edn. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: 
Transforming Law and Governance (Aldershot: Ashgate 2008); S. Dresner, The Principle of Sustainability, 2
nd
 
edn. (London: Earthscan, 2002);T. O’Riordan, ‘The politics of sustainability’ in R. Turner (ed.), Sustainable 
Environmental Management: Principles and Practice (London: Belhaven , 1993);   A. Ross, ‘Modern 
Interpretations of Sustainable Development’ (2009) 36 (1) JLS 32-54; V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable development and 
unsustainable Arguments’ in A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19-35;  N. 
Schrijver and F. Weiss (eds.), International law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Leiden: 
Nifhoff, 2004); and M. Segger and A. Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and  
Prospect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); T. O’Riordan and Heather Voisey (eds.), The Transition to 
Sustainability: The Politics of Agenda 21in Europe (London: Earthscan, 1988). 
122
 Report of the UN Conference on Human Environment. UN Doc A/CONF.48/14 (1972).  
123
 Ibid. Also see P. Sands and P. Galizzi (ed.), Documents in International Environmental Law 2
nd
 edn. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3. 
124
 For instance, Principle 21 affirms the responsibilities of states to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction do not cause damage in another state or beyond national jurisdiction. 
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“[d]evelopment which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.”125 In its definition, the Commission goes on state 
that overriding priority should be given to the essential needs of the world's poor.
126
  
2.2.1 Issues with the Commission’s Definition 
 
 Although there is a general consensus amongst nations and institutions that sustainable 
development is an ideal that all should strive to achieve,
127
 its precise meaning, principle and 
implementation remains elusive in international law. Consequently, this has opened the term 
up to several debates. In addition to the definition advanced by the Brundtland Commission, 
many other authors and writers also advanced various definitions of the concept. In 1996, 
Fowke and Prasad identified at least 80 different, often competing or contradictory, 
definitions of sustainable development.
128
 Some definitions favour strong sustainability while 
others favour weak sustainability.
129
 Strong sustainability is based on the belief that ‘natural 
capital’ is not substitutable with ‘man-made capital’.130 On the other hand, weak 
sustainability is based on the belief that ‘natural capital’ (non-renewable resources) can be 
substituted with ‘man-made capital’ (machineries, roads ports etc.) and that what matters to 
future generations is the total stock available to them and not whether it is ‘natural’ or ‘man-
                                                 
125
 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 43. 
126
 Ibid. 
127
 E. Neumayer, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms 3
rd
 edn.  
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010), 1. 
128
 R. Fowke and D. Prasad, ‘Sustainable development, cities and local government’ (1996) 33 Australian 
Planner, 61. Also see A. Ross ‘Why legislate for sustainable development? an examination of sustainable 
development provisions in UK and Scottish Statutes’ (2008) 20 JEL 35 at 39. 
129
 K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance, 26.  See also: D. Pearce 
et al., Blue Print 3: Measuring Sustainable Development (London: Earthscan, 1993), 16; A. Ross, ‘It’s time to 
get serious—why legislation is needed to make sustainable development a reality in the UK’ (2010) 2 
Sustainability 1101 at pg. 1106; A. Rieu -Clarke, International Law and Sustainable Development: Lessons 
from the Law of International Watercourses (London: IWA Publishing, 2005), 56; and C.Stone, Should Trees 
Have Standing? : and other Essays on Law, Morals and the Environment (New York: Oceana, 1996). 
130
 E. Neumayer, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms, 1. See 
also: E. Goldsmith et al., Blueprint for Survival (London: Tom Stacey, 1972); D. Meadows et al., The Limits to 
Growth (New York: Universal Books, 1972); H. Daly, ‘Elements of environmental macroeconomics’ in D. 
Constanza (ed.), Ecological Economics: The Science and Management of Sustainability (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 32-46. 
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made’ capital.131  
 
In Bosselmann’s summary of both approaches, he opines that criticism of the growth 
paradigm inspired the first camp’s vision of strong sustainability as the counter-model to 
economic domination, while the position of the weak sustainability camp became popular 
with all political affiliations because they consider growth (development) as an integral part 
of the new concept of sustainable development (environment)
 
.
132
 However, in recent years, 
the focus of literature has moved from attempting to define what sustainable development is, 
to describing it. For example, the International Law Association’s (ILA) New Delhi 
Declaration did not attempt to define sustainable development, but rather states that “[t]he 
objective of sustainable development involves a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
economic, social and political processes, which aims at the sustainable use of natural 
resources of the Earth and the protection of the environment on which nature and human life, 
as well as social and economic development depend, … with due regard to the needs and 
interests of future generations.
133
 French suggests that “[s]ustainable development is founded 
upon the argument that economic development and environmental protection are not 
mutually exclusive goals, but that both must be concurrently attained if improvements are to 
be seen in global human welfare.”134 Bosselmann proffers a more radical view of sustainable 
development. He suggests that in order for sustainable development to have any meaning, it 
is crucial to re-emphasise the ecological core of the concept and that ecology should be the 
foundation on which the other pillars of sustainable development – the social and economic 
                                                 
131
 E. Neumayer, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms, 1. See 
also K. Arrow et al., ‘Economic growth, carrying capacity and the environment’ (1995) 268 Science 520-521; 
D. Pearce et al., Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan, 1989); and P. Bartelmus, Environment, 
Growth and Development: The Concepts and Strategies of Sustainability (New York: Routledge, 1994) .  
132
 K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance, 26. 
133
 ILA ‘New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development’ (2002) 
2(2), International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 209-216.  
134
 D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, 2 
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components - should rest.
135
 He argues that placing the three pillars of sustainable 
development on the same level is misleading, and deviates from the core concept of 
sustainable development.
136
 
 
Despite their differences, the common thread that runs through these definitions is that: 
sustainable development is an ideal that should be attained by all; the needs of the present and 
future generations must be taken into account in decision making; poverty must be eradicated 
and priority should be given to the needs of the world’s poor; the environment must be 
protected and its resources used in a sustainable manner; and in addition, there must be an 
integration of economic, social and environmental protection to achieve sustainable 
development. Therefore, the concept of sustainable development establishes that the present 
generation has a responsibility to future generations to use natural resources in a sustainable 
manner, such that future generations have access to the same resources to aid their own 
development process. It also seeks to encourage the integration of these considerations into 
policy choices, as well as into everyday human living choices. Ultimately, sustainable 
development aims to achieve an acceptable outcome for present and future generations.
137
  
 
Despite the unsettled nature of sustainable development, it is generally accepted that 
sustainable development consists of three core pillars of economic and social development 
and environmental protection and that these three pillars should be mutually reinforcing and 
                                                 
135
 K. Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance, Chapter 1. 
136
 Ibid. at 11. According to him, ‘sustainable development does not call for a balancing act between the needs 
of people living today and the needs of people living in the future, nor for a balancing act between economic, 
social and environmental needs. The notion of sustainable development… calls for development based on 
ecological sustainability in order to meet the needs of people living today and in the future. 
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 D. Tarlock, ‘Ideas without institutions: the paradox of sustainable development’ (2001) 9 Indian Journal of 
Global Legal Studies, 42. 
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integrated to achieve sustainable development.
138
 However, it is the varying priority afforded 
to each of the three pillars by different interpretations of sustainable development which 
creates the unsettling and vague nature of the term. Subsequent international law declarations 
and other soft law documents have gone on to affirm the three pillars. For example, the 
‘Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action’ made the 
explicit linkage between social and economic development and environmental protection as 
essential pillars that have to be integrated to achieve sustainable development.
139
 Paragraph 6 
of the Declaration states that “[w]e are deeply convinced that economic development, social 
development and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing 
components of sustainable development...” 
 
However, apart from affirming the three pillars of sustainable development, international law 
declarations and other soft law documents also provide, in many ways, a new 
conceptualisation of sustainable development. Subsequent international law declarations and 
soft law documents have broadened the pillars of sustainable development to include such 
issues as good governance and poverty eradication. According to French, these various 
declarations and soft law documents expand the concept of sustainable development.
140
 For 
example, in 2002, while Paragraph 2 of the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
                                                 
138
 See the following: J. Vogler, ‘The international politics of sustainable development’ in G. Atkinson et al 
(eds.), Handbook of Sustainable Development (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 430 at  
437; J. Strachan et al., The Plain Language Guide to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (London: 
Earthscan, 2005), 3; T. Strange and A. Bayley, Sustainable Development: Linking Economy, Society, 
Environment (Paris, OECD Insights, 2008), 27; B. Dalal-Clayton and S. Bass, Sustainable Development 
Strategies: A Resource Book (London: Earthscan, 2002), 12. 
139
 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social 
Development, 12 March, 1995, UN Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development. See 
also D. Magraw and L. Hawke, ‘Sustainable Development’ in D. Bodansky et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), 613 at pg. 617;  D. French, 
International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, 22. 
140
 French adopts a slightly different approach in defining the pillars or components of sustainable development. 
He suggests that sustainable development can be divided into four core elements of environment, economy, 
equity and empowerment. See D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, 22.   
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Sustainable Development (WSSD) reaffirms the continued efforts to promote the integration 
of the three components of economic development, social development and environmental 
protection as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars, it went a step further by 
including poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption, and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social 
development, as overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable 
development.
141
 Also, the outcome of the comments received in preparation for the recently 
held Rio+20’s142 theme on institutional framework for sustainable development states that 
good governance should be seen as a fourth pillar of sustainable development.
143
 The 
outcome of Rio+20, ‘The Future We Want’,  in its means of implementation of the 
sustainable development goals states in Paragraph 252 that “…good governance and the rule 
of law at the national and international levels are essential for sustained, inclusive and 
equitable economic growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and 
hunger.”144 
 
2.2.2 Principles of Sustainable Development 
The principles of sustainable development are important for the implementation of 
sustainable development.
145
 This is because the principles of sustainable development 
provide a framework for the implementation of sustainable development. However, just as 
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Programme of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 
(2002).  
142
 http://www.earthsummit2012.org/conference/themes (Earth Summit 2012 website 3/4/2012). The 
conference marks the 20th anniversary of 1999 UNCED and the 10th anniversary of the 2002 WSSD.  
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 R. Gardiner, ‘Comments on the Prep Com 4 text on “Institutional framework for Sustainable Development”, 
2. Available at www.earthsummit2002.org/es/issues/.../PC4-institutional-framework (Earth Summit website 
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 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil 20-22June 2012 
A/CONF.216/L.1*.  
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 D. French, International Law and Policy of Sustainable Development, 22. See also: A. Rieu-Clarke, 
International Law and Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Law of International Watercourses, 59. 
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with its definition, the principles and normative content of sustainable development remain 
unsettled in international law.
146
 For instance, there have been various attempts to develop 
and set out the principles that will guide the governance and implementation of sustainable 
development in international law.
147
 Some of the studies include: the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD)’s report on the Principles of 
International Law of Sustainable Development;
148
 the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) Draft Covenant on Environment and Development;
149
 and the ILA’s New 
Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development.
150
 
An analysis of the various studies indicates that while they may differ to some extent, there 
are some recurrent themes amongst the three studies, such as: the precautionary principle; 
public participation and access to information and justice; right to development; the right to a 
healthy environment and the protection of the environment by preventing environmental 
harm; integration of the pillars of sustainable development and the interrelationship between 
them; sustainable use of natural resources; eradication of poverty; and equity.   
 
International law scholars have also contributed to the debate on the principles of sustainable 
development in international law. For example, Sands, and Magraw and Hawke, list the 
following as the four core principles of sustainable development: inter-generational equity; 
                                                 
146
 M. Fitzmaurice, Contemporary Issues in International Environmental Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2009), 69. See also: A. Boyle and D. Freestone, ‘Introduction’ in A. Boyle and D. 
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intra-generational equity; the protection of the environment; and the integration of economic, 
social and environmental policies.
151
 Boyle and Freestone identify the following as principles 
of sustainable development: sustainable utilisation of natural resources; integration of 
environmental protection and economic development; inter and intra-generational equity; 
public participation in environmental decision-making; and EIA.
152
 Taken together, the 
various principles proposed by the several studies provide a normative content for sustainable 
development.  
 
Despite the differences about the principles of sustainable development, various international 
law scholars argue that the principle of integration is the most significant and relevant for 
implementation of sustainable development.
153
 According to Voigt, “[d]espite the variability 
of approaches to categorizing the elements of sustainable development, the principle of 
integration remains the most fundamental and operationally significant.”154 Similarly, Segger 
and Khalfan advocate that integration can resolve the differences concerning the principles of 
sustainable development, and guide the effective integration of the environmental, social and 
economic aspects of development.
155
 Dernbach asserts that the principle (integration) holds 
the other principles together in an attempt to operationalise sustainable development,
156
 and 
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 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
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that the other principles, such as the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, and 
public participation, all depend on integrated decision-making.
157
  
 
Although there remain questions about the definition, principles, the interpretation and 
application of the principles and the legal implications of such principles, there is a growing, 
though not universal, acceptance of a legal status for sustainable development with principles 
that can aid its implementation. Many international, regional and national instruments and 
organisations adopt sustainable development as a goal or guiding principle.
158
 Lowe is 
however, not of the persuasion that sustainable development has attained a legal status in 
international law. According to him, “…whatever the label might be, it is itself not a norm; it 
can be no more than a name for a set of norms.”159   
 
Despite the wide acceptance of sustainable development, this does not seem to have been 
translated into practical action and there appears to be a lack of effective governance and 
implementation of sustainable development at all levels.
160
 The next sub-section examines 
this issue in greater detail. 
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2.2.3 Governance and Implementation of Sustainable Development in 
International Law 
 
Governance has always been recognised as a critical tool for advancing sustainable 
development at all levels, through the role of global, regional, national and local 
institutions.
161
 In recent years, many international treaties have stated sustainable 
development as their overall objective, part of their purpose, or an obligation to be achieved 
by the Parties to a treaty. Most of these treaties are in the field of international environmental 
and economic law.
162
 For instance, Article 8(e) of the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) states that Parties should [p]romote environmentally sound and 
sustainable development.
163
 Reference to sustainable development is also found in 
international instruments relating to international economic law and policy. For instance, the 
Preamble to the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
recognises that trade and economic enterprise should be conducted with consideration for, 
inter alia, raising standards of living and ensuring full employment and large and steadily 
growing real income, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, with a view to protecting and 
preserving the environment.
164
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A number of international organisations, programmes and bodies govern sustainable 
development at the global level. For example, international organisations established by 
multinational environmental agreements (MEAs), legally binding treaties and conventions 
with their own secretariats, such as the UNFCCC’s COP/MOP and its EB, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and its COP, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) and its COP. There are also a range of UN commissions, including the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that govern sustainable 
development.
165
  
 
However, notwithstanding all the instruments which incorporate or the number of 
international organisations, programmes and bodies established to govern sustainable 
development, there is growing concern amongst the global community that there are 
challenges with the implementation of sustainable development, as an overarching 
framework or guiding principle.
166
 In fact, it seems the international community, international 
organisations and national governments remain uncertain of ways to ensure its effective 
implementation.
167
 The reasons for the lack of implementation of sustainable development 
includes, inter alia:  
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(i) Lack of coherence and co-ordination amongst the different organisations 
governing sustainable development is one of the major setbacks for the effective 
governance and implementation of sustainable development at all levels. As stated 
earlier, there are a multitude of international organisations, programmes and 
commissions that govern sustainable development. While this setup has its 
advantages, there is bound to be fragmented governance and implementation. For 
instance, some of the UN agencies have been criticised for focusing on only one 
aspect of sustainable development. Each of these organisations and bodies have 
their objectives and mandates and they would sometime act independently, and 
are more likely to implement one or two pillars of sustainable development and 
neglect the other.
168
 For example, the UNCSD has been criticised for focusing on 
the environment aspect of sustainable development alone, and not effectively 
promoting the three pillars of sustainable development.
169
 
(ii) Another major setback is the lack of integration of the three pillars of sustainable 
development to achieve an overarching goal.
170
 For example, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) have been criticised for the emphasis on the social 
aspect of sustainable development over the other pillars of sustainable 
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Nations University Press, 2000), 378 at 394. According to Chasek, “… the CSD has given insufficient attention 
to the key linkages environment and development issues.” Also see J. Drexhage and D. Murphy, ‘Sustainable 
Development: From Brundtland to Rio 2012’, 13. 
170
 Integration is relevant to the success of sustainable development. In fact, sustainable development has been 
described as an inherently integrative concept. S. Jodoin, ‘The Principle of Integration and Interrelationship in 
relation to Human Rights and Social, Economic and Environmental Objectives’, 3. Draft paper available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/papers/CISDL_P6_Integration.pdf . (CISDL 
Website, 10/05/2012).    
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development; only one of its eight goals is dedicated to the environmental aspect 
of sustainable development.
171
  
(iii) Also, the global sustainable development process has little, if any jurisdiction over 
the economic aspect of sustainable development. This is because this aspect of 
sustainable development is usually governed by intergovernmental or regional 
organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Organisation of Petroleum Economic 
Community (OPEC), which have been accused of being less open and more 
influential.
172
 Most of the international organisations involved in the governance 
of sustainable development have specific objectives and mandates which are 
usually related to the social or environmental pillars of sustainable development. 
 
International law scholars have identified different reasons for the lack of implementation of 
sustainable development at both the international and national arena. Some of the reasons 
proffered for the challenges in translating sustainable development into practical action are: 
little understanding of sustainable development and its role in governance;
173
 a disconnect 
between the adoption of sustainable development as a policy tool and the institutional 
structures necessary to implement it;
174
 lack of political will on the part of the international 
                                                 
171
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development at the national level, its findings ring true for the implementation of sustainable development 
generally. 
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community to implement sustainable development;
175
 a disconnect between the wide-ranging 
goals and policies of multilateral processes such as the CCR and national action;
176
 and 
sustainable development still being rooted in the environmental agenda.
177
  
 
The next section considers the governance and implementation of sustainable development in 
the CCR, especially in the CDM process. The effective governance and implementation of 
sustainable development is vital, given the impact of climate change on sustainable 
development and also because as stated in Chapter 1, climate change and sustainable 
development are linked and inseparable. As the IPCC notes, “[i]t is no longer a question of 
whether climate change policy should be understood in the context of sustainable 
development goals; it is a question of how.”178 Consequently, whatever may be regarded as 
the meaning and nature of sustainable development generally, the fact remains that it is one 
of the key principles of the CCR, as well as one of the main objectives of the CDM. 
Furthermore, Drexhage and Murphy observe that, “… climate change has emerged as the de 
facto proxy for addressing sustainable development issues... In many respects climate change 
has determined what a sustainable development approach to implementation would look 
like.”179  
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2.3 Governance and Implementation of Sustainable Development in the 
CCR 
 
The IPCC predicts that climate change will exacerbate existing poverty, especially in 
developing countries if climate change and sustainable development are not linked. 
According to the IPCC, “[t]he impact of climate variability and change, climate policy 
responses, and associated socio-economic development will affect the ability of countries to 
achieve sustainable development goals. Conversely, the pursuit of those goals will in turn 
affect the opportunities for, and success of, climate policies.”180 Therefore, it is impossible to 
have a successful CCR without promoting and achieving sustainable development.
181
  
However, neither the UNFCCC nor the KP defines what sustainable development is for the 
CCR.
182
 This is an important omission given the unsettled nature of sustainable development 
and its various definitions which are sometimes poles apart.
183
 Therefore the following 
section will attempt, through an analysis of relevant sections in both the UNFCCC and the 
KP, to determine what sustainable development is for the CCR. As a starting point, this thesis 
adopts the Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development. 
 
2.3.1 Sustainable Development in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol  
 
Although both the UNFCCC and the KP do not define what sustainable development is for 
the CCR, they both uphold sustainable development as one of the guiding principles of the 
CCR. For instance, Article 3.4 of the UNFCCC
184
 states that Parties have a right to, and 
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should, promote sustainable development. It further specifies that measures adopted in 
response to climate change should be integrated with their national development priorities.
185
 
However, this Article is ambiguous because it does not elaborate on what that ‘right’ entails 
and how it should be enforced and implemented. According to Voigt, the reason for its 
vagueness can be traced to the negotiating history of the UNFCCC.
186
 During the 
negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, developing countries demanded the inclusion of a 
‘right to development as an inalienable human right’ while developed countries insisted on a 
‘duty to ensure sustainable development’. However, developed countries rejected the 
inclusion of a ‘right to development as an inalienable human right’ on the grounds that it 
could become an avenue for developing countries to demand financial assistance from 
developed countries, while developing countries declined to accept the position of developed 
countries because they feared that a duty to sustainable development could inhibit their 
development aspirations.
187
 Article 3.4 is therefore a middle ground for both positions. This is 
because Article 3.4 does not impose a duty on developing countries to ensure that they take a 
sustainable path to their development and it does not create an inalienable right to 
development. Rather it seems Article 3.4 seeks to raise awareness on the part of all parties to 
pursue sustainable development.      
 
Although Article 2 of the UNFCCC does not specifically mention sustainable 
development,
188
 it states that part of its ultimate objective, in addressing climate change, is to 
                                                 
185
 UNFCCC Article 3(4)  
186
 C. Voigt, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts between Climate 
Measures and WTO Law, 65.  
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 Article 2 states that “the ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
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ensure that food production is not threatened so as to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.
189
 This suggests that the UNFCCC’s concept of sustainable 
development can, for instance, be likened to Voigt’s ecological thresholds of sustainable 
development.
190
 According to Voigt, Article 2 establishes that the protection of the global 
climate system is the overarching priority of the CCR, by setting limits on humans’ 
interaction with the environment.
191
 She further avers that the second part of Article 2 reflects 
the concept of ecological limits (overarching priority), which must be respected and which set 
a limit on how human activates can interfere with the climate system.
192
 Therefore, while 
recognising the overarching priority of the global climate system, mitigating measures 
adopted to address climate change must ensure that economic activities proceed in a 
sustainable manner. Also, the preamble to the UNFCCC affirms that the response to climate 
change (which is an environmental protection issue) should be integrated with the other two 
pillars of sustainable development - social and economic development - in order to ensure 
that the needs of developing countries for sustained economic growth and eradication of 
poverty are taken into account.
193
 Taken together, these paragraphs affirm that sustainable 
development is one of the overarching principles of the CCR and it consists of the three 
pillars of environmental protection, social and economic development. 
 
Similarly, sustainable development features in the KP as one of the principles to be promoted 
by its Parties. Article 2 of the Protocol specifies ways in which Annex I Parties can achieve 
                                                 
189
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their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments in order to promote 
sustainable development.
194
 Some of the measures specified are expansion of energy 
efficiency,
195
 the promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture,
196
 and appropriate reforms in 
relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol.
197
  
 
Taken together, the provisions regarding sustainable development in the UNFCCC and the 
KP indicate that it is a key principle of the regime and that the CCR has a policy mandate for 
the promotion of sustainable development as a right of all Parties. The next section will 
examine sustainable development and the CDM, which is the main focus of this thesis.  
 
2.3.2 Sustainable Development and the CDM 
 
Promoting sustainable development, through the implementation of CDM projects, is one of 
the dual objectives of the CDM. However, an analysis of Article 12 shows that there is no 
actual definition of the ‘sustainable development’ that CDM projects are expected to 
promote.
198
 For instance, rather than define what sustainable development is,  Article 12(2) 
only describes sustainable development as one of the purposes of the CDM and it does not 
indicate how that purpose should be fulfilled.
199
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Furthermore, Article 12 is more forthcoming on the benefits of the CDM for Annex I 
countries than for non-Annex I countries. For instance, while Article 12(3) (a) states that 
“[p]arties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in certified 
emission reductions”, without elaborating on what those ‘benefits’ would be, Article 12(3) 
(b) explicitly states that “[p]arties included in Annex I may use the certified emission 
reductions accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3....” 
 
Equally important is the fact that sustainable development is not listed as one of the 
requirements that a proposed CDM project will be judged on before it is certified and 
awarded CERs. Article 12(5), which specifies the eligibility criteria for CDM projects, does 
not include a sustainable development criterion for eligibility of CDM projects. It however 
lists the cost-effective emission reduction objective of the CDM as an eligibility criterion for 
CDM projects. Specifically, it states that “[e]mission reductions resulting from each project 
activity shall be certified by operational entities… on the basis of: (a) [v]oluntary 
participation approved by each Party involved; (b) [r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits 
related to the mitigation of climate change; and (c) [r]eductions in emissions that are 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.” This 
suggests that a CDM project’s contribution to achieving sustainable development will not be 
given the same priority as the objective of cost-effective emission reductions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
development objectives?’ Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO) Working 
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Furthermore, as a result of the dual objectives of the CDM, there is a continuing debate on 
whether, from the language of Article 12(2), there is a priority between the CDM’s dual 
objectives. Huq and Reid have suggested a prioritisation between the twin objectives of the 
CDM. According to them, the reduction of emissions is the first objective of the CDM, 
followed by a second objective to assist CDM host countries in achieving sustainable 
development.
200
 However, the negotiations leading to the creation of the CDM do not support 
Huq and Reid’s position. Analysis of the negotiations indicates that achieving sustainable 
development in developing countries is at par with the CDM’s other objective of cost-
effective emission reduction for developed countries.
201
 What can be said of the negotiations 
leading to the creation of the CDM is that both parties (developed and developing) tried to 
build their interest into what emerged as the CDM: for countries with emission reduction 
commitments, the flexibility to explore other means to achieve their emission reduction 
commitments without the burden of financial penalty for non-compliance; and for developing 
countries, financial mechanism to assist them in achieving sustainable development.
202
  
 
An analysis of the provisions of Article 12(2) of the Protocol does not suggest such hierarchy 
in their objectives. In fact the wordings of Article 12(2) seem to suggest that the sustainable 
development objective of the CDM takes precedence over the emission reduction objective of 
the CDM. According to Boyd et al., “[i]ndeed the first statement in the Kyoto Protocol that 
defines the CDM says clearly, ‘the purpose of the Clean Development Mechanism shall be to 
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
                                                 
200
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contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention....’ an ordering which gives clear 
priority by the negotiators to sustainable development.”203 However, as shall be discovered 
later in this thesis, this precedence is not demonstrated in the practical governance and 
application of the objectives of the CDM.  
 
A number of reasons could be proffered for the reluctance of the CDM’s governing body 
towards ensuring the governance, and the effective implementation of the CDM’s sustainable 
development objective - firstly, it could be as a result of the uncertainty surrounding 
sustainable development as a concept in international law and as a tool for governance.
204
 
Secondly, in the course of negotiating the structure of the CDM, different options for 
ensuring project compatibility with sustainable development goals were discussed. The main 
question was whether CDM host countries should establish their own standards and criteria 
for assessing the sustainable development contributions of proposed CDM projects, or 
whether international standards or rules should be formulated to guide CDM host 
countries.
205
 In particular, CDM host countries were concerned about protecting their 
sovereignty right and they were unwilling to accept sustainable development priorities 
imposed on them by the North.
206
 For example, during the negotiations that resulted in the 
CDM rules, developing countries rejected the guidance on sustainable development, which 
was contained in the draft proposal for the CDM rules because they were of the opinion that 
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it will violate their sovereign right to define their development priorities.
207
 For example, the 
draft proposal stated that “[s]ustainable development priorities must be based on the best 
available long-term environmental option, taking into account local and national needs and 
priorities. Technology transfer shall be state-of-the-art and environmentally sound; and 
priority should be given to renewable energy, energy efficiency.”208 This guidance was not 
included in the final text of the CDM rules.
209
  
 
Despite the rationale for developing countries’ position on their sovereign right to define their 
sustainable development, several research studies highlight the dangers in this. For instance, 
according to Sutter, the CDM’s failure to establish international standards or indicators for 
assessing the sustainable development contributions of CDM projects, could lead to a ‘race to 
the bottom’ because in a bid to attract CDM investment, CDM host countries can set low 
sustainability assessment standards for proposed CDM projects.
210
  Furthermore, because the 
CDM involves different stakeholders with unequal power and influence, the stronger 
stakeholder (usually the CDM investor) will be in a better position to influence the terms of 
the CDM project, to the detriment of the weaker stakeholder (usually the host country and the 
host country project participant keen to attract CDM investment). Also, because there are no 
internationally agreed set of criteria and indicators for measuring the sustainable development 
                                                 
207
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contributions of proposed CDM projects, the governance of the sustainable development 
objective of the CDM will likely vary from one host country to the other.
211
   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Sustainable development remains a relevant policy tool in international law, as well as in the 
regional, national and local contexts. Although its meaning, principles and implementation 
remain unsettled in international law, sustainable development is indispensable in the effort 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Likewise, climate change mitigation and adaptation 
efforts can also contribute to the achievement of sustainable development.
212
 
 
Sustainable development is a key principle of the CCR regime. However, sustainable 
development is not defined for the CCR. Although the CDM was established to assist CDM 
host countries in achieving sustainable development, the provisions of Article 12 and the 
CDM rules with regard to the sustainable development objective of the CDM are inadequate. 
As discussed earlier, this is an important omission given the unsettled nature of sustainable 
development in international law, and its various definitions which, sometimes, tend to focus 
on one aspect of sustainable development rather than an effective integration of the whole.  
 
Therefore, one of the key reasons for the current failure of the CDM to deliver on its 
sustainable development mandate is that the CCR particularly Article 12 and the CDM rules 
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do not define the sustainable development that the CDM is established to promote. As a result 
of this omission, there are no minimum standards and guidelines for governance and 
implementation of sustainable development. Without minimum standards and guidance, it is 
unlikely that the CDM will achieve its sustainable development objective. To address this 
inadequacy, internationally-agreed set of criteria and indicators, for measuring the sustainable 
development contributions impact of CDM projects, should be introduced for the CDM. 
These internationally-agreed set of criteria should complement nationally defined criteria and 
indicators for assessing proposed CDM projects where available. The advantage of this is that 
the existence of both standards – international and national – will mitigate possible 
weaknesses in the existing system of sustainability assessment by some host country DNAs, 
while encouraging CDM host countries to build upon the minimum standards.  
 
In view of the current challenges of the CDM to effectively contribute to sustainable 
development in developing countries, this thesis considers in the following three chapters if 
there are shortcomings in the V & R requirements themselves or if the shortcoming is from 
the fulfilment, implementation and supervision of the V & R requirements that contribute to 
the CDM’s failure in achieving its sustainable development objective.213 The next chapter 
assesses these requirements to determine if they are capable of promoting sustainable 
development in CDM host countries. 
  
                                                 
213
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE VALIDATION AND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
FOR CDM PROJECTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the suitability of the V & R requirements in order to 
determine if these requirements can contribute to the sustainable development objective of 
the CDM. As highlighted in Chapter 1, some of the V & R requirements are generally 
regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development in international law, therefore, on 
the face of it, if they are fulfilled, implemented and supervised effectively, they should 
promote sustainable development in CDM host countries.  
 
This chapter analyses the requirements as contained in the CDM rules and the further 
clarifications contained in the CDM Manual, as well as the practical application of these rules 
by CDM project participants. In analysing the V & R requirements, this chapter will use the 
requirements of the GS as a yardstick for measuring the ability of the current V & R 
requirements to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries.
214
 Specifically, this 
chapter will analyse the CDM V & R requirements and compare them to the GS 
Requirements
215
 and the GS Toolkit.
216
 The purpose of this analysis is to determine whether 
features of the GS can be adopted for the CDM, because, the GS requirements have been 
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found to be robust tools for assessing projects’ contribution to sustainable development in 
CDM host countries.
217
  
 
Although there are other voluntary carbon offset standards, the GS was selected for several 
reasons. Firstly, of all the other standards,
218
 the GS is the only standard that places an 
emphasis on the sustainable development benefit of projects and has put mechanisms in place 
to ensure that project participants actively consider the sustainable development impact and 
benefits of their projects. Secondly, GS requires a strict set of criteria that is additional, robust 
and more comprehensive than the V & R requirements.
219
 Thirdly, the GS toolkit provides 
standards, guidelines, detailed instructions and best practices on how project participants 
should fulfil the requirements, something that is currently lacking in the CDM rules. 
Fourthly, the GS is regarded as rigorous and as having the highest level of voluntary emission 
reduction certification.
220
 Although the GS requirements are considered ‘strict’, research has 
shown that GS project participants generally consider the additional GS requirements to be 
manageable.
221
 Finally, comparative analysis of registered CDM and GS projects conclude 
that GS CDM projects have a higher potential to contribute to local sustainable development 
compared to regular CDM projects.
222
   
 
This author acknowledges that despite the advantages of the GS, it is not perfect. For 
instance, the GS only registers renewable energy and demand-side energy efficiency CDM 
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projects. This is an arbitrary definition of sustainable development because other CDM 
projects that could potentially contribute to sustainable development, such as transport and 
waste handling and disposal, are screened out of the GS. Additionally, although project 
participants acknowledge that the additional work and cost required to obtain GS certification 
are manageable, unfortunately, GS certification does not always translate into a higher price 
at the carbon market. This is because compliance buyers show very little interest in the GS as 
it makes no difference if they use conventional CDM credits or GS CDM credits towards 
their emission reduction commitments.
223
   
 
A new regulatory framework is currently being implemented for the CDM, and it is important 
to include the new regulatory framework in the analysis of this chapter.
224
 At its 59th 
Meeting, the EB instituted the CDM Management Plan 2011 with the objective of, among 
other things, achieving greater efficiency in the operation of the CDM.
225
 With specific 
relevance for this thesis, objective 3(b) of the Management Plan states that it aims to clarify, 
consolidate and enhance the consistencies of all the existing regulatory decisions of the EB 
relating to the validation and verification of CDM projects.  
 
Following this, and in response to the inputs of various stakeholders on the need to strengthen 
the governance and implementation of the CDM,
226
 the EB adopted the: CDM Project 
Standard (version 01.0, hereinafter called CDM PS), with the objective of enhancing the 
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 This is despite the fact that the new regulatory framework was instituted just as the corrections to this thesis 
were about to be submitted.  
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 See Paragraph 2 of EB-59, Annex 17. 
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 For instance, see the following: ‘The Gold Standard Foundation Submission’ on the ‘CDM Executive Board 
call for public input on the inclusion of co‐benefits and negative impacts in CDM documentation’. 
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consistency and clarity of the V & R requirements, so as to facilitate and promote a clear and 
common understanding by all parties involved in the CDM;
227
 and Validation and 
Verification Standard which is applicable to DOEs (version 02.0, hereinafter called CDM 
VVS).
228
 Although the CDM rules are still in force and the CDM V & R requirements remain 
the same, the CDM Manual has been cancelled as of May 2012, and replaced with the CDM 
VVS.
229
 The new standards and guidelines seek to provide further clarification to project 
participants, DOEs and other relevant CDM stakeholders involved in the governance and 
implementation of CDM projects. While the analysis in this chapter is based on the CDM 
rules and the CDM Manual, it is important to analyse the new regulatory framework as an 
addendum to the analysis made herein. Consequently, at the end of the discussion of each 
requirement, this chapter will analyse the new rules. The purpose of the analysis is to 
determine if there are improvements in the new regulatory framework for the CDM and if 
such improvements will promote sustainable development in the CDM.   
 
It is also important to note that the analysis made in this chapter is influenced by both 
international and national issues such as state sovereignty, capacity needs of developing 
countries to effectively implement and supervise the CDM V & R requirements, political 
instability in host countries, local rules and regulations that may affect the requirements and 
so on. For example, the sovereignty of CDM host countries limits the extent to which the 
CDM can prescribe detailed procedures for the fulfilment and supervision of some of the V & 
                                                 
227
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228
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R requirements, such as the requirement for EIA. This chapter answers the first part of the 
main research question - to what extent are the V & R requirements suitable for promoting 
sustainable development. 
 
3.2 The Validation and Registration Requirements for CDM Projects  
Before a proposed project can be registered as a CDM project, the project participants must 
fulfil the V & R requirements in respect of that project. It is the responsibility of the DOE, 
being under a contractual relationship with the project participants, to review the PDD and 
any supporting documentation to confirm that the requirements have been fulfilled.
230
   
 
 The V & R requirements are described and analysed below, alongside relevant clarifications 
in the CDM Manual, to determine if the provisions stipulated in the CDM rules can promote 
sustainable development in CDM host countries.
231
  
 
3.2.1 CDM Participation Requirements 
 
To be eligible to participate, Parties must fulfil four requirements, which are: ratification of 
the KP; establishment of a DNA; confirmation of voluntary participation and written 
confirmation by the host Party DNA that the proposed CDM project assists it in achieving 
sustainable development.
232
 The participation requirements, including the further 
clarifications contained in the CDM Manual, are discussed separately below. There is no 
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corresponding requirement in the GS, therefore the GS will not be considered for the first 
three requirements. However, the requirement for confirmation of contribution to sustainable 
development will be analysed alongside the GS requirement.    
 
(a) Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
The requirement for ratification applies to both Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
233
 
Currently, 192 countries have ratified the Protocol.
234
 Afghanistan is the only developing 
country, and the United States of America (USA) the only developed country, that has not 
ratified the Protocol (USA has signed, but not ratified it).
235
 Apart from ensuring that 
participating countries have ratified the KP, Curnow and Hodes advise CDM investors to 
ensure that the ratification process has been completed satisfactorily according to national 
rules and regulations by the host country, such as national rules that require that international 
treaties be enacted into domestic legislation in order for it to be implemented locally.
236
 The 
new regulatory framework has not changed this requirement and as a result of that, it will not 
be necessary to discuss this further.  
(b) Instituting a Designated National Authority 
The DNA of a country acts as the principal point of contact for the CDM within and outside 
that country.
237
 It approves participation in CDM projects and, in addition, the DNAs of non-
Annex I Parties confirm that proposed CDM projects assist in achieving sustainable 
                                                 
233
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs 30 and 37(a).  
234
 ‘Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’ 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php  (UNFCCC Website, 16/3/ 2012).  
235
 Ibid. 
236
 P. Curnow and G. Hodes (eds.), Implementing CDM Projects: Guidebook to Host Country Legal Issues, 20. 
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development. Therefore, the DNA has key functions in the CDM, including to: establish the 
approval procedure for CDM projects (Annex I and non-Annex I Party DNAs); confirm 
voluntary participation of project participants (Annex I and non-Annex I Party DNAs); 
confirm sustainable development contribution of projects (non-Annex I Party DNAs); and 
issue LoAs for the purposes of validation and registration (Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties).
238
 In addition to its stated functions, host country DNAs also have the option of 
playing discretionary roles, such as capacity building and promotional activities, and the 
assessment of technical aspects of proposed projects (e.g. baselines and additionality).
239
 As 
of 1
st
 February 2012, 160 countries, consisting of 32 Annex I and 128 non-Annex I Parties 
have established DNAs.
240
 The new regulatory framework has not changed this requirement 
and as such, the analysis made below is based on the CDM rules.  
 
The CDM rules relating to the establishment of DNAs simply provide that countries should 
establish DNAs. However, considering the importance of the DNA in the CDM approval 
process, especially with regard to the approval of projects and confirmation that proposed 
projects assist in achieving sustainable development, the CDM rules provide very little 
guidance on the role and functions of a DNA.
241
 Therefore, Parties wishing to participate in 
the CDM are left to define and determine the role, strength, and visibility of their DNAs.
242
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The lack of guidance on the role and function of DNAs will likely impact, in varying degrees, 
host countries’ participation in the CDM, this is because some host countries may lack the 
capacity and adequate institutional structure required to establish an efficient DNA structure. 
For example, in her comparison of host country DNAs, Lokey noted that while most host 
country DNAs are located within the country’s ministry of environment or energy (with the 
associated bureaucracy that goes with ministries), some other host countries, (such as Peru, 
Ecuador and Argentina), have thriving DNA offices that are commercial offices, privately 
and independently run on revenues from completing the CDM project cycles for prospective 
developers.
243
 While both arrangements will have their advantages and disadvantages, Lokey 
notes that the degree to which a DNA office is independent and active in the local community 
is one of the contributory factors that determine if a country achieves its CDM potential or 
not.
244
  A well-structured DNA office, with clear powers and responsibilities, will enrich the 
CDM process and facilitate the implementation of CDM projects. On the other hand, if the 
DNA office created is not well-suited to the needs of the host country, it may lead to internal 
power struggles between ministries and a haphazard approval process.  
 
Although not stipulated in the CDM rules, the DNAs established by Parties, particularly 
developing host country Parties, must be capable of establishing an approval procedure for 
proposed CDM projects, and be capable of assessing proposed projects for their sustainable 
development contribution.
245
 However, without establishing an approval procedure and 
assessment criteria for sustainable development, it is more likely that the DNA will simply 
                                                                                                                                                        
DNA operation: Lessons from different DNA settings in non-Annex-B countries, 11. 
243
 E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development under the Clean Development Mechanism: A Guide for 
Latin America, 150.   
244
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245
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issue LoAs and confirmation of sustainable development contribution routinely. Several 
authors have highlighted that the DNA has substantial influence on guiding proposed CDM 
projects to ensure that they contribute to the country’s sustainable development priorities.246 
However, many DNAs have not been able to put this influence to effective use due to, inter 
alia, a lack of defined criteria for assessing projects and inability to effectively apply these 
criteria to assess proposed CDM projects. Hayashi and Michaelowa, in their research on the 
structure of DNAs in Asia, Latin America and South-Eastern Europe, established that 
although most DNAs have defined sustainable development criteria for proposed CDM 
projects, there is little evidence that most DNAs have been able to define concrete methods to 
effectively assess CDM projects against their defined sustainable development criteria.
247
  
 
Research studies have suggested ways for Parties to establish successful and efficient 
DNAs.
248
 For instance, Olivas advocates that an initial assessment should be conducted 
before establishing a DNA.
249
 She suggests that the assessment process should consider two 
broad elements; the political situation in the country that could affect the CDM and the 
current technical knowledge and know-how that is available in the country.
250
 Once the initial 
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assessment has been carried out, Olivas provides a general framework that could guide 
Parties in establishing a DNA. She proposes three steps for Parties wishing to establish a 
DNA. Firstly, host countries must clearly define the aims and objectives of the DNA office, 
while promoting national sustainable development goals. Secondly, host countries must 
provide the DNA with an official status, which may come from national legislation, a 
presidential or ministerial decree, or other similar legal instrument.
251
 Thirdly, host countries 
must review and establish a national legal framework for CDM project implementation.
252
 
 
The framework suggested is a broad framework, and the process adopted for establishing a 
DNA is not cast in iron, so, each country can tailor the above process to its national 
circumstances. The important factor is that the institution established should have the 
capacity to act as an effective DNA, performing the functions that will allow the country to 
effectively assess and approve proposed projects, while actively promoting projects that align 
with nationally-defined sustainable development priorities.
253
 
 
Depending on its national circumstances, a country could adopt any of the following five 
structures of DNA: single government model; two-unit model; inter-ministerial model; 
foreign direct investment (FDI) piggyback model; and outsourcing model.
254
 For the single 
government model, the same government department undertakes project approval and CDM 
promotion activities in a country. Hayashi and Michaelowa note that although this is a cost 
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saving measure, it could lead to conflicts of interest where the DNA is in charge of approving 
projects and, at the same time, attracting investors through CDM promotional activities.
255
 
The two-unit model involves the creation of two distinct arms within the DNA, one 
responsible for regulations and the other responsible for CDM promotional activities. Unlike 
the single government model, the two unit model will be independent and will rarely 
encounter conflict of interest situations in the performance of their responsibilities.
256
 The 
inter-ministerial model consists of representatives from all relevant government departments, 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Environment. This model has the added advantage 
of expertise and varied experience among its members because its members, drawn from 
different government departments, are involved in the approval process. However, just as in 
the single government model, this arrangement can lead to conflicts of interest and power 
struggles among the different departments.
257
 The FDI model involves adopting the FDI’s 
institutional framework to establish a DNA office.
258
 Finally, the outsourcing model involves 
outsourcing the administration and functions of the DNA to an independent agency. The 
agency will be responsible for approving proposed projects and communicating its approval 
decisions to the relevant government agency. This model requires stringent supervision by 
the government agency in order to ensure that projects that support the sustainable 
development objectives, in the case of host country, and quality projects generally, are being 
approved by the independent agency.
259
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Michaelowa recommends a single unit, such as the single government model discussed above 
as the ideal DNA structure for Parties.
260
 In the alternative, he recommends a two-tiered 
organisation such as the two-unit model discussed above as a second-best option.
261
 Curnow 
and Hodes advocate the two-unit model and cited Peru’s DNA structure as an example. 
Peru’s DNA is structured after this model, Peru established two distinct DNA agencies for 
CDM activities; the Ministry for Environment (MINAM) acts as the DNA agency regulating 
CDM project activities, while the National Fund for the Environment (FONAM) is the DNA 
agency responsible for promoting CDM project development in Peru.
262
  
 
To avoid the conflict of interest situations that can arise from some of the models above, it is 
recommended that Parties should establish the two-unit model DNA agencies. This model is 
ideal because the CDM has a regulatory and a commercial aspect and it will likely be 
ineffective for a single agency to be in charge of these two distinct aspects. The separation of 
functions traditionally performed by one agency, into two distinct agencies, with distinct 
roles, will enhance the regulatory capacities of the agencies, while avoiding possible conflicts 
of interest situations that could arise where a single agency is responsible for regulating and 
promoting CDM activities in the CDM host country. Apart from their regulatory 
responsibilities, provided in the CDM rules, DNAs should be commercially inclined in order 
to attract CDM investment that will also contribute to national sustainable development goals 
and priorities. These goals and priorities may be set out in a variety of places, including the 
host country’s constitution, relevant strategies, plans, guidance and policy for sustainable 
development.  
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Ultimately, a CDM structure that is well-suited to national circumstances will enhance the 
ability of the DNA to ensure that CDM projects contribute to the country’s sustainable 
development goals. The new regulatory framework has not changed this requirement, and as 
a result, it will not be necessary to discuss this further.  
 
c) Voluntary Participation of Parties 
Paragraph 28 of the CDM rules states that “[p]articipation in a CDM project activity is 
voluntary”.  Therefore, the rule makes it clear that there is no obligation on Parties, both 
developed and developing countries and their entities, to participate in the CDM. However, 
while paragraph 28 is silent on who should make the confirmation of voluntary participation 
and how, paragraph 40(a) of the CDM rules clarifies paragraph 28. It affirms that the DOE 
must have received written confirmation of voluntary participation in the LoA from the DNA 
of each Party involved in the CDM project.
263
 In validating voluntary participation, the CDM 
Manual provides that the DOE shall determine that the requirement in the CDM rules with 
regards to participation has been fulfilled.
264
 However, as a further clarification, the CDM 
Manual provides that if the DOE is in doubt about the authenticity of the LoA, the DOE shall 
verify with the issuing DNA that the LoA is authentic.
265
  
 
It is unlikely that there will be circumstances where a developing country will be 
participating involuntarily in the CDM. This is because the CDM rules provide safeguards 
against undue influence in instances where an Annex I country or an international 
organisation is directly involved in a CDM project. For instance, the CDM rules requires all 
PDDs to provide confirmation that the funding for the CDM project does not result in 
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diversion of official development assistance (ODA). As a result, the ability of developing 
countries to obtain ODAs is not connected to their participation in the CDM.
266
 Furthermore, 
State entities are not the only entities involved in CDM projects, private entities from Annex I 
and non-Annex I Parties also participate in the CDM, and it is unlikely that they can compel a 
developing country to participate involuntarily in a proposed CDM project. The new 
regulatory framework has not changed this requirement and as a result of that, it will not be 
necessary to discuss this further.  
(d) Confirmation from Host Party DNA that a Project Assists it in Achieving 
Sustainable Development 
Paragraph 40(a) of the CDM rules requires the host country DNA to confirm in the LoA that 
the project assists it in achieving sustainable development. In addition, the CDM Manual 
provides that the DOE shall ascertain that the LoA by the DNA of the host Party confirms 
that the proposed CDM project will contribute to the sustainable development of the host 
Party.
267
  
 
The provision that CDM projects should contribute to the sustainable development objectives 
of CDM host countries is an important provision because it goes to the root of the objective 
of the CDM. Furthermore, this function of the DNA is regarded as one of its key functions, 
because, in this regard, the DNA is responsible for ensuring that projects implemented within 
its country will actually contribute to the country’s sustainable development.268 Therefore, it 
is envisaged that in confirming that the proposed CDM project assists it to achieve 
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sustainable development, the DNA of the CDM host country would only approve projects 
that actually contributes to its sustainable development.
269
  
 
However, the provision in the CDM rules relating to this function is vague. The rules only 
require confirmation from the DNA that the proposed CDM project will assist it in achieving 
sustainable development. The CDM rules do not provide guidance on how DNAs should 
assess the sustainable development contribution of proposed CDM projects. It simply 
provides that the DNA should confirm that a project assists it in achieving sustainable 
development and nothing else. The CDM Manual simply repeats the provisions in the CDM 
rules.
270
 
 
As a result, the procedure for sustainability assessment and approval of CDM projects will 
vary significantly between countries and different host countries will have different approval 
procedures for assessing and confirming the sustainable development contributions of CDM 
projects.
271
 For example, Table 3.1 below provides a snapshot of the sustainable development 
criteria for proposed projects in India, China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Morocco and 
Armenia. The seven host countries adopt the checklist approach for assessing the sustainable 
development contributions of proposed CDM projects. However, an overview of the table 
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indicates that ‘criteria’ differ from one country to the other.272 For example, the sustainable 
development criteria for CDM projects in India, South Africa and Morocco are defined along 
the traditional sustainable development dimensions of social, economic, environmental and 
technological development. For Brazil and Mexico, CDM projects must conform to existing 
sustainable development policies. In addition, Brazil and Mexico also require that CERs 
achieved from CDM projects should be monitored annually via the submission of a validation 
report to the DNA. On the other hand, China defines its priority area for sustainable 
development as energy efficiency and methane recovery and utilisation projects. To further 
this goal, it uses a discriminatory taxation system to attract projects that promote its 
sustainable development criteria. China levies lower taxes on CERs earned from projects that 
fall within its sustainable development priority areas and it levies higher taxes on projects that 
fall outside its priority areas.
273
 Also, China protects its right to emit GHGs by stipulating that 
companies investing in CDM projects must have at least 51% Chinese ownership. See Table 
3.1 below for a snapshot of the sustainable development criteria for proposed projects in 
India, China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Morocco and Armenia. 
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Table 3.1: Sustainable Development Criteria and Processes for Approval of CDM Projects
1
 
 India  China  Brazil  Mexico  South Africa  Morocco   Armenia 
SD criteria Checklist for: 
1. Social 
2. Economic 
3.Environmental 
and  
4.Technological 
well-being 
Priority area for 
sustainable 
development:   
1.Energy efficiency 
2.Methane recovery 
and utilisation 
 
Discriminatory tax 
based approach: 2% 
tax on CERs from 
priority areas, 30% 
for N2O and 65% 
for HFCs and PFCs 
Checklist for: 
congruence with 
existing SD policies 
 
Checklist for: 
congruence with 
existing SD 
policies 
Checklist for: 
1.Economic 
2.Social and   
3.Environmental 
Development 
Checklist for: 
1.Social 
2.Economic 
3.Environmental 
and 
4.Technological 
Development 
 
Checklist for: 
1.Environmental 
2.Economic and  
3.Social criteria 
 
Other 
eligibility 
criteria 
None 1.At least 51% 
Chinese ownership 
of enterprises 
2.CER sales belong 
to the Chinese 
government and 
project developers 
and  
3.Revenue sharing 
by other entities 
forbidden 
1.Submission of 
Validation report in 
Portuguese before 
LoA is given 
2.Documentation 
for stakeholder 
consultation 
Commitment to 
report on the CERs 
produced 
1.Documentation 
of the legal and 
physical existence 
of the requesting 
Party 
2.Commitment to 
report on the CERs 
produced annually 
 
None 1.Conform with 
Morocco’s laws 
and policies, 
particularly an 
EIA 
 
None 
                                                 
1
K. Olsen and J. Fenhann, (2008), 2821. 
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Documentation 
required for 
LoA 
Approval 
process for 
LoA 
1. PDD and 
presentation. 
 
 
1.DNA is a single 
Window clearance 
for LoA 
2.LoA issued 
within 60 days 
 
1.PIN: LoE  
2.PDD: LoA 
PDD: LoA 
1.DNA issues LoE 
2.DNA and National 
CDM Board issues 
LoA 
3.LoA issued within 
60 days 
 
1.PDD: LoA 
 
 
 
1.DNA is a single 
Window clearance 
for LoA 
2. LoA issued 
within 60 days 
1.PIN: LoE 
2.PDD: LoA 
 
1. DNA and 
ministries and 
audit committee 
issues LoA  
2. LoA issued 
within 30 days. 
 
 
 
 
1.PIN: LoE 
2.PDD: LoA 
 
1.DNA issues 
LoE within 30 
days 
2. DNA and 
public 
consultation 
for 30 days and 
advisory 
committee 
before LoA is 
issued 
3. Loa issued 
within 30 days 
1.PIN: LoE 
2. PDD: LoA 
 
1. DNA is a 
single window 
clearance for 
LoA 
2. LoA issued 
within 4 weeks 
1.PIN: LoE 
2.PDD: LoA 
 
 
1.DNA and 
stakeholder 
Consultations   
2.LoA issued within  
30 days 
K. Olsen and J. Fenhann, (2008), 2821. 
Legend for Table 4.1 above:  
LoE: Letter of endorsement 
LoA: Letter of approval  
PIN:  Project idea note 
EE: Energy efficiency 
  
76 
 
The disadvantage of such varying approval procedures and sustainability assessment is that it 
most likely will impact on the quality of projects approved in host countries.
275
 Host 
countries with standard approval procedures that are directly concerned with promoting 
sustainable development, (for example, China’s definition of its priority areas for sustainable 
development), are more likely to approve quality projects for registration and implementation 
as a CDM project, while countries with no discernible procedures will likely approve any 
project, regardless of its quality or contribution to their sustainable development.  
 
The absence of minimum standards and guidance could lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. This is 
because host countries are likely to want to attract as many projects as they can, in order to 
benefit from the foreign investment that result from CDM projects, while placing low 
importance on the sustainable development impact of projects.
276
 Detailed procedures and 
stricter assessment are perceived by host countries to be a disincentive to investors, because 
they may add red tape, delay, and cost to the approval process. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, this is an erroneous view because investors are not discouraged by rules and 
regulations, on the contrary, rules and regulations encourage investment confidence.
277
 
 
Furthermore, the assessment of registered projects in Chapter 5 indicates that CDM host 
countries usually adopt vague, qualitative assessments, without concrete indicators, for 
defining their sustainable development criteria for CDM projects. Another consequence of 
the lack of detailed guidance to DNAs is that host countries interpret the confirmation of 
sustainable development to mean that a project complies with national rules and 
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 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 for further discussion and comparative analysis of the approval procedure of 
China, India and Brazil. 
276
 This is discussed further in Chapter 5, Section 5.5. 
277
 S. Huq and H Reid, ‘Benefit sharing under the Clean Development Mechanism’  in D. Freestone and C 
Streck (eds) Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanisms: Making Kyoto Work (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 230 at pg. 246. 
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regulations.
278
 This is undesirable because compliance with national rules and regulations, 
although a good thing, is not the same as assessing projects to ensure that they contribute to 
sustainable development and that they do not result in negative impacts. For example, 
according to Eguren et al., while some host countries
279
 require that proposed CDM projects 
comply with national rules and regulations only, such as EIA and stakeholders participation, 
other countries
280
 assess projects based on additional sustainable development criteria related 
to environmental (clean energy), social (stakeholders participation), and economic (improved 
local economy in CDM host country) attributes.
281
 In addition, in the absence of guidelines or 
specific criteria in a host country, there is the possibility that the DNA might be influenced to 
approve projects for financial and other gains accruing to the DNA office or its employees.
282
  
 
The requirement for confirmation of sustainable development contribution is therefore not 
sufficient to promote sustainable development in the CDM, as this requirement is vague and 
lacks defined parameters for its fulfilment. It is essential that the DNA fulfils this function, of 
confirming sustainable development contribution, in a manner that will ensure that the CDM 
achieves its sustainable development objective. This can be achieved, for example, by 
ensuring that all countries a have minimum standard or procedure for assessing the 
sustainable development contributions of proposed CDM projects and approving projects. 
Furthermore, DNAs of individual countries should ensure that proposed projects are in line 
                                                 
278
 E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development under the Clean Development Mechanism: A Guide for 
Latin America, 89. See also S. Headon, ‘Whose sustainable development? sustainable development under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the "coldplay effect," and the CDM Gold Standard’ (2009) 20 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 127 at pg. 127. 
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 Such as Chile, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Republic of Korea. 
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 L. Eguren et al,  ‘Analysis of the present situation and future prospects of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) in the FEALAC member countries’, Study of FEALAC for the 4th Economy and Society 
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 E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development under the Clean Development Mechanism: A Guide for 
Latin America, 89. 
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with their sustainable development needs and priorities, so as to promote sustainable 
development in such countries.
283
   
 
Also, considering the findings of literature with regard to the lapses of DOEs when validating 
CDM projects,
284
 it is important to ensure that only quality projects get to the approval 
stage.
285
 This can be achieved by, for example, appraising projects against standard approval 
process and sustainable development criteria. Furthermore, CDM host countries can improve 
the quality of projects that get to the validation stage by refusing to issue LoAs to undesirable 
projects, building investor confidence in their CDM approval procedures, lowering 
transaction cost for investors and project participants by providing predictable processes and 
costs, monitoring the implementation and progress of key sustainable development indicators, 
and reviewing their sustainable development priorities as required.
286
  
 
This lack of guidance on the sustainability assessment and approval processes for proposed 
CDM projects is a key failing of both the CDM rules and the CDM Manual, in terms of the 
CDM’s achievement of its sustainable development objective. While acknowledging that it 
will be impracticable for the CDM to prescribe detailed procedures to host countries for 
assessing and approving proposed CDM projects;
287
 this thesis advocates that a framework 
procedure will be appropriate, such as the framework adopted by the GS to assess the 
sustainable development contributions of proposed GS projects. Host countries can build 
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 S. Ganapati and L. Liu, (2009), 57. According to Ganapati and Liu, “DNAs should use their authority to 
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284
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 L. Schneider, Is the CDM fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? An 
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287
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their assessment and approval procedures upon the framework provided by the CDM rules to 
ensure that only projects that contribute to their sustainable development goals or objectives 
receive the approval of the CDM host country. Currently, despite the opportunity that the 
CDM gives host countries to use CDM investment to drive their sustainable development 
priorities, CDM host countries have so far put relatively low importance on defining 
sustainable development criteria for CDM projects hosted by them.
288
 This may be due to the 
fact that stakeholders interested in sustainable development in developing countries often 
have little political influence, rarely influence policy decisions and are rarely involved in 
government decision-making. It may also be due to the fact that developing countries are 
more interested in the investment opportunities that CDM projects present, or they assume 
that CDM projects, regardless of the sector and its development priorities, will promote 
sustainable development and that it was not necessary to establish adequate governing tools 
to ensure that this happens.
289
 Specific recommendations for strengthening the fulfilment and 
implementation of this requirement are discussed further in Section 3.3 infra. 
 
Also, as noted above, the host country is required to confirm the sustainable development 
contributions of proposed projects in the LoA. There is, however, also limited guidance on 
the content of such LoA. This is an important point because, ideally, the LoA should set out 
how the project contributes to the host country’s sustainable development and the criteria that 
were used to arrive at that conclusion. Another challenge relating to the issuance of LoAs is 
that the CDM rules do not stipulate whether a Party can revoke or cancel a LoA once it has 
been issued. Furthermore, the EB is currently silent on whether a DNA can revoke the LoA 
once it has been issued. This may lead to cases where projects can still generate CERs despite 
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the fact that they are not in compliance with national or international laws. For instance, at 
the 61
st 
meeting of the EB (30
th
 May – 3rd June), the DNA of Colombia sought clarification 
from the EB on its right to revoke the approval of a registered project that is no longer in 
compliance with national laws (a landfill project violating national environmental laws).
290
 
The lack of clarification calls into question the status of such a project in the host country 
where it will be implemented (assuming it is not already in operation), and it raises other 
issues such as: will the revocation of the LoA cause the project to grind to a halt?: and can the 
project continue to earn CERs despite the fact that it is now in breach of the CDM 
participation requirement (since the LoA has been revoked)? However, despite this silence, 
the DNAs of South Africa and Brazil state that LoAs can be revoked, after they have been 
issued, for non-compliance with national laws and regulations. Specifically, the Brazilian 
DNA states that a LoA can be revoked if evidence of illegality or acts contrary to the public 
interest comes to light after its issuance.
291
  
 
Gold Standard Procedure 
Under the GS, project participants are required to not only confirm, but to demonstrate that 
their project will have clear and verifiable sustainable development benefits.
292
 The 
requirement for sustainable development under the GS is assessed through an integrated 
approach that involves four compulsory steps. Firstly, projects are required to conduct a ‘Do 
No Harm’ assessment. Secondly, the stakeholder consultation is conducted. Thirdly, the 
sustainable development matrix is conducted during one of the several rounds of stakeholder 
consultations. Lastly, the sustainability monitoring plan is prepared and submitted with the 
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other project documentation.
293
 Steps 1, 2 and 4 are discussed extensively under their 
corresponding CDM requirement below. To fulfil the third step, project participants are 
required to demonstrate that the project will have clear sustainable development benefits 
through a detailed impact assessment, using a sustainable development matrix.
294
 GS projects 
are assessed against a series of twelve sustainable development indicators, using the 
environment, social, economic and technological development criteria.
295
 To ensure standard 
and uniformity, the list of indicators and the means of scoring the indicators are provided by 
the GS rules.
296
 Furthermore, the GS requires that the scoring of the sustainable development 
indicators must be easily reproducible and supported by convincing argument, such as 
publicly available information sources or expert opinions.
297
 One of the key features of 
fulfilling this requirement is that project participants do not carry out this exercise in 
isolation. The assessment is usually done with the input of local stakeholders during one of 
the stakeholder consultation processes. This ensures that all relevant indicators and 
parameters are assessed. It also ensures that project participants actively consider the 
sustainable development impacts of their project. A project that fails to satisfy the GS 
requirements on clear sustainable development contribution is rejected for registration.
298
  
 
The CDM rules on the requirement to confirm sustainable development contributions of 
CDM projects lack some of the important requirements and safeguards present in the GS. The 
GS’s sustainability assessment process is insightful because there are mechanisms established 
to ensure effective fulfilment by project participants. Quite unlike the CDM’s checklist 
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procedure, the GS provides minimum standards for fulfilling the requirement that projects 
contribute to sustainable development in the host country. The effective fulfilment of this 
requirement, through a detailed sustainability impact assessment, will promote sustainable 
development in developing countries, and it will ensure that projects do not result in negative 
impacts. Furthermore, the requirement to conduct the assessment in collaboration with 
stakeholders ensures that stakeholders are involved in shaping the design of the project, and it 
promotes transparency and equity in the registration process. In addition, it ensures that 
mitigating measures are built into the monitoring plan for the project, and where mitigating 
measures will not address the negative impact, the project is not allowed to proceed under the 
GS.  
 
Addendum 
The CDM PS requires project participants to “…explain the contribution of the project to 
sustainable development.”299 Although this provision in the CDM PS is an improvement on 
the provisions in the CDM rules, it is not as detailed and specific as the GS requirement. In 
practice, under the CDM rules, although project participants are not required to explain how 
their project contributes to sustainable development in the PDD, project participants usually 
include an explanation of how the project contributes to sustainable development in the 
PDD.
300
  Therefore, the additional requirement in the CDM PS only validates what obtains in 
practice in the CDM.  In addition, the CDM PS does not require a detailed sustainability 
assessment of the project. This is an unfortunate omission because the sustainability 
assessment highlights not just the positive, but also the negative impacts of projects. As a 
result of this, the sustainable development claims made by project participants are not 
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verified. The CDM VVS is equally vague on how the DOE should validate this requirement. 
To validate this requirement, the DOE is required to confirm, from an assessment of the LoA, 
that the DNA has ‘considered’ whether the project assists the host country in achieving 
sustainable development.
301
 However, in reporting its findings, the DOE is required to 
confirm that the host country DNA has established that the project assists it in achieving 
sustainable development. The word ‘considered’ makes an objective assessment by the DOE 
impossible, this is because the word ‘considered’ is subjective and it is up to the DOE to 
determine how it will conclude that the host country DNA has ‘considered’ whether the 
project will contribute to sustainable development. This author can only speculate that the 
DOE will validate this requirement through an independent confirmation from the DNA of 
the host country. This is because Paragraph 42 of the VVS states that if the DOE doubts the 
authenticity of the LoA, the DOE shall verify with the DNA that it is authentic.
 302
 
Furthermore, the DOE is required to determine that the confirmation of sustainable 
development contribution, made by the host country DNA, is unconditional.
303
  
 
In addition to specifying how projects contribute to the sustainable development of the host 
country, Paragraph 31(e) of the CDM PS includes a new requirement to describe how the 
proposed CDM project will transfer EST technology to the host country. One of the ways in 
which developing countries can attain sustainable development is through the transfer of 
EST. Therefore, the requirement for EST is an improvement on the CDM rules. However, it 
remains to be seen how this requirement will promote sustainable development since it does 
not mandate projects to transfer technology but only requires a description of the technology 
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302
 Ibid. Paragraph 42 
303
 Ibid. Paragraph 40. 
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transferred. Host countries can influence the extent to which CDM projects transfer EST.
304
 
CDM host countries can, for example, include transfer of technology in their approval criteria 
for CDM projects.
305
 However, the success in the fulfilment and implementation of this 
requirement is further influenced by issues that are beyond the control of the CDM, such as 
protection of intellectual property rights, trade restrictions, excessive tariffs and other barriers 
to imports.  
 
Although the CDM PS is a marked improvement on the CDM rules, it still falls short of what 
is obtained under the GS. This is because it does not address some important issues that 
should be addressed. For instance, the CDM PS does not require that projects should be 
assessed against internationally accepted sustainable development criteria. Furthermore, the 
problem of limited guidance on the content of LoAs and its status, once revoked by the host 
country, still persist.  
 
3.2.2 Stakeholder Participation 
Public participation is the umbrella term for citizen, stakeholder and community 
participation, and stakeholder participation is a subset of public participation.
306
 Participation 
in environmental decision-making is recognised as one of the key ways to achieving 
sustainable development. For instance, Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration recognises that 
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human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development, and its Principle 10 
sets out the main ideas behind public participation. It provides that 
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access 
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities… States 
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
307
 
 
Principle 10 sets out the three elements for public participation, which are, access to 
information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in environmental 
matters. Following on from the Rio Declaration, several other international treaties and 
declarations also recognise public participation as one of the fundamental tools for achieving 
sustainable development. For instance, the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention) is based on Principle 10, and it grants rights to the public, and imposes 
obligations on States, regarding access to information, public participation and access to 
justice.
308
 The three elements of public participation identified in Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration are restated in Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention.
309
 Also, Paragraph 16 of the 
Malmö Declaration of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) states that “the role 
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of civil society at all levels should be strengthened through freedom of access to 
environmental information to all, broad participation in environmental decision-making, as 
well as access to justice on environmental issues…”310  
 
These international treaties, declarations and multilateral agreements have jointly established 
that meaningful participation is important for achieving sustainable development.
311
 
Participation ensures that members of the public that might be affected by policy decisions or 
proposed projects have an opportunity to be informed of them.
312
 Some of objectives of 
public participation are that it promotes better decision-making, by making the participation 
process accessible to all, and it acknowledges and incorporates the diverse viewpoints of 
participants during consultation.
313
  
 
The stakeholder process, being a form of public participation, is therefore an important tool 
for achieving sustainable development.
314
 Hemmati defines stakeholders as “… those who 
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have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or representatives of a group. 
This includes people who influence a decision, or can influence it, as well as those affected 
by it.”315 While national performance and standards may vary in the implementation of the 
three elements of participation, certain general characteristics are necessary for meaningful 
participation to occur and should therefore be evident in all stakeholder participation 
procedures.
316
 These are access to information by the public, provision of information in a 
culturally-appropriate manner, the opportunity for the public to provide informed, timely and 
meaningful input, and access to a review process to seek redress and remedy for any harm 
suffered.
317
  
 
The UNFCCC and its KP both contain provisions relating to public participation in general 
and stakeholder participation in particular. The UNFCCC provides that in carrying out their 
commitments under the Convention, Parties shall promote public access to information on 
climate change and its effects and public participation in addressing climate change and its 
effects.
318
 The Protocol also requires Parties to facilitate at the national level public 
awareness of, and public access to, information on climate change.
319
 Stakeholders are 
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defined for the purpose of the CDM as the public, including individuals, groups or 
communities affected, or likely to be affected, by proposed CDM projects.
320
 
 
The CDM rules require project participants to provide a brief description of the stakeholder 
process adopted, a summary of the comments received from stakeholders and a report to the 
DOE of how they have taken due account of the comments received from stakeholders.
321
 
The rules also require the DOE to review the PDD and confirm that project participants have 
invited comments from local stakeholders.
322
 In addition to the provisions in the CDM rules, 
the CDM Manual states that project participants shall invite stakeholders to comment on the 
proposed CDM project before the PDD is published on the UNFCCC website.
323
 The CDM 
Manual further provides that as a means of validation, the DOE shall, by means of document 
review and interview with local stakeholders, determine: whether comments by local 
stakeholders that can reasonably be considered relevant for the proposed CDM project 
activity have been invited; that the summary of the comments received as provided in the 
PDD is complete; and that project participants have taken due account of any comments 
received and have described this process in the PDD.
324
  
 
The nature of CDM projects dictates that all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by 
proposed CDM projects should have access to relevant information, the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process, and recourse to judicial remedies, such as a 
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grievance mechanism that is open to local stakeholders, to address unresolved issues that 
arise from the stakeholder participation process, the environmental analysis and the 
sustainability assessment, and for issues that arise post-registration.
325
 However, an analysis 
of the CDM rules and the CDM Manual indicates that there are considerable missed 
opportunities to ensure that stakeholders have access to justice in environmental matters.
326
  
 
Generally, the CDM rules do not provide guidelines or prescribe minimum standards to 
project participants and host countries for conducting stakeholder participation, except to the 
extent specified above. It therefore lacks the requirement for meaningful participation as set 
out in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention. For instance, the CDM 
rules on stakeholder participation do not set out the process by which the stakeholders of a 
particular project should be identified; this is left to the project participant or the host country 
DNA to decide.  The CDM rules do not require project participants to disclose how relevant 
stakeholders were identified, and the PDDs are usually silent on how the stakeholders were 
selected.  
 
Furthermore, the CDM rules do not require that stakeholders should be consulted during the 
design stage of the project. Of the 100 projects assessed for this thesis, only 2 projects 
consulted with stakeholders during the design stages.
327
 These projects obviously exceeded 
the requirements, as the CDM rules only require consultation with stakeholders during the 
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validation and registration stages. Early consultation during the design and implementation 
stages of a project benefits both the project participants and stakeholders. This is because 
early consultation enables project developers to better recognise community needs and also 
reduces the financial risks associated with projects that do not have community support. Early 
consultation with stakeholders ensures transparency, it builds community trust and it helps a 
project avoid conflicts and disputes during the validation, registration and post-registration 
stages of projects.
328
 For instance, according to Lokey, if the local community feels left out of 
the decision-making process, it is more likely to vandalise or sabotage the implementation of 
the project.
329
 
 
In addition, the CDM rules do not offer guidance on the appropriate channels which project 
participants should use to communicate and engage effectively with stakeholders. As is 
shown later in this thesis, this has led to varying standards for stakeholder participation. For 
example, in the absence of standards, stakeholders may be consulted using culturally 
inappropriate methods such as through the internet (for example, a company website) or 
telephone.
330
 The danger in this is that relevant stakeholders may be side-lined and excluded 
from the consultation process. This is a key failing of the CDM rules because where 
culturally inappropriate methods are used, it negates the whole purpose of conducting 
stakeholder participation as the relevant stakeholders are essentially not able to participate 
effectively, or even at all, in the process.
331
 For example, where the internet is used to invite 
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and consult with local people that have no access to the internet, then they could even be 
completely unaware of, and uninvolved in, the on-going ‘consultation’ process.  
 
While acknowledging that national procedures may differ, however, in order to ensure that 
relevant stakeholders are not side-lined during the consultation process for CDM projects, it 
is essential that clear international requirements for conducting local stakeholder 
consultations are established. This is because the level of involvement of host country DNAs 
in the implementation of CDM projects differs.
332
 For instance, the DNA in Brazil provides a 
minimum list of relevant stakeholders that should be invited to comment on proposed CDM 
projects in Brazil, a format of the letter of invitation with which stakeholders should be 
invited, and specific information that should be included in the letter of invitation such as the 
name and type of project and the proposed project’s contribution to sustainable 
development.
333
 For example, a large number of the PDDs assessed did not disclose how they 
identified relevant stakeholders, while some of the other PDDs stated that the main 
stakeholder identified for the project is the technology (equipment) supplier, which is usually 
a company based outside the host country and whose only connection to the project is the 
supply of equipment used to implement the project.
334
   
 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged in this thesis that the stakeholder consultation process 
adopted for the different categories of CDM projects may differ. For example, end-of-pipe 
projects do not necessarily need to include local stakeholders in the consultation process. This 
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is because such projects are usually implemented in existing factories that retro-fit an 
emission reduction technology to an existing plant. The appropriate stakeholders for such 
projects will usually be governmental agencies such as the ministry of environment. 
However, there are some projects that require active participation and consultation with local 
communities that are likely to be affected by the proposed project. For example, the 
relocation of a community as a result of the implementation of a CDM project, will likely 
affect the livelihood and the mainstay of that community. Such projects will require the 
active and meaningful participation of stakeholders to ensure that their source of livelihood 
and other rights are protected. 
 
There is little guidance in the CDM rules on fulfilling the requirement for stakeholder 
participation. As a result, the process and procedure for the fulfilment of this requirement is 
decided entirely by the project participants and the host country. Therefore, minimum 
standards and guidelines, to guide project participants and host countries in the fulfilment and 
implementation of this requirement, are recommended. Specific recommendations for 
strengthening the fulfilment and implementation of this requirement are discussed further in 
Section 3.3 infra. 
 
Gold Standard Procedure 
The GS provides clear standards and guidelines for preparing for, and conducting the 
stakeholder consultation process. The GS requires two rounds of stakeholder consultation, 
local stakeholder consultation and the stakeholder feedback round with clear guidelines and 
procedure.
335
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However, prior to the consultation process, the GS provides guidelines for preparing for the 
consultation process, and there are clear guidelines for arranging the stakeholder consultation 
process. As a first step, the GS provides guidelines for identifying relevant stakeholders to a 
proposed project. As a minimum, the GS recommends that the following be invited for 
stakeholder consultation: local people impacted by the project or their official 
representatives; local policy makers and representatives of local authorities; an official 
representative of the DNA; Local NGOs working on topics relevant to the project; local GS 
expert; and international NGOs who support the GS.
336
 The GS also establishes clear 
guidelines for inviting local stakeholder. Some of the methods suggested for inviting 
stakeholders include newspapers, radio or television advertisements, hand delivery of 
invitation letter, invitation sent via the post and by email.
337
 In addition, the GS stipulates that 
the invitation should include project documentation such as a non-technical summary of the 
project.
338
  
 
The next step is the first round of stakeholder consultation process. To fulfil this requirement, 
the GS stipulates that local stakeholder consultation should include at least one public 
meeting, open to anyone willing to attend and that the meeting should be conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines provided in the GS Toolkit.
339
 The GS Toolkit provides the 
following criteria for consultation with stakeholders: project participants should adapt the 
consultation process to suit the abilities of the different categories of stakeholders invited, so 
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that all stakeholders understand the project; the meeting should be well documented; and 
project participants should provide stakeholders with a non-technical summary of the project. 
The non-technical summary should be presented in an appropriate local language, to allow 
stakeholders understand the project.
340
 An important feature of this round of consultation is 
that project participants are required to finalise the project’s sustainable development matrix 
in consultation with stakeholders. Stakeholders are consulted on the results of the self-
assessed sustainability assessments, and they are given an opportunity to comment and raise 
issues of concern to them.
341
   
 
The second consultation process is the stakeholder feedback round which may also include a 
physical meeting, although it is not mandatory.
342
 The purpose of the feedback round it to 
cover all issues raised from the local stakeholder consultation meeting and address how due 
account was taken of the comments received.
343
 The GS Requirement provides that for the 
stakeholder feedback round, stakeholders must be provided with the following documents: 
the local stakeholder consultation report, the revised PDD (where applicable), and the revised 
GS sustainability assessment Passport, and, if applicable, supporting documentation such as 
the EIA report.
344
  
 
The GS stakeholder consultation process contains the essential elements for an effective 
participation process. The GS requirement and the further guidance provided in the GS 
Toolkit ensures that the procedure adopted by project participants is inclusive. For instance, 
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the GS’s toolkit provides guidelines for inviting and identifying relevant stakeholders. This 
guarantees that stakeholders contribute to the project design, ensures that relevant 
stakeholders are informed about the project in a timely manner and in an appropriate 
language, and that they are given the opportunity to discuss the social, environmental, and 
economic impact the project will have on them. During this meeting, both the ‘Do No Harm’ 
assessment and the sustainable development matrix are assessed by stakeholders through the 
use of a blind exercise, i.e. stakeholders are given the opportunity to score the indicators that 
the project participants assessed, without revealing the project participants’ score to the 
stakeholders during the exercise. The outcome of this exercise enables both sides to decide on 
the list of indicators and the contributions of the project to sustainable development, the blind 
exercise also helps to identify likely negative impacts, and it allows  both sides to decide on 
mitigating measures where required.   
Addendum  
The additional requirement contained in the CDM PS is a marked improvement on the CDM 
rules on stakeholder participation. The predominant word used in the standard relating to the 
fulfilment of this requirement is ‘shall’. For instance, Paragraph 65 states that “[p]roject 
participants shall invite local stakeholders to provide comments on the proposed CDM 
project … and shall demonstrate how due steps/actions were taken to appropriately engage 
stakeholders and solicit comments.” The word ‘shall’ makes the prescribed standards and 
guidelines compulsory for project participants, and CDM host countries can build upon these 
minimum standards when implementing the fulfilment of this requirement. In addition, the 
CDM PS contains some of the minimum standards and guidelines which this thesis advocates 
for the effective fulfilment of stakeholders participation process.  
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For example, the PS specifies that project participants should demonstrate the steps they took 
to ensure that stakeholders were engaged in an appropriate manner. The standard goes on to 
specify the ways in which project participants can engage with stakeholders in an appropriate 
manner. For instance, Paragraphs 65 - 69 lists the required steps to ensure that project 
participants engage meaningfully with stakeholders. Project participants are required to:  
(i) invite local stakeholders to provide comments and demonstrate how due steps 
were taken to appropriately engage stakeholders and solicit their comments; 
(ii) invite comments from local stakeholders in an open and transparent manner, in a 
way that facilitates comments to be received from local stakeholders, and allows 
for a reasonable time for comments to be submitted;  
(iii) describe the proposed CDM project in a manner that allows the local stakeholders 
to understand the project activity; 
(iv) prepare a summary of the comments provided by local stakeholders; and  
(v) demonstrate that they considered all comments received for the proposed project 
and complete the consultation process before validation of the project. 
 
To validate this requirement, the CDM VVS requires the DOE to review the PDD and 
conduct interviews with stakeholders (if deemed necessary)
345
 in order to assess the adequacy 
of the stakeholder process conducted by the project participants, and to provide an opinion on 
the adequacy of same in its validation report.
346
  
 
However, this still does not go far enough to provide the required standards and guidelines 
that will enhance the stakeholder participation process in the CDM.  At best, the CDM PS 
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provides further clarification for fulfilling the stakeholder participation process. As a result 
there is still room for inconsistent interpretations by project participants in the fulfilment, and 
DOEs in the supervision, of this requirement. For instance, the provision that project 
participants should demonstrate how due steps were taken to appropriately engage with 
stakeholders and solicit their comments is vague, as the provision does not provide guidelines 
on what the ‘due steps’ are. Furthermore, it does not provide a minimum list of stakeholders 
that should be consulted and the appropriate means of soliciting comments from stakeholders. 
Similar to the CDM rules, the CDM PS does not require project participants to consult with 
stakeholders during the design stage of the project. This is a considerable missed opportunity 
because during the design stage of the project, project participants are still genuinely open to 
making changes to the design and implementation plans of the project. Furthermore, the 
standard is silent on further steps where the DOE determines that the stakeholder process is 
not adequate. It is unlikely that such a finding will affect the validation and registration status 
of the project.  The effective implementation of this provision, just as in the CDM rules, still 
depends on the subjective interpretation that project participants and the DOEs give to it.  
 
3.2.3 Environmental Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
 
Paragraph 37(c) of the CDM rules provides that 
Project participants have submitted to the designated operational entity 
documentation on the analysis of the environmental impacts of the project 
activity, including transboundary impacts and, if those impacts are considered 
significant by the project participants or the host Party, have undertaken an 
environmental impact assessment in accordance with procedures as required by 
the host Party.  
98 
 
3.2.3 (i) Environmental Analysis 
The CDM rules establish a two-step decision-making process before a project performs the 
EIA process. First, the CDM rules require that the environmental and transboundary impacts 
of the proposed project should be analysed. If the analysis indicates that the impacts are not 
‘significant’, then the project is not required to go through an EIA procedure. Second, if the 
project participants or the host country deems that the impacts identified are ‘significant’, 
then the project would have to perform an EIA in accordance with procedures stipulated by 
the host country.
347
 In addition to these provisions in the CDM rules, the CDM Manual 
requires that project participants submit documentation to the DOE on the analysis of the 
environmental impacts of the project in accordance with paragraph 37(c) of the CDM 
rules.
348
 To validate this requirement, the CDM Manual clarifies that the DOE shall confirm, 
by means of a document review and/or using local official sources and expertise, that project 
participants have undertaken an analysis of environmental impacts, and, if required by the 
host Party, that an EIA has been conducted.  
 
The requirement for analysis of the likely environmental impact of the proposed CDM 
project is an important requirement because it aids the decision maker in deciding whether 
the project should conduct an EIA or not. However, the means of fulfilling this requirement is 
vague, and it is unlikely to highlight or mitigate negative impacts arising from the project. 
This is because the CDM rules do not define what ‘significant impacts’ are, neither do they 
provide the host country or project participants with guidelines on how to identify what 
impacts on the environment should be considered ‘significant.’ Therefore, it is likely that the 
interpretation given to ‘significant impacts’ by CDM host countries will vary from strict 
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interpretation to a very lenient definition of the term. Furthermore, in instances where the 
environmental analysis indicates that projects will have significant negative impacts on the 
environment, the rule is not clear on what should happen if despite the negative impact 
identified, the host country does not require an EIA, mitigating measures, or a monitoring 
plan for such CDM projects.  
 
Furthermore, project participants are not required to present the result of the environmental 
analysis in the PDD nor is there a requirement to present stakeholders and other interested 
parties with the report or a non-technical summary of the analysis. The assessment conducted 
in Chapter 5 indicates that none of the projects assessed stated in the PDD that the results of 
the environmental analysis were presented to stakeholders during the consultation process. 
The absence of minimum standards and guidelines does not give stakeholders the opportunity 
to question and consider the likely environmental impacts of the project and the right to insist 
that mitigating and monitoring conditions should be imposed.
349
  
3.2.3(ii) Environmental Impact Assessment 
An EIA is a national procedure for evaluating beforehand, the likely impacts of a proposed 
activity on the environment.
350
 The ‘Impact’ that is assessed in an EIA is any effect caused by 
a proposed activity on the environment, including human health and safety, flora, fauna, soil, 
air, water, climate, or the interaction among these factors. It also includes effects on cultural 
heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.  
                                                 
349
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An EIA is regarded as one of the tools for achieving sustainable development both nationally 
and internationally.
351
 Holder and Lee, for instance, describe it as an instrument for the 
practical manifestation of sustainable development.
352
 The EIA process is an important 
process because it aids the decision-making process of, for example, the regulator.
353
 It 
provides the regulator, and other interested parties, with the opportunity to systematically 
examine the environmental impacts of a proposed project, and alternatives to the proposed 
project, before a decision is made to allow the project go ahead or not.
354
 It also provides an 
opportunity for public participation, especially by stakeholders.
355
 Apart from promoting 
sustainable development generally, EIAs also contribute to sustainable development 
indirectly by enhancing the public and stakeholder participation process.
356
 Furthermore, it 
can culminate in follow-up monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance with conditions for 
approval.
357
 Also, EIA encourages environmental responsibility on the part of project 
developers and promotes self-regulation.
358
  
 
In addition, several treaties and soft law documents require that EIAs be conducted in 
specified circumstances or that EIAs be conducted for all projects
359
 Agenda 21 and the Rio 
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Declaration make several references to the importance of EIA in achieving sustainable 
development.
360
 For instance, Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration states that EIAs shall be 
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have significant adverse impacts on the 
environment. The Espoo Convention states that Parties have an obligation to assess the 
environmental impacts of projects that might have a significant transboundary impact.
361
 
Also, international financial institutions such as the World Bank require that applicants 
submit an EIA statement in support of their application for funding for national projects.
362
  
 
Considering the safeguarding mechanisms built into the EIA, there is insufficient guidance in 
the CDM rules for project participants, DNAs and DOEs on fulfilling and implementing the 
requirement for EIAs. This is because the requirement to conduct an EIA is optional and it is 
dependent on host country environmental regulations. Therefore, the procedure and 
rigorousness of an EIA will vary depending on the environmental policies and laws of the 
host country. For instance, in countries that have weak EIA legislation, the EIAs conducted 
may fall below international standards. Furthermore, because there are no guidelines on the 
interpretation of ‘significant impacts’ that should trigger off an EIA, it is unlikely that project 
participants will voluntarily undertake an EIA. This is because an EIA process in any country 
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could be a time-consuming and expensive process.
363
 According to Meijer and Werksman, 
“[s]ince a host country generally benefits from a CDM project, the absence of uniform EIA 
rules for the CDM may create an incentive for the host country to not insist on a thorough 
EIA in order to make its country attractive for CDM projects.”364   
 
More importantly, the need to conduct an EIA cannot be triggered by a stakeholder or an 
independent third party. This is because the decision to conduct an EIA is restricted to the 
host country and the project participants and their interpretation of ‘significant impacts.’ This 
can either be seen as expedient or a denial of stakeholders’ rights and there are two sides to 
this debate. If stakeholders or interested third parties are given the right to trigger an EIA, it 
could lead to ‘not in my backyard syndrome’ (NIMBYS) or cause unnecessary delays to the 
implementation of projects. On the other hand, such right will ensure that projects that are 
likely to have significant negative impacts on the environment avert their minds to mitigation 
measures.   
 
More worryingly, the rules are silent on situations where the environmental impacts of a 
proposed project are considered significant but the host country has no EIA legislation or 
policies. It would seem that an EIA cannot be conducted for a CDM project implemented in 
that country, regardless of the significance of the negative impacts of the project. Again, this 
is a significant shortcoming in terms of the sustainable development objective of the CDM. 
Also, the rules do not require that projects should adopt mitigation strategies, or even 
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compensation measures, for instances where it is determined that the project will have 
significant impacts that are likely to affect stakeholders.  
 
While it would be redundant and costly for all categories of CDM projects to go through an 
EIA process, EIAs should be a compulsory requirement for some categories of CDM 
projects, especially large projects. For example, large hydropower projects could require 
damming of rivers or redirecting their flow. Such projects will likely have negative 
environmental and socio-economic impacts on the host community, such as loss of 
biodiversity in the rivers, loss of livelihood, relocation of communities, the loss of farmlands, 
and the infringement of fundamental human rights.
365
 For example, several NGOs urge the 
EB to reject proposed large hydroelectric projects for non-compliance with international 
environmental criteria established by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) criteria. For 
example, CDM Watch and International Rivers Network (IRN) urged the EB to reject the 
proposed ‘Bayano Hydroelectric Expansion and Upgrade Project in Panama’ because the 
dam, inter alia, did not comply with the WCD criteria for implementing hydro projects and it 
flooded 350 square kilometres of tropical forests. Furthermore, the NGOs claimed that the 
dam does not have the support of the local community because it has been the subject of a 25-
year struggle by indigenous groups to receive adequate compensation for the loss of their 
lands and increased waterborne diseases.
366
 However, despite the on-going opposition, and 
the evident negative impact on the community and the environment, the PDD made no 
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mention of conducting stakeholder consultations and EIA, which are essential for addressing 
social and environmental concerns raised by the project.
367
  
 
A project that results in significant negative impacts cannot be said to be consistent with 
sustainable development, and allowing the registration of such projects would negate the 
sustainable development objective of the CDM, especially where impacts that should be 
considered ‘significant’ are not, and such projects are allowed to be registered.368 
Furthermore, because this requirement is directly linked to an effective stakeholders’ 
participation process, it is almost certain that the deficiencies identified earlier in the 
stakeholders’ participation process, will have a knock-on effect on the effective fulfilment 
and implementation of this requirement. Although the EIA process can be used as an avenue 
to guarantee the right of stakeholders to participate effectively in the decision-making process 
for proposed CDM projects, this opportunity has not been effectively utilised by the CDM 
rules.
369
 Specific recommendations for strengthening the fulfilment and implementation of 
this requirement are discussed further in Section 3.3 infra. 
Gold Standard Procedure 
Although the GS does not also require an EIA for all its projects, GS projects are required to 
conduct a ‘Do No Harm’ assessment as a pre-requisite to the sustainability assessment.370 
This requirement can be likened to the CDM’s requirement for environmental analysis, and 
the means for fulfilling this requirement is clearer under the GS.  
                                                 
367
 ‘Bayano Hydroelectric Project in Panama’, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_650592459/Bayano%20PDD.pdf?t=RlN8bTRidzlkfDAtbSfW3-
jJI9lore47X9FP (UNFCCC website, 20/11/2011). 
368
 According to Eddy and Wiser, Greenpeace emphasised the need for the CDM EB to provide guidelines for 
EIA procedures in the CDM and to define the ‘significant impacts’ that can trigger an EIA procedure in the 
CDM. See Eddy and Wiser, ‘Public participation in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol’ 
in C. Bruch (ed), The New “Public”: The Globalization of Public Participation, 206. 
369
 N. Eddy and G. Wiser, ‘Public participation in the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol’ in 
C. Bruch (ed), The New “Public”: The Globalization of Public Participation, 211. 
370
 GS Requirement V.II.b. 
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The ‘Do No Harm’ assessment is conducted by project participants to determine the risk that 
the project might result in negative environmental, social, and/or economic impacts during its 
implementation.
371
 The assessment is guided by eleven safeguarding principles derived from 
the UNDP Millennium Development.
372
 The aim of this assessment is to determine if any of 
the impacts assessed are grave enough for the project to be eliminated from the approval 
process.  
 
To conduct the assessment, project participants are required to provide answers to the 
following questions, inter alia: does the project respect internationally proclaimed human 
rights? does it involve in or is it complicit in involuntary settlement? and is it involved in any 
form of forced or involuntary labour?
373
 Paragraph V.II.b.2 provides that projects that violate 
or risk violating any of the safeguarding principles will not be eligible for registration under 
the GS, unless the project is modified to comply with these principles or mitigation measures 
are created to ensure the harmful effects will not occur.  
 
Compared to the requirement under the CDM, this requirement ensures that projects with 
significant or high negative impacts do not go on to seek registration as GS projects, unless 
                                                 
371
 GS Requirement V.II.b.1, GS Toolkit 2.4.1 and Annex H. According to the UNDP, projects which do not 
meet international conventions and standards are unsuitable for UNDP and/or the MDG Carbon Facility. 
Therefore, project participants are required to acknowledge that the 13 safeguarding principles will be adhered 
to under all circumstances. Available at europeandcis.undp.org/ (4/5/2012).   
372
 GS Toolkit 2.4.1. 
373
 The other Principles include: the project is not complicit in human rights abuses; the project respects dignity, 
human rights, cultural property and uniqueness of Indigenous Peoples; the project respects the employees´ 
freedom of association and their right to collective bargaining ; the project does not employ any form of child 
labour; the project does not involve any form of discrimination based on gender, race, religion, sexual 
orientation or any other basis; the project provides workers with a safe and healthy work environment; the 
project takes a precautionary approach in regard to environmental challenges; the project does not involve 
significant  conversion or degradation of critical natural habitats, including those that are (a) legally protected, 
(b) officially proposed for protection, (c) identified by authoritative sources for their high conservation value, 
and (d) recognized as protected by traditional local communities; the project does not involve corruption at any 
level and; the project does not involve the alteration, damage or removal of any critical cultural heritage.  
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mitigation measures are introduced for the project. This requirement is also a cost saving 
measure in many ways because it is a pre-qualification assessment that eliminates projects 
that are likely to have negative impacts from the early stage and thus save money, time and 
resources.   
 
EIA is optional for GS projects, dependent on host country regulations, and it can be 
conducted at the local, regional, and national levels.
374
 The requirement for EIA is conducted 
as part of the sustainability assessment requirement for GS projects, during the stakeholder 
consultation process. Project participants are required to provide stakeholders with the EIA 
document, (if applicable), alongside other supporting documents.
375
  
Addendum  
The CDM PS clarifies the requirement for environmental analysis. Environmental analysis is 
mandatory for all projects, irrespective of the host country environmental regulations on EIA. 
The CDM PS uses a stronger language than the CDM rules. Paragraph 63 of the CDM PS 
provides that project participants shall submit to the DOE documentation on the analysis of 
the environmental impacts of the project, including its transboundary impacts. This is a 
marked improvement on the means of fulfilling the requirement under the CDM rules. This is 
because, as stated earlier, it is not clear from the CDM rules if environmental analysis is 
compulsory. Paragraph 63 settles this uncertainty and it is made clear that every proposed 
CDM project is required to undertake an analysis of the environmental impact of the project, 
irrespective of the environmental regulations in the host country with regard to EIA.
376
 
However, the CDM PS stops short of requiring that the report of the analysis should be 
                                                 
374
 GS Requirement VII.a.4 and GS Toolkit 2.4.4. 
375
 The assessment is based on the UNDP safeguarding principles which were derived from the Millennium 
Development Goals. See Gold Standard Toolkit T.2.4.1, Annex H to the Toolkit GS Requirement VIII.d.2, and 
Rule VII.a.1. 
376
 Recall that under the CDM rules, the requirement to conduct an EIA is dependent on if the project 
participants or the host country deems it necessary.  
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attached to the PDD or that the analysis should be made available to stakeholders during the 
consultation process. 
 
To validate this requirement, the CDM VVS provides that the DOE shall confirm that project 
participants conducted an analysis of the environmental impacts of the project, including its 
transboundary impacts and an EIA if required by the host country or deemed necessary by 
project participants. Furthermore, the DOE can conduct a review of the environmental 
analysis document and /or use local official expertise or sources to ensure that the required 
analysis was undertaken.
377
 This is an obvious improvement because it gives the DOE the 
option to request for the result of the environmental analysis and to also conduct an 
independent review of the environmental analysis through the interview of local official 
expertise or sources.   
 
The minimum standards and guidelines provided for fulfilling this requirement will improve 
its fulfilment and supervision. However, there is still room for improvement. The CDM PS 
has not resolved the situation where, for example, the result of the environmental analysis 
indicates that the project will have negative impact and the host country does not require EIA 
for all CDM projects or for that category of CDM projects.  
 
3.2.4 Additionality 
The CDM rules provide that a proposed project activity must be ‘additional’ before it can be 
registered as a CDM project. A CDM project is ‘additional’ if it leads to reductions in 
emissions of GHGs that are supplementary to any that would occur in the absence of the 
                                                 
377
 CDM VVS, Paragraphs 134, 135 and 136.  
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proposed CDM project.
378
 To show that emissions are ‘additional,’ project participants have 
to establish a baseline. A baseline is the scenario that represents the GHG emissions that 
would have occurred in the absence of the proposed CDM project.
379
 Reductions below this 
baseline are ‘additional’ reductions, and it is for these that CERs are issued.380 The CERs 
generated from CDM projects in non-Annex I Party countries can be used by Annex I Party 
countries to meet their emission reduction commitments. Theoretically, this would allow 
Annex I Parties to emit GHGs in their countries over and above their assigned amounts.
381
 
However, in reality, Annex I Parties must reduce their emissions to meet their emission 
reduction commitments, or at the very least, maintain their current levels, because most of 
them currently emit more than their assigned amounts, calculated based on their 1990 
emission levels. Therefore, if a non-additional project was registered and earned CERs, the 
use of the CERs would result in an overall increase in global GHG emissions.
382
 Therefore, it 
is important that CERs represent a real emission reduction in order to promote the overall 
objective of the climate change regime and to ensure the environmental integrity of the KP 
system.
383
 
                                                 
378
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex Paragraphs 37(d) and 43.  .   
379
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex Paragraph 44. Paragraph 44 provides that the baseline shall cover emissions from 
all gases, sectors and source categories listed in Annex A within the project boundary. A baseline shall be 
deemed to represent reasonably the anthropogenic emissions by sources that would occur in the absence of the 
proposed project activity if it is derived using a baseline methodology referred to in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the 
CDM rules. Furthermore, Paragraph 45 provides that the baseline should be established in a transparent and 
conservative manner and that it should take relevant national or sectoral policies and circumstances into 
account.  
380
 See Chapter 1 for discussion of CERs and their use.  
381
 All Annex I Parties have an amount of GHGs that they are allowed to emit, referred to as their ‘assigned 
amount.’ This amount is calculated pursuant to their emission reduction commitments, inscribed in Protocol 
Annex B, and they are not allowed to emit beyond their assigned amounts. See KP, Article 3(1) and Annex B.  
382
 L. Schneider, ‘Is the CDM fulfilling its environmental and sustainable development objectives? An 
evaluation of the CDM and options for improvement’, 7.   
383
 See the following: A. Michaelowa, ‘Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: changes in additionality 
definitions and regulatory practices over time’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon 
Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, 248; L. Schneider, ‘Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: 
practical experiences and lessons learned’ (2009) 9 Climate Policy 242; and E. Meijer and J. Werksman, 
‘Keeping it clean – safeguarding the environmental integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism’ in D. 
Freestone and C. Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Implementing the Kyoto Protocol Mechanism: Making Kyoto 
Work, 193. 
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Although the CDM rules provide guidelines that project participants should follow to prove 
the additionality of a project, the EB created the ‘Tool for the demonstration and assessment 
of additionality’ as a general framework for project participants to demonstrate the 
additionality of proposed CDM projects.
384
 This tool is referred to as the ‘additionality test’ 
and is used to establish that emission reductions achieved by CDM projects are additional to 
the baseline scenario. The additionality tool is not mandatory, but simply acts as a guide for 
project participants and DOEs.
385
 However, it is common practice for project participants to 
utilise it to prove that proposed projects are additional.  
 
To prove additionality, a project proponent must demonstrate a hypothetical reduction in 
GHGs resulting from the proposed project by comparing the lower emissions that would 
result from the project against the baseline emissions. The DOE selected by project 
participants to validate a proposed project must review the PDD and any supporting 
documentation to confirm that the proposed project would result in a reduction of emissions 
below the baseline.
386
 As a further guidance to the DOE, the CDM Manual further provides 
that as a means of validation, the DOE shall assess and verify the reliability and credibility of 
all data, rationales and assumptions used to establish the additionality of the proposed 
project.
387
  
                                                 
384
 The latest version of the additionality tool (Version 05) was adopted at the Executive Board’s 39 th meeting, 
CDM-EB-39, Annex 10. http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/039/eb39_repan10.pdf  (UNFCCC Website, 16/6/ 2010). 
See also: A. Michaelowa, ‘Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: changes in additionality definitions 
and regulatory practices over time’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: 
Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, 54. 
385
 Paragraph 28 of Decision 7/CMP.1, Further Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism 
provides that “as stipulated in decision 12/CP.10, the use of the ‘tool for the demonstration and assessment of 
additionality’ is not mandatory for project participants, and that in all cases the project participants may propose 
alternative methods to demonstrate additionality for consideration by the Executive Board, including those cases 
where the ‘tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality’ is attached to an approved methodology.” 
386
 See Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 37(d). 
387
 EB 55 Annex 1, Paragraph 95. 
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Currently, the  CDM’s additionality test consists of the following four steps: identification of 
alternatives to the project that are consistent with mandatory laws and regulations in the 
CDM host country; investment analysis to determine that the proposed project is either not 
the most financially attractive or not financially feasible without CERs; barrier analysis to 
determine if there is at least one barrier preventing the implementation of the project; and 
common practice analysis to determine that the project is not common practice in the host 
country or, where it is common practice, to determine if there are essential differences 
between the proposed CDM project and the common practice that can reasonably be 
explained. It should be noted that the barrier and investment analyses are alternatives and 
project participants can choose to use either or both. The common practice analysis is used in 
both the barrier and investment analysis as a credibility check to demonstrate that the project 
is not common practice. Therefore, the common practice analysis is to complement and 
reinforce the investment and/or barriers analysis. The component steps and sub-steps are 
analysed below. 
 
The first step involves the identification of alternatives to the project consistent with current 
laws and regulations in a host country.
388
 This involves two sub-steps: identification of 
alternatives to the project activity consistent with current laws and regulations; and 
consistency with mandatory laws and regulations. Firstly, project participants are required to 
identify realistic and credible alternative scenarios to the proposed CDM project which are 
available to the project participants or to similar project developers that provide outputs or 
services comparable with the proposed CDM project.
389
 The alternatives identified should 
                                                 
388
 EB 39 Report Annex 10, step 1. 
389
 Ibid. sub-step 1(a), Paragraph 1. 
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include: the proposed project undertaken without being registered as a CDM project; other 
realistic and credible alternative scenario(s) to the proposed CDM project that deliver 
products or services with comparable quality, properties and application areas; and, if 
applicable, continuation of the current situation (no project or other alternatives 
undertaken).
390
 Secondly, the project is required to test consistency with mandatory laws and 
regulations. To do this, the alternative(s) project scenario identified earlier shall be in 
compliance with mandatory legislation and regulations in the host country,
391
 taking into 
account the enforcement in the region or country and EB decisions on national and/or sectoral 
policies and regulations. Alternatives that are not in compliance with mandatory laws and 
policies may be considered if the project participants can prove that there is widespread non-
compliance with the national law or regulation in question.
392
 If the proposed project is the 
only alternative amongst the ones considered by the project participants that is in compliance 
with mandatory regulations, with which there is general compliance, then the proposed CDM 
project is not additional.
393
  
 
The test in sub-step 1(a) should result in identified realistic and credible alternative scenario 
to the CDM project that are in compliance with mandatory legislations, taking into account 
the enforcement in the host country and EB decisions on national and sectoral  policies. The 
test in sub-step 1(b) should identify realistic and credible alternative scenario(s) to the project 
activity that are in compliance with mandatory legislation and regulations taking into account 
the enforcement in the region or country and EB decisions on national and/or sectoral policies 
and regulations. 
 
                                                 
390
 Ibid. sub-step 1a Paragraph 1(a) (b) and (c). 
391
 Ibid. sub-step 1b Paragraph 2. 
392
 Ibid. sub-step 1b Paragraph 3. 
393
 Ibid. sub-step 1b Paragraph 4. 
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The second and third stages involve the investment and barrier analysis. Project participants 
can choose to prove either the investment or barrier analysis or both. To use investment 
analysis,
394
 project participants are required to prove that the proposed project is either not 
the most economically or financially attractive,
395
 or not economically or financially feasible 
without the revenue from the sale of CERs.
396
 To determine this, project participants are 
required to apply simple cost analysis if the CDM project and the alternatives identified in 
step 1 generate no financial or economic benefits other than CDM-related income. Otherwise, 
investment comparison analysis or benchmark analysis can be used to prove the additionality 
of the project.
397
 To prove additionality using simple cost analysis, project participants are 
required to document the costs associated with the CDM project and the alternatives 
identified in step 1, and demonstrate that there is at least one alternative which is less 
expensive than the proposed CDM project.
398
 If it is concluded that the proposed CDM 
project is more expensive than at least one alternative, then project participants can proceed 
to the common practice analysis.  
 
If investment comparison analysis is used, project participants are required to identify a 
financial indicator, such as the internal rate of return (IRR) or cost-benefit ratio, most suitable 
for the project type and decision-making context and utilise that to prove additionality.
399
 To 
use the benchmark analysis,
400
 project participants are required to identify the most suitable 
                                                 
394
 Ibid. A detailed further guidance of the investment analysis is included in Annex 35. 
395
 Ibid. sub-step 2(a). 
396
 Ibid. sub-step 2(b). 
397
 Ibid. sub-step 2a, Paragraph (1). 
398
 Ibid. sub-step 2b, Paragraph (2). 
399
 Ibid. sub-step 2b, Paragraph (3). 
400
 The benchmark analysis shall be obtained  from: government bond rates; estimates of the cost of financing 
and required return on capital;  company internal benchmark, this can only be used for instances where the 
project upgrades an existing process or uses a resource that is not traded but is available on project site; 
government/official approved benchmark, where such benchmarks are used for investment decisions;  any other 
indicators, if the project participants can demonstrate that the indicators provided in the tool are not applicable 
and that their indicator is appropriately justified . Ibid. sub-step 2b, Paragraph (6) (a-e). 
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financial/economic indicator, such as IRR.
401
 When applying investment comparison analysis 
or benchmark analysis, the financial/economic analysis shall be based on parameters that are 
standard in the market, considering the specific characteristics of the project type, and not the 
subjective profit expectations or risk profile of the project participants.
402
 However, the 
specific financial/economic situation of the company undertaking the project can be 
considered only where, for example, the project upgrades an existing process or uses a 
resource that is available on the project site and that is not traded (for example, waste). The 
investment analysis provides a valid argument in favour of additionality only if it consistently 
supports the conclusion that the project is unlikely to be the most financially/economically 
attractive, or is unlikely to be financially/economically feasible.
403
 If, it is concluded that the 
proposed CDM project is unlikely to be the most financially/economically attractive or is 
unlikely to be financially/economically feasible, then the project participants can proceed to 
the common practice analysis or they could elect to undertake the barrier analysis as well.  
 
Barrier analysis involves determining whether the proposed project faces barriers that prevent 
the implementation of the type of project proposed, and do not prevent the implementation of 
at least one of the alternatives.
404
 The identified barriers are only sufficient grounds for 
demonstration of additionality if they would prevent potential project participants from 
carrying out the proposed project unless it is registered as a CDM project.
405
 However, if the 
CDM does not mitigate the identified barriers that prevent the proposed project from being 
implemented, then the project activity is not additional. Some of the barriers may include: 
investment barriers that are different from the economic/financial barriers discussed in step 2 
                                                 
401
 Ibid. sub-step 2b, Paragraph (4). 
402
 Ibid. sub-step 2b, Paragraph (5). 
403
 Ibid. sub-step 2d, Paragraph (11). 
404
 Ibid. step 3(a) and (b). 
405
 Ibid. sub-step 3a, Paragraph (1). 
114 
 
above;
406
 technological barriers such as unavailability in the host country or region of skilled 
or properly trained personnel to operate and maintain the technology;
407
 barriers due to 
prevailing practice, for example, if the project is the first of its kind in the host country or 
region;
408
 and other barriers.
409
 Upon identification of barriers, the project participants are 
required to demonstrate that the identified barriers would not prevent the implementation of 
at least one of the alternatives, except the proposed project.
410
  
 
The common practice analysis is a credibility check to complement the investment analysis 
or barrier analysis. Therefore, unless the proposed project type has demonstrated that it is 
first-of-its kind project in the host country where it is proposed to be implemented, the 
analysis must be complemented with an analysis of the extent to which the proposed project 
type (for example, technology or practice) has already spread in the relevant sector and 
region.
411
 To do this, the project participants must analyse other activities that are operational 
and similar to the proposed project and, on the basis of this analysis, describe whether and to 
what extent similar activities have already diffused in the relevant region.
412
 If similar 
activities are widely observed and commonly carried out, it calls into question the claim that 
the proposed project is financially unattractive or faces barriers. Therefore, if similar 
activities are identified above, then it is necessary to demonstrate why the existence of these 
activities does not contradict the claim that the proposed project is financially/economically 
                                                 
406
 For example, an investment barrier could be non-availability of capital from domestic or international capital 
markets due to real or perceived risks associated with investment in the country where the proposed CDM 
project is to be implemented, as demonstrated by the credit rating of the country or other country investments 
reports of reputed origin. Ibid. sub-step 3a, Paragraph (1) (a).  
407
 Ibid. sub-step 3a, Paragraph (1) (b). 
408
 Ibid. sub-step 3a, Paragraph (1) (c). 
409
 Ibid. sub-step 3a, Paragraph (1) (d). 
410
 Ibid. sub-step 3b. 
411
 Ibid. sub-step 4. 
412
 Ibid. sub-step 4a, Paragraph (1). Note that CDM project activities (registered project activities and project 
activities which have been published on the UNFCCC website for global stakeholder consultation as part of the 
validation process) are not to be included in this analysis. 
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unattractive or subject to barriers. This can be done by comparing the proposed project to the 
similar activities, and pointing out and explaining essential distinctions
413
 between them that 
explain why the similar activities enjoyed certain benefits that rendered them 
financially/economically attractive,
414
 but which are not available to the proposed project.
415
  
 
The demonstration of additionality has been a controversial issue since the creation of the 
CDM. According to the various studies conducted on the additionality test, it is doubtful that 
many of the registered CDM projects are additional.
416
 This is because the outcome of the 
additionality test is not predictable, as it requires the calculation of emission reductions 
against scenarios that are difficult to verify.
417
 Furthermore, the problem of defining and 
measuring the additional emission reductions arising from a CDM project, as compared to 
what would have happened under a business-as-usual scenario, has been described as one of 
the two Achilles’ heels of the mechanism.418 For instance, the three component parts of the 
additionality test, the investment, barrier and common practice analyses, are subjective, as 
they are based on information which is usually only available to the project developers and 
                                                 
413
 Essential distinctions may include a serious change in circumstances under which the proposed CDM project 
will be implemented when compared to circumstances under which similar projects were carried out. For 
example, new barriers may have arisen, or promotional policies may have ended, leading to a situation in which 
the proposed CDM project activity would not be implemented without the incentive provided by the CDM. The 
change must be fundamental and verifiable. Ibid. sub-step 4b, Paragraph 3. 
414
 For example, if the existing activities had access to subsidies or other financial flows. 
415
 Ibid. sub-step 4b, Paragraph 2. 
416
 See: A. Michaelowa, ‘Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: changes in additionality definitions and 
regulatory practices over time’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds.), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, 
Copenhagen and Beyond, 270-271; B. Muller, Additionality in the Clean Development Mechanism, Why and 
What? (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2009), 8; J. Ellis and S. Kamel, ‘Overcoming barriers to 
Clean Development Mechanism projects’, 40. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/14/38684304.pdf  (OECD 
Website, 15/1/ 2010); and M. Wara and D. Victor ‘A realistic policy on international carbon offsets’ Stanford 
University Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #74, April 2008. 
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/a_realistic_policy_on_international_carbon_offsets (Stanford University 
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development Website, 15/1/ 2010.)   
417
As Schneider points out, the major challenge for the additionality test is the fact that it is based on 
hypothetical scenarios that are very difficult to replicate independently.  L. Schneider, Is the CDM fulfilling its 
Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for 
Improvements, (Berlin: Öko-Institut, 2007), 7. 
418
 M. Grubb et al.,  The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 2001), 227  
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which is difficult to objectively compare and verify.
419
 In Schneider’s assessment of PDDs 
for their demonstration of the investment analysis of the additionality test, he noted that the 
application of the investment analysis varies widely for the projects assessed.
420
 According to 
him, about 30% of the PDDs assessed used a ‘black-box’ approach, simply stating the 
outcome of the analysis, without providing the key information and data used to conduct the 
analysis. As such, an independent party cannot replicate the calculations and justification that 
the project is additional.
421
  
 
A major shortcoming of the current additionality test is that it could create perverse policy 
incentives in developing countries.
422
 In a bid to ensure that projects pass the additionality 
test, host countries may refrain from undertaking and adopting domestic climate change 
mitigation strategies. This is because the adoption of mitigation strategies would make it 
difficult for proposed CDM projects to pass the additionality test. An example of climate 
change mitigation strategy could be the introduction by a State of a renewable energy 
mandate into the national energy mix.
423
 For instance, the methodology panel queried the 
additionality of proposed hydroelectric plants in Costa Rica because of a 1995 national policy 
requirement that privately generated electricity should derive 20% of generated energy from 
renewable energy sources.
424
 Following from this, Colombia chose not to officially 
incorporate energy efficiency standards into its energy laws in 2003 and 2004 following a 
widespread assessment of its CDM potential.
425
 The effect of creating perverse policy 
                                                 
419
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420
 L. Schneider, Is the CDM fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Development Objectives? An 
Evaluation of the CDM and Options for Improvements, 8. 
421
 Ibid. at 9. 
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 E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development under the Clean Development Mechanism: A Guide for 
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424
 Ibid. 
425
 Ibid. 
117 
 
incentives in developing countries is that the additionality test conflicts with the CDM’s 
sustainable development objective, which should include the promotion of environmentally-
friendly practices and policies, such as renewable energy promotion.  
 
The additionality test and its protection of the environmental integrity of the CDM are 
fundamental to the integrity of the CDM process. However, if the CDM is to achieve its dual 
objective, the relevant actors cannot afford to be entirely focused on the effective governance 
of those requirements that ensure emission reduction at the expense of requirements that 
promote sustainable development. The additionality test focuses on the emission reduction 
objective of the CDM and does not consider its sustainable development objective.
426
 
Currently, the additionality test does not necessarily promote sustainable development 
because its goal is not to ensure that registered projects are additional in terms of the 
sustainable development benefits they provide to countries but only that they are additional in 
terms of the emission reductions they achieve. Whether or not CDM projects provide 
sustainable development benefits or additional sustainable development benefits is irrelevant 
and such projects could pass the additionality test, as long as the projects can prove the 
additionality of the emission reductions achieved. 
Gold Standard Procedure 
GS project participants demonstrate additionality by using the UNFCCC’s ‘Tool for the 
Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality’,427 which has been discussed extensively 
above. However, note that apart from the requirement to pass the additionality test, Paragraph 
VII.a.5 of the GS Requirement states that the GS Foundation reserves the right to reject 
                                                 
426
 Recall that Article 12(5) (a-c) of the KP sets out the additionality criteria for a CDM project as follows: (a) 
Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related 
to the mitigation of climate change; and (c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur 
in the absence of the certified project activity. Note that the criteria set out for CDM projects do not include a 
sustainable development criterion
.
 
427
 GS Requirement VI.b.1. 
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projects that fail to satisfy the GS requirements on sustainability. Therefore, contribution to 
sustainable development is one of the eligibility criteria for GS projects, unlike Article 12(5) 
of the KP which does not include contributions to sustainable development as one of the 
eligibility criteria for CDM projects.
428
 The eligibility criteria for GS projects consist of the 
following, projects must: be additional; contribute to sustainable development; and result in 
real, measurable and verifiable permanent emission reductions.
429
 The eligibility criteria for 
GS projects therefore reinforce the importance of projects contributing to the sustainable 
development of CDM host countries and to the overall climate change process.   
Addendum   
The CDM PS and VVS do not provide additional standard and guidance that will ensure that 
the fulfilment of this requirement promotes the sustainable development objective of the 
CDM. As such, the additional provisions in the CDM PS and CDM VVS will not be 
considered further in this section. 
 
3.2.5 The Baseline and Monitoring Requirements 
 
The baseline, also known as the ‘business as usual' scenario for a proposed CDM project, is 
the amount of GHG emissions that would be produced in the absence of the project. The 
baseline forms the basis for calculating a project’s emissions reductions and helps determine 
its additionality.
430
 Monitoring is the collecting and archiving of all relevant data in a CDM 
project scenario, and it is necessary for determining the baseline and for measuring the 
                                                 
428
 Recall Article 12(5) of the KP states the eligibility criteria for CDM projects as:  voluntary participation of 
each Party involved; real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and 
reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. 
Also see further discussions in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.  
429
 GS Requirement III.a.1. 
430
 See Decision 3. CMP.1, Annex Paragraphs 44 and 45. See also M. Lee et al., Baseline Methodologies for 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects: A Guidebook (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and 
Sustainable Development, 2005), 14.  
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emission reductions achieved as a result of the implementation of a CDM project.
431
 To fulfil 
the baseline and monitoring requirements, the CDM rules provide that CDM projects should 
only adopt baseline and monitoring methodologies approved by the EB, as a prerequisite for 
proving the additionality of a project.
432
 The CDM Manual reaffirms that as a means of 
validation, the DOE shall ensure that the baseline and monitoring methodologies selected by 
the project participants comply with EB approved methodologies.
433
  
 
The requirement for baseline and monitoring, like the requirement for additionality, aims to 
ensure that emission reductions achieved during the implementation of a CDM project are 
additional to what would have happened in the absence of that project. This requirement does 
not promote the sustainable development objective of the CDM because it only requires 
monitoring of emission reduction achieved during project implementation. It does not require 
monitoring of the sustainable development impact at the implementation stage of the project. 
Apart from the initial confirmation from the host country that the project assists it in 
achieving sustainable development, the rules do not require that the sustainable development 
impacts and contributions of CDM projects be continually assessed the way that the emission 
reduction of CDM projects are monitored and verified throughout the lifespan of the 
project.
434
 Thus, while the CDM rules require a monitoring plan for all categories of CDM 
projects, in order to collate data on GHG emission reductions achieved by CDM projects, the 
                                                 
431
 Decision 3 CMP 1, Annex paragraph 53(a). Also, the Glossary of CDM Terms (Version 5) defines 
monitoring as collecting and archiving all relevant data from a project necessary for determining the baseline, 
and for measuring emission reductions achieved by the project within the project boundary and any leakages. 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/glos_CDM.pdf (UNFCCC Website, 4 /5/ 2011). 
432
 Decision 3. CMP 1, Annex, Paragraph 37(e) (i). 
433
 EB 55 Annex 1, Paragraph 65. 
434
 C. Voigt, ‘The deadlock of the Clean Development Mechanism: caught between sustainability, 
environmental integrity and economic efficiency’ in B. Richardson et al. Climate Change and Developing 
Countries: Legal and Policy Challenges for the World Economy, 249. 
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rules do not require that environmental and other socio-economic impacts that may result 
from the implementation of CDM projects be monitored during the lifespan of the project.
435
  
 
This is an important omission because the implementation of CDM projects may result in 
other socio-economic and environmental impacts that may be negative or that may affect 
sustainable development at local, regional, and national levels. Some of the likely negative 
environmental impacts from the implementation of CDM projects include, inter alia: 
emission of other atmospheric pollutants arising from the implementation of CDM 
projects;
436
 production of solid waste; and impacts on biodiversity.
437
 Potential economic and 
social impacts at local, regional and national levels include, inter alia, increased transaction 
cost due to the need for additional information and training and further concentration of 
income distribution in a select few.
438
  
 
To ensure that CDM projects contribute to sustainable development and that projects do not 
have negative impacts, it is essential to monitor the sustainable development indicators of 
projects. This is because monitoring will determine if the effect of the implementation of a 
project on those indicators have been positive or negative. For example, the implementation 
of a project could be resulting in trade-offs between the different indicators of sustainable 
development. For example, despite leading to job creation, the implementation of a project 
could result in loss of biodiversity. Issues such as these will not come to light if the impact of 
the project is not monitored.  Furthermore, without adequate monitoring, it will be impossible 
to determine if the sustainable development claims made in the PDD were achieved and if the 
                                                 
435
 S. Thorne and E. La Rovere, ‘Criteria and indicators for appraising Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects’, 20. 
436
 Such as oxides of sulphur, nitrogen, and radioactive waste. 
437
 S. Thorne and E. La Rovere, ‘Criteria and indicators for appraising Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects’, 20.  
438
 Ibid. 
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project is resulting in negative impacts that were not envisaged during the design of the 
project. Furthermore, monitoring allows lessons to be learnt from the implementation of the 
project, bearing in mind that CDM projects usually have a lifespan of over 21 years. Post-
registration monitoring is also important because not all CDM projects are required by CDM 
host countries to conduct EIA. Therefore, the inclusion of a monitoring requirement will 
ensure that possible negative and positive impacts that may likely result from the 
implementation of CDM projects, are properly addressed and harnessed where applicable.
439
 
Specific recommendations for strengthening the fulfilment and implementation of this 
requirement are discussed further in Section 3.3 infra. 
Gold Standard Procedure 
The GS requires a sustainability monitoring plan to monitor the impact of project activities on 
sustainable development. Monitoring will ensure that implementation of the project (post- 
registration) has indeed contributed to sustainable development (as assessed pre-registration). 
The monitoring requirement required by the GS is ex post and it is used to ascertain if the 
project not only reduces GHG emissions, but that it actually contributes to sustainable 
development, as assessed ex ante.
440
 Paragraph VII.d.1 of the GS requirement states that GS 
projects must develop a sustainability monitoring plan to monitor the impact that the project 
has on sustainable development and to verify if the project has indeed contributed to 
sustainable development, in order to assess its eligibility for GS certification.
441
  
 
To monitor the sustainable development contributions and impacts of GS projects, project 
participants are required to identify parameters that can be used to properly monitor each 
non‐neutral sustainable development indicator over the crediting period and on a recurrent 
                                                 
439
 S. Huq, ‘Applying sustainable development criteria to CDM projects: PCF Experience’, 21. 
440
 This is the assessed conducted during the sustainable development matrix. 
441
 Also see GS Toolkit 2.4.3. 
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basis, to measure the impact of the project on sustainable development indicators.
442
 The 
indicators are also required to be monitored over the crediting period, on a recurrent basis, 
and verified during each verification period, as well as during each mandatory site‐visit.443 In 
addition, the mitigation measures introduced to mitigate identified negative impacts during 
the ‘Do No Harm’ assessment and the sustainability assessment are monitored. The result 
from the monitoring exercise is used to verify if GS projects have indeed contributed to 
sustainable development and are consequently eligible for the issuance of GS VER credits.   
 
The GS requirement for monitoring is essential to its sustainable development objective 
because it provides an opportunity to reassess the sustainability assessment conducted before 
the implementation of the project and it also allows monitoring of the impact of the project 
during its implementation. This ex post monitoring requirement will most likely ensure that 
project participants exercise more care and attention during the implementation of the project.  
Addendum 
Similar to the CDM rules, the CDM PS and VVS do not provide additional standard and 
guidance for fulfilling this requirement. The CDM PS does not require monitoring of the 
sustainable development impact of a project during implementation, and the DOE is not 
required to verify that sustainable development is achieved during the implementation of the 
project. The absence of follow‐up monitoring means that project participants are not held 
accountable. This is a considerable missed opportunity in the CDM to strengthen the weak 
sustainability criteria of host countries and to ensure that CDM projects do not result in 
negative impacts compared to the baseline situation. Furthermore, the absence of sustainable 
development follow‐up assessment means that CDM projects are not held accountable to the 
                                                 
442
 GS Requirement VII.d.2. See Section 3.3 infra and Table 3.1 for further discussion and examples of 
indicators and parameters.  
443
 Ibid. 
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host country. It is imperative to introduce detailed ex ante assessment of potential impacts 
and to continuously monitor whether the claims made in the PDDs still obtain during the 
implementation of the project. CDM projects should be required to submit a sustainable 
development monitoring plan which ensures compliance with the ‘Do No Harm’ assessment, 
the sustainability assessment, and any other mitigation measures. Furthermore, the 
monitoring plan should be monitored and regularly verified by the DOEs. Clear guidelines 
should be developed on the verification of the sustainability criteria and indicators by DOEs. 
   
3.2.6: Requirement for Monitoring, Verification and Reporting 
 
Verification is the periodic independent review and ex post determination of the monitored 
reductions in emission during the verification period.
444
 The verification of CDM projects is 
usually carried out during the implementation of a project by an appointed DOE. Essentially, 
the project participants monitor and keep records of the emission reductions achieved as a 
result of the implementation of a CDM project through the monitoring plan,
445
 while the 
DOE confirms the authenticity of the reductions during the verification period, through the 
verification report.
446
   
 
The V & R requirements do not require monitoring of sustainable development impact during 
the implementation of projects. Therefore, it will be impossible for the DOE to verify the 
sustainable development impact of the project during the verification period. The DOE is 
only required to verify the emission reductions claimed by project participants. This 
requirement will not be discussed further because there is considerable overlap between this 
                                                 
444
 Decision 3. CMP 1, Annex, Paragraph 61. Monitoring has been discussed earlier in section 4.2.5. 
445
 Ibid. Annex, Paragraph 56. 
446
 Ibid. Annex, Paragraph 62(h). 
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requirement and the baseline and monitoring requirement which has been discussed 
extensively in Section 3.2.5 above. 
 
3.3 Analysis of the Validation and Registration Requirements 
Taken together, the provisions in the CDM rules regarding the V & R requirements are 
limited in their potential to promote the CDM’s sustainable development objective. However,   
the provisions of the CDM PS and the CDM VVS improve the fulfilment, supervision and 
implementation of the V & R requirements, albeit in a very small way.  
 
The CDM rules, for those V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting 
sustainable development, lack the necessary minimum standards and guidelines to ensure that 
they are fulfilled by project participants, implemented by DNAs and supervised by DOEs, in 
a way that will promote sustainable development. However, some of the issues raised from 
the analysis of the CDM rules and the CDM Manual have been addressed by the new CDM 
PS and CDM VVS. For example, the requirement for stakeholder participation is improved 
by the CDM PS and VVS; for instance, the PS specifies that project participants should 
demonstrate the steps they took to ensure that stakeholders were engaged in an appropriate 
manner. Even so, the further clarification in CDM PS  falls short of the minimum standards 
and guidelines advocated by this thesis.  
 
One significant addition to the CDM PS and the VVS is that they both have paragraphs for 
‘terms’ and ‘definition’ which interprets the language of the provisions. For instance, the PS 
states that ‘shall’ indicates requirements to be followed by project participants, ‘should’ is 
used to indicate that among several possibilities, one course of action is recommended, and 
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‘may’ is used to indicate what is permissible.447 This is an improvement on the CDM rules 
because the language of the CDM PS clarifies requirements that are mandatory for project 
participants and those that are not. For example, the CDM PS makes it clear that an 
environmental analysis is compulsory for all projects, by using the word ‘shall’448 as against 
‘have’449 used in the CDM rules. Therefore, by defining what is obligatory and permissible 
with regards to the V & R requirements, the new regulatory framework improves the way 
project participants fulfil the requirements and this will have a positive impact on promoting 
the sustainable development objective of the CDM.  
 
The analysis of the V & R requirements shows that the V & R requirements can be fulfilled 
in a haphazard manner, given that the V & R requirements contain no required sequence or a 
link between the requirements. Unfortunately, the CDM PS and the CDM VVS do not cure 
this defect. For instance, the CDM rules and the CDM PS and the CDM VVS do not establish 
the sequence in which the V & R requirements should be fulfilled by project participants. On 
the other hand, the GS requirements are fulfilled in a sequential manner and the result of one 
requirement ties into the fulfilment of the next requirement. The GS sustainability assessment 
consists of four steps that are fulfilled in a sequential manner. The ‘Do No Harm’ assessment 
is the first requirement, followed by the sustainable development matrix, then the two‐step 
stakeholder consultation, and finally the sustainability monitoring plan. These requirements 
have to be fulfilled in the sequence cited above and the result of one step ties into what is 
required to fulfil the next step. For example, the results of the self-assessed ‘Do No Harm’ 
assessment’ and the sustainability assessment are presented to stakeholders at the first round 
                                                 
447
 Paragraph 13(a-c), CDM PS. Also see Paragraph 10(a-c) of the CDM VVS. 
448
 Paragraph 63 states that [p]roject participants shall carry out an analysis of the environmental impacts of the 
proposed CDM project activity … including transboundary impacts. 
449
 Paragraph 37(c) states that [p]roject participants have submitted to the designated operational entity 
documentation on the analysis of the environmental impacts of the project activity, including transboundary 
impacts. 
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of the stakeholder participation meeting and the results are discussed and modified, if 
required, in collaboration with local stakeholders. An analysis of the V & R requirements 
indicates that in order for their fulfilment to promote sustainable development, there has to be 
an integrated approach and a link in their fulfilment in such a way that the outcome of one 
requirement ties into the fulfilment of another. 
 
The CDM rules have failed to effectively integrate the CDM’s sustainable development 
objective into its procedural and institutional structures. While the CDM rules provide 
elaborate guidelines and structures to govern the emission reduction objective of the CDM, 
for example through the additionality test and the baseline and monitoring requirement, the 
CDM rules have failed to establish standards and guidelines to ensure the effective fulfilment 
of the CDM’s sustainable development objective. Although the CDM PS and the CDM VVS 
attempt to incorporate the CDM’s sustainable development objective into the V & R 
requirements, by requiring project participants to explain the contribution of their project to 
sustainable development, the requirement is not detailed enough and is therefore inadequate 
to promote sustainable development. As discussed in Chapter 2, the principles of sustainable 
development are important because they provide a framework for the implementation of 
sustainable development. Some of the principles include eradication of poverty, sustainable 
use of natural resources, and the right to a healthy environment. Unfortunately, many of these 
principles find no place in the V & R requirements, though one or two of them, such as the 
sustainable use of natural resources and the alleviation of poverty could have been included 
in the V & R requirements.    
 
This chapter advocates the creation of minimum standards and guidelines that project 
participants and CDM host countries should not fall below, in the fulfilment and the 
127 
 
implementation of the V & R requirements. This is because currently, the CDM rules provide 
a ‘checklist’ of requirements to be fulfilled by project participants, without setting out 
minimum standards for fulfilling those requirements and the CDM PS and the VVS do not go 
far enough to provide the required standards and guidelines. The setting of standards, if any, 
is left to CDM project participants and at best to CDM host countries. Undoubtedly, this will 
result in varying standards of fulfilment and implementation amongst CDM project 
participants and CDM host countries, and this will hamper the ability of the CDM and its V 
& R requirements to promote sustainable development. Furthermore, the creation of 
minimum standards and guidelines will also encourage host countries to establish a structured 
framework for the implementation of the V & R requirements. This is because they can build 
upon the minimum standards and guidelines established by the CDM, for their approval 
procedure and the implementation of the V & R requirements. The minimum standards 
advocated here are internationally accepted standards for fulfilling those V & R requirements 
that will promote sustainable development. This will ensure that, at a minimum, the V & R 
requirements are fulfilled and implemented in a manner that will promote sustainable 
development. Furthermore, this thesis advocates that the V & R requirements should be an 
avenue to foster policy development and reforms that will promote sustainable development 
in CDM host countries. The following additional standards and guidelines are recommended.  
 
With regard to assessing the sustainable development contributions, an international 
sustainability assessment process with clear criteria and indicators should be introduced for 
CDM projects. As discussed in Chapter 2 and in this chapter, one of the key challenges of the 
CDM in achieving its sustainable development objective is the lack of an internationally 
agreed set of criteria and indicators for measuring the sustainable development contributions 
of proposed CDM projects. In light of this, several research centres, NGOs, UN agencies and 
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other focus groups have conducted studies to develop sustainable development criteria and 
indicators to assist CDM host countries in their assessment of the sustainable development 
contributions of proposed CDM projects, and to support the CDM in realising its sustainable 
development potential.
450
 These studies attempt to identify standards or indicators that can be 
applied universally to measure the sustainable development benefits of proposed CDM 
projects. The criteria and indicators will allow project participants demonstrate clearly the 
sustainable development benefits of the proposed project. Although there is a degree of 
subjectivity involved in such assessment because it is qualitative, such assessment, for 
example, the GS sustainable development matrix, is transparent, replicable and it is presented 
in easily accessible format. The criteria and indicators adopted should be flexible in order to 
accommodate the circumstances of individual projects, while setting boundaries for 
establishing clear sustainable development contributions that can be monitored and verified. 
In addition, to ensure flexibility and to avoid unnecessary cost, only criteria that will be 
                                                 
450
 See the following studies: ‘The Gold Standard Requirements’  hereinafter called GS requirement, (version 
2.1), available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/GSv2.1_Requirements-11.pdf 
and ‘The Gold Standard Toolkit’ hereinafter called GS Toolkit (version 2.1), available at 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/GSv2.1_Toolkit_Clean-11.pdf . (The Gold 
Standard Foundation Website, 17/3/ 2011). These documents set out the principles and rules by which Gold 
Standard projects are carried out. See also: the SouthSouthNorth, Sustainable Development Appraisal and 
Ranking Matrix Tool (Cape Town: SouthSouthNorth) 1-12; M. Lee (ed.), CDM Information and Guidebook 2
nd
 
Edn. (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, 2004), 17-28; L. 
Waldegren, ‘The Gold Standard validation & verification manual for CDM projects’, 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6_GS_technical_docs/manuals_and_methodolgies/GS
%20VVM%20CER.pdf, 38-40. (The Gold Standard Foundation Website, 17/3/ 2011); C. Sutter, Sustainability 
Check-Up for CDM Projects: How to assess the sustainability of international projects under the Kyoto 
Protocol, (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2003), 207. Sutter developed the Multi-Attributive Assessment of 
CDM (MATA-CDM) methodology; Olsen and Fenhann, (2008), 2819-2830. K. Olsen and J. Fenhann 
developed 13 sustainable development criteria through a method they called the ‘taxonomy’ method; R. 
Heuberger et al, ‘CDM projects under the Kyoto Protocol: a methodology for sustainability assessment – 
experiences from South Africa and Uruguay’ (2006) Environment, Development and Sustainability 1-16; S. 
Huq, ‘Applying sustainable development criteria to CDM projects: PCF Experience’ PCFplus Report 10 
Washington DC, April 2002,  http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00083.pdf (International Institute of Environment and 
Development (IIED) Website, 17/3/2011) ; A. Brent et al., ‘Evaluating projects that are potentially eligible for 
clean development funding in the South African context: a case study to establish weighting values for 
sustainable development criteria’ (2005) 10 Environment and Development Economics 631-649; E. Boyd et al., 
‘Reforming the CDM for sustainable development: lessons learned and policy futures (2009) 12 Environmental 
Science & Policy 820-831; and  S. Thorne and  S. Raubenheimer, ‘Sustainable development (SD) appraisal of 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Projects – Experiences from the SouthSouthNorth (SSN) Project’, 54-
70.  Note that different research studies have termed this in different ways, such as, inter alia, international 
standards, global checklist, guidelines and defined criteria for sustainable development. 
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affected by the project should be assessed. One of the advantages of establishing 
internationally acceptable sustainable development criteria and indicator for assessing CDM 
projects is that it will build the capacity of host countries to assess proposed projects, whether 
CDM or not. Another advantage is that it will foster policy development and reforms in CDM 
host countries. The following paragraph presents an example of criteria and indicators for 
measuring the sustainable development contributions of proposed CDM projects. 
 
The GS Toolkit and its Annex I contains the ‘sustainable development matrix’ in which 
project participants justify how their projects score against a set of pre-determined sustainable 
development criteria, indicators and possible parameters for measuring the sustainable 
development impact of projects. To allow for a detailed scoring, twelve specific indicators 
are considered under:  environment – air quality, water quality and quantity, soil condition, 
other pollutants and biodiversity; social – quality of employment, livelihood of the poor, 
access to affordable and clean energy services, and human and institutional capacity; and 
economic and technological development – quantitative employment and income generation, 
balance of payments and investment and technology transfer and technological self-reliance. 
Identified parameters are used to monitor the impact of the project on each identified 
indicator.  
 
To score the indicators, project participants are required to briefly describe what the baseline 
scenario is for the relevant indicator, and the relevant explanations and parameters under the 
different indicators
451
 are scored ‘negative’, ‘positive’ or ‘neutral’, in comparison with the 
                                                 
451
 An example of the indicator for ‘biodiversity’ under environment are changes compared to the baseline is: 
number of genes (i.e., genetic diversity within a species) species and habitats existing within the project’s 
impact boundaries; alteration or destruction of natural habitat; and depletion level of renewable stocks like 
water, forests, fisheries.  
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baseline scenario.
452
 Indicators with negative impacts are scored ‘–‘, although negative 
indicators can potentially be remedied with mitigation measures. The proposed mitigation 
measures as well as all non-neutral indicators are required to be monitored. Neutral impacts, 
including negative impacts that are remedied with mitigating measures, are scored ‘0’, 
positive impacts in comparison with the baseline are scored ‘+’. All indicators in the matrix 
have the same weight. To be eligible under the GS, projects must contribute positively to at 
least two of the three categories and be neutral in the third category. If the project fails the 
sustainability assessment, the project can be altered and additional mitigation measures could 
be implemented or it will be refused registration as a GS project. The advantage of using such 
matrix is that it gives a detailed description of the indicators being assessed, it provides 
possible parameters of what the indicators are, and it allows for replication and independent 
assessment and analysis of the results.  
 
The indicators contained in Table 3.1 below have been adapted from Annex I of the GS 
Sustainable Development Matrix.
453
 The indicators cover environmental protection, social 
and economic and technological development dimensions of sustainable development.
454
   
 
Table 3.2: Sustainable Development Criteria and Indicators for Assessing Proposed 
CDM projects 
Criteria Indicators Parameter 
Environment Water Quality and 
Quantity  
Water quality refers to 
Quality: 
Levels of: Biological oxygen 
demand  
                                                 
452
 An example of the parameter for ‘biodiversity’ under environment  are: the number of affected and/or 
threatened Plants ; and number of affected and /or threatened mammals, birds, reptiles, fishes, and other species 
and habitats. Apart from the parameters given in the matrix, project participants can provide their chosen 
parameters and a justification of the parameter chosen. 
453
 http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/v2.2_ANNEX-I.pdf (Gold Standard website 
1/5/2012). 
454
 There are some drawbacks that have been identified in measuring the sustainable development contributions 
of projects, such as: it involves some subjectivity on the part of the person assessing the project; and different 
project assessors and assessment procedures may assign an indicator to different components of sustainable 
development. For example, while some assessors may classify job creation under the economic component of 
sustainable development, others may classify it under the social component of sustainable development. 
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changes compared to the 
baseline in: 
• Release of pollutants and 
its impacts on the 
environment and human 
health, including biological 
oxygen demand and chemical 
oxygen demand,  thermal 
pollution, mercury, Six, NOx, 
POPs, lead, coliforms 
(bacteria from animal waste). 
 
Water quantity refers to 
changes in water balance and 
availability in ground and 
surface water 
Chemical oxygen demand 
Thermal pollution 
Mercury 
SOx 
NOx 
POPs 
Lead 
Coliforms (bacteria from 
animal waste)  
 
Quantity: 
Water used in the process. 
Indirect parameters like fuel 
wood consumption etc. that 
can be proven to be linked to 
decreased surface water run 
off etc. 
 
 
 Contribution to 
Biodiversity 
This refers to changes 
compared to the baseline 
in: 
• Number of genes (i.e., 
genetic diversity within a 
species) species and habitats 
existing within the project’s 
impact boundaries. 
• Alteration or destruction 
of natural habitat 
• Depletion level of 
renewable stocks like water, 
forests, fisheries 
 
 
Number of affected and/or 
threatened Plants  
Number of affected and /or 
threatened mammals, birds, 
reptiles, fishes, and other 
species and habitats 
Social Quality of employment: 
This refers to changes 
compared to the baseline 
in: 
• Labour conditions, such as 
Job-related health and safety 
 
Qualitative value of 
employment, such as whether 
the jobs resulting from the 
project activity are highly or 
poorly qualified, temporary 
or permanent etc. 
Training, workshops etc. 
 
Labour conditions 
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 Access to affordable and 
clean energy services 
 
This refers to changes 
compared to the baseline 
in: 
• Presence, affordability of 
services and reliability of 
clean energy services in the 
local area or households 
Change in Energy use 
 
Change in traditional fuel 
Consumption (e.g. % of total 
energy requirements) 
 
Electricity consumption per 
capita (kilowatt-hours) 
 
Reduced black outs, 
fluctuations, etc. 
Economic and 
Technological 
Quantitative employment 
and income generation 
 
This refers to changes 
compared to the baseline in: 
• Number of jobs 
• Income from employment 
(with salaries at par or better 
than the average local/sector 
wage level) 
 
 
Household income generated 
from the project 
 
Number of jobs created 
 Technology transfer and 
technological self-reliance 
 
This refers to changes 
compared to the baseline in: 
• Technology development as 
well as adaptation of new 
technologies to unproven 
circumstances. 
 
Technology can be sourced 
from outside or inside the 
country as long as it is new to 
a particular region and 
introduced in a proven 
sustainable way. 
  
Number of workshops, 
seminars organised, and 
training-related opportunities 
Held for masons/external 
audience who would be 
directly involved in 
replication of the technology 
 
Number of participants who 
attend those capacity 
building activities  
 
Source: Annex I Guidance on Sustainability Assessment (Gold Standard Matrix)
455
 
The above GS sustainability matrix is a practical indication that despite the uncertainty 
surrounding sustainable development as a concept in international law and indeed in the 
                                                 
455
 Available at http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/v2.2_ANNEX-I.pdf  (Gold 
Standard Website, 1/5/2012). 
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CCR,
456
 the sustainable development impact and contribution of proposed projects can be 
assessed pre-registration and also monitored post-registration. Although there is some 
subjectivity involved in the GS matrix assessment, some of its key advantages are that the 
assessment is transparent, it can be duplicated, and it ensures project participants are mindful 
of the impact of their project on the sustainable development indicators assessed.  
 
With regard to the requirement for stakeholder participation, this thesis recommends that a 
structured stakeholder participation process should be introduced for CDM projects. The 
following minimum standards and guidelines will safeguard the interest of stakeholders, and 
it will ensure that the process promotes sustainable development in host countries. Project 
participants should be required to consult with stakeholders during the design stage of the 
project, when the project is still open to changes and modifications in its implementation. 
Furthermore, project participants should actively invite participation through appropriate 
media such as local bulletin boards, newspapers, and other appropriate media. In addition, as 
a minimum, invitation letters should be sent to the following stakeholders; local people likely 
to be affected by the project or their official representatives; local policy makers and 
representatives of local authorities; the DNA of the host country; and local NGOs interested 
or working in the area related to the proposed project and the DOE selected to validate the 
project. In addition, the letters of invitation should include a non‐technical summary of the 
project activity in an appropriate local language(s) (bearing in mind that majority of 
stakeholders in CDM host countries may not speak English), the result of the sustainable 
development matrix recommended above, a simplified non-technical summary of the PDD, 
and the environmental analysis report. These are essential tools that will help stakeholders 
prepare for a meaningful consultation process with project participants. 
                                                 
456
 See the discussions in Chapter 2. 
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This thesis recommends that at a minimum two rounds of stakeholder consultation process 
should be introduced for CDM projects, a stakeholder consultation meeting, conducted prior 
to the validation but during the design stage of the project, and a feedback session, conducted 
during the validation process. The stakeholder consultation meeting should include at least 
one physical meeting, and depending on the stakeholders invited, the meeting should be 
conducted in an appropriate local language. As a minimum, the following should be 
presented at the meeting: the project; results of the sustainable development matrix; and 
report of the environmental analysis. In addition, stakeholders should be given an opportunity 
to contribute to the assessment result, and the responsibility for monitoring sustainable 
development indicators, mitigation measures and grievance procedures, during the 
implementation of the project, should be finalised at the meeting. This thesis also 
recommends that a report of the consultation should be prepared and made available at the 
local government office, for stakeholders and other relevant government officials. The report 
should include: all comments received during the consultation process; how those comments 
have been taken into account in the project design; the result of the finalised sustainable 
development matrix; and if negative impacts were identified, the mitigating measures agreed 
at the meeting. The feedback session should be an opportunity to ascertain from the 
stakeholders if their comments, from the consultation meeting(s) have been addressed 
sufficiently. The feedback session should include all stakeholders that participated in the 
consultation process and it does not necessarily have to be a physical meeting. The second 
round could be conducted during the validation process.  
 
Apart from the foregoing recommendations, this thesis recommends that the EB should 
establish a grievance mechanism to allow local stakeholders initiate the review of an existing 
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project that is in violation of national rules and regulations or international treaties and 
conventions. Therefore, this thesis recommends that the EB should establish a grievance 
mechanism for aggrieved stakeholders. This is especially important to resolve issues that 
arise during the implementation of the project. For instance, the grievance mechanism should 
be established to resolve issues that were not envisaged during the design and validation 
stages of the project or issues that arise as a result of the implementation of the project. For 
example, a project may result in negative impact on one or more of the sustainable 
development indicators.  
 
With regard to the requirement for environmental analysis and EIA, there is need for further 
clarification on the meaning of ‘significant impact’ that can trigger the need for EIA. 
Currently, neither the CDM rules nor the CDM PS defines what ‘significant impact’ means 
and it is left to the project participant and the host country DNA to define ‘significant impact’ 
for CDM projects. This thesis further recommends that this requirement should be replaced 
with the GS ‘Do No Harm Assessment’.   
 
With regard to the baseline and monitoring requirement, it is hereby recommended that the 
CDM project should be required to monitor the sustainable development indicators of the 
project, verify that the project indeed contributes to sustainable development, and does not 
result in negative impacts. Therefore, the monitoring plan required by the CDM rules should 
include a sustainable development monitoring plan, as part of the requirements for the 
validation of CDM projects. This will ensure that projects do not result in negative impacts 
during implementation and it will allow mitigating measures to be introduced where required.  
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The EB should also address the situation where a DNA revokes the LoA issued to a 
registered CDM project. For instance, a registered project that got the approval of the DNA 
but subsequently violates national laws.  Lastly, this thesis recommends that CDM projects 
should be penalised for not achieving their sustainable development claims and for having 
negative impacts on sustainable development indicators. Currently, CDM projects are only 
penalised for not achieving their estimated emission reduction during the verification and 
certification process. It is assumed that DNAs approve CDM projects based on their 
undertaking to contribute to sustainable development in host countries, therefore, CDM 
projects that do not achieve the sustainable development benefits claimed in their PDDs 
should be penalised, by awarding such projects fewer credits.    
 
This thesis also recommends that the CDM EB should provide adequate guidelines to DOEs 
on how to validate the V & R requirements. For instance, with regards to validating the 
requirement for stakeholder’s participation, the EB should provide guidelines on the 
adequacy of the stakeholder participation process. Also, the EB should provide clear 
guidelines on the appropriate stakeholders for each category of CDM projects. As discussed 
earlier, the stakeholder that should be consulted for an end-of pipe CDM project in sectoral 
scope 11 should be different from the stakeholders consulted for a sectoral scope 1 hydro 
project. The guidelines should also clarify the appropriate means of contacting and inviting 
stakeholders to the consultation process. For instance, if the stakeholders are largely illiterate, 
then invitation placed in a newspaper will not be sufficient, but invitation on local radio or on 
a village billboard will be more appropriate in this situation. In addition, the guidelines to 
DOEs should specify the type of information that project participants should make available 
to stakeholders, such as the PDD, EIA and the result of the sustainability matrix. For 
example, project participants should be provided with a non-technical summary of the PDD, 
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the PDD translated into the local language(s), the EIA, the sustainable development matrix 
and the sustainability monitoring plan.  
 
The recommendations made herein are by no means rigid; host countries can establish 
additional rules and regulations to regulate CDM activities within their jurisdictions.
457
 The 
assessment and analysis conducted in Chapter 5 confirms that the existence of stringent 
project approval rules in a host country does not make it less attractive to CDM investors. 
Therefore, this creates an opportunity for CDM host countries to enact rules and regulations 
that are suitable and appropriate to their existing laws. Such laws will also recognise the 
distinct circumstances of the host country and enhance its development priorities. Curnow 
and Hodes note that some host countries have passed laws to govern investment in CDM 
projects, such as: the terms and the type of involvement of entities in the host country; 
ownership of CDM projects and CERs accruing from such projects; and the price at which 
CERs generated by CDM projects in the host country can be sold.
458
  
 
Compared to the CDM rules, the GS puts the sustainable development objective on the same 
footing as emission reduction objective. Its integrated approach to sustainability assessment 
ensures a structured fulfillment, implementation and supervision of the requirements. This is 
because the GS provides project participants, host countries, and the DOEs with the 
necessary guidelines and minimum standards required, to assist them fulfil, implement and 
supervise the validation requirements in a manner that will promote sustainable development. 
Furthermore, GS framework ensures that project participants think carefully of the benefits 
and possible negative effects of their project, it ensures that mitigation measures are 
                                                 
457
 P. Curnow and G. Hodes (eds.), Implementing CDM Projects: Guidebook to Host Country Legal Issues, 12. 
458
 Ibid.  
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introduced, and where mitigation measures do not eliminate the negative effects, it ensures 
that such project does not pass its certification process. The application of the GS 
requirements is flexible, the GS assessment is not applied as a strict tool but it accommodates 
the different circumstances of each project within its defined framework. 
 
It is important to highlight that the effective fulfillment and implementation of the V & R 
requirements alone cannot guarantee that CDM projects will contribute to sustainable 
development of the host country. This is because the CDM cannot resolve some of the 
underlying challenges of implementing projects in developing countries, which are 
influenced by host country conditions, such as lack of infrastructures.
459
  Furthermore, 
achieving sustainable development in the CDM depends greatly on the willingness and the 
ability of the CDM host country to ensure that requirements that will promote its sustainable 
development are fulfilled and implemented effectively. It will also depend on the ability of 
the host country to attract projects that enhance their defined sustainable development 
priorities and the commitment of CDM project participants to promote sustainable 
development.  
 
The recommendations made herein will not add substantial cost to the validation and 
registration and the implementation stages of the project but it would ensure that the 
fulfilment and implementation of the V & R requirements promote sustainable development 
in CDM host countries.  
 
This author recognises that some of the above recommendations raise issues of sovereignty 
and the prerogative that host countries have to define their sustainable development priorities. 
                                                 
459
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For instance, States might view the recommendation that the CDM’s institutional body 
should prescribe internationally agreed criteria for sustainable development as a threat to their 
sovereign right. It also raises the question how easy would it be to adopt and implement such 
criteria bearing in mind that generally, negotiations relating to climate change are always 
long drawn and States usually come to the negotiating table to protect their national interest. 
Furthermore, establishing criteria for sustainable development is made more difficult by the 
unsettled nature of sustainable development in international law. Despite these challenges, it 
is important to establish minimum standards and guidelines that will ensure the sustainable 
development objective of the CDM is achieved alongside its emission reduction objective.  
 
As a result of the challenges discussed above, one possible solution could be to make the 
minimum standards and guidelines optional, thereby making it easy for Parties to accept it.  
However, this will not improve the CDM because it is likely that such optional standards and 
guidelines will suffer from the same fate of varying approval procedures and sustainability 
assessment highlighted earlier in this chapter. Therefore, the only option is to make the 
minimum standards and guidelines mandatory for project participants and host countries. 
Arguments about the sovereign right of States to define their sustainable development can be 
refuted with the argument that the CDM is a voluntary mechanism and as such, it should only 
be open to project participants and host countries that are willing to abide by its minimum 
standards and guidelines, in order to promote its dual objectives. According to Bodansky 
noted “it is hard to imagine how problems such as global climate change will be successfully 
addressed, without the eventual establishment of more authoritative international institutions 
to set standards and oversee compliance”.460 Furthermore, this will discourage some host 
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 D. Bodansky, ‘The legitimacy of international governance: a coming challenge for international 
environmental law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law (AJIL), 599. 
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countries’ perception of the CDM as a source of foreign investment solely, to the detriment of 
pursuing sustainable development.  
 
3.3.1 Can the Validation and Registration Requirements Foster Policy Reforms 
That Will Promote Sustainable Development in Developing Countries? 
The desire to ensure effective implementation and governance of the CDM V & R 
requirements can act as a catalyst to prompt CDM host countries to establish rules, 
regulations, and infrastructures that will invariably foster policy reforms and development. 
For example, the World Bank requires that all projects funded by it should conduct an EIA. 
As a result of this stipulation, any country desirous of attracting funding from the World 
Bank to implement projects will, as of a necessity, conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
the environmental impacts of the proposed project. What this means is that this policy 
directive will not only ensure that host countries establish structures, policies and regulations 
for conducting EIAs, but it will also promote capacity building in environmental management 
in the host country.
461
   
 
Furthermore, the host country regulatory and infrastructural framework will be enhanced, 
where compulsory minimum standards and guidelines are established. This is because the 
need to conform to the standards of the CDM will ensure that internationally acceptable 
standards, and framework, adopted by the host country becomes a normative standard in that 
host country.
462
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Although previous research studies assert that the CDM has remained ineffective in 
promoting sustainable development in CDM host countries,
463
 this thesis advocates that the 
effective fulfilment and implementation of the V & R requirements can foster policy reforms 
and changes that will contribute to sustainable development in host countries. However, this 
can only be achieved if CDM host countries build upon the standards and guidelines provided 
by the CDM’s governing body. It is important to concede at this point that the ability of the V 
& R requirements to foster policy reforms is hampered by issues mentioned earlier at the 
beginning of the chapter, such as state sovereignty, capacity building needs, political 
instability, local rules and regulations and more importantly, the willingness of developing 
countries to use the CDM as an avenue to drive their sustainable development goals, and not 
only an avenue to attract foreign investment. Ultimately, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
the CDM and the V & R requirements can only provide tools to foster policy development 
and reforms in developing countries but it cannot solve fundamental issues and challenges 
that are unique to developing countries.     
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes that the V & R requirements for CDM projects, especially those V & 
R requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development, are not 
suitable to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. With regards to the 
analysis of the CDM PS and the VVS, It is commendable that the CDM PS has introduced 
further clarifications for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements. However, this does not go 
far enough to prescribe the minimum standards and guidelines necessary for fulfilling and 
implementing those V & R requirements in a way that will promote sustainable development. 
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Furthermore, some of the other V & R requirements remain unchanged and, overall, the 
CDM PS and the VVS do not provide the minimum standards and guidelines required to 
ensure their fulfilment and implementation promotes sustainable development.  
 
It is evident from the analysis of the V & R requirements that the governance of the CDM has 
a stronger focus on the cost-effective emission reduction objective of the CDM than it's 
sustainable development objective. This thesis assumes that because of the challenges of 
sovereignty of States, the CDM’s governing structure has devolved the governance of the 
sustainable development aspect of the CDM to host countries rather than prescribe minimum 
standards. Therefore, the onus is on the CDM host country to ensure that CDM projects, apart 
from fulfilling the cost-effective emission reduction objective of the CDM, also promote their 
sustainable development. However, as is shown in subsequent chapters, CDM host countries 
are often unwilling
464
 or unable
465
 to ensure that proposed projects contribute to their 
sustainable development priorities. This may be due to issues such as lack of capacity and 
expertise to implement CDM projects, the absence of national framework to govern the CDM 
process, the interests of host country to secure as many CDM projects as possible because of 
the investment they bring, little incentive to require strong sustainability criteria that could 
dampen investment, lack of infrastructure within CDM host countries, political instability, 
and the need to address urgent national issues such as poverty alleviation.    
 
The next chapter examines the institutional structure of the CDM. It examines how the 
institutional bodies supervise the CDM, focusing in particular on their functions in relation to 
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projects contribute to sustainable development in host countries.    
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the supervision, (of the fulfilment and the implementation),
466
 of the V & R requirements for 
CDM projects.  
  
                                                 
466
 The V & R requirements are fulfilled by project participants and implemented by the DOE and the DNA. 
144 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CDM GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
4.1 Introduction: Governing the CDM 
Chapter 2 established that governance is a critical tool for advancing sustainable development 
at all levels.
467
 Chapter 3 concluded that the CDM rules and the CDM PS and VVS do not 
provide the minimum standards and guidelines required to ensure that the fulfilment and 
implementation of the V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting 
sustainable development promotes sustainable development. This chapter aims to determine 
whether the CDM’s institutional bodies can effectively supervise and implement the CDM V 
& R requirements and whether they can, through this supervision, promote sustainable 
development in CDM host countries. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to answer the second 
sub-research question - do the rules confer sufficient authority on the CDM’s institutional 
bodies to effectively implement and supervise the V & R requirements?
468
 An addendum, 
based on the analysis of the CDM VVS and its additional clarification to DOEs will be 
included in this chapter.  
 
To do this, this chapter examines the functions of these bodies, as provided for in the CDM 
rules). Specifically, it analyses if these functions include supervision of the V & R 
requirements, particularly those that should promote sustainable development in developing 
countries. This chapter also assesses the extent to which the CDM’s institutional bodies can 
                                                 
467
 The institutional structure of the CDM (national and international) is central to the delivery of sustainable 
development in the CDM. H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change, 13. See also K. Bäckstrand, 
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effectively carry out their supervisory functions and whether such supervision is well-suited 
and effective to promote the sustainable development objective of the CDM. Finally, this 
chapter considers whether the CDM’s institutional body, specifically the COP/MOP and the 
EB, have the authority to prescribe minimum standards to project participants and host 
countries, for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements that are tools for prompting 
sustainable development. This is particularly important because as noted in Chapter 3, the 
CDM’s institutional body is reluctant to prescribe guidance and minimum standards for the 
fulfilment of those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development in CDM 
host countries.  
 
The CDM’s institutional structure comprises the COP/MOP, the EB and its panels and 
working groups, DOEs and the UNFCCC Secretariat. In addition to these international 
bodies, DNAs are also part of the governance structure of the CDM because they are directly 
responsible for implementing the V & R requirements at the national level. Therefore, the V 
& R requirements can be loosely classified into international requirements that are supervised 
by the CDM’s institutional structure and national requirements that are implemented by the 
host country. Table 4.1 below provides a snapshot of the CDM’s institutional structure. Note 
that this chapter will only examine and analyse CDM actors that are directly involved in the 
supervision of the V & R requirements, such as the EB and its Registration and Issuance team 
(RIT), UNFCCC Secretariat, DOEs and DNAs. In addition, this chapter will briefly examine 
and analyse the functions and the role of the COP/MOP, although they not directly involved 
in the supervision of the CDM, they are involved in the formulation of the rules governing 
the CDM. 
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4.2 The Institutional Structure of the CDM 
Evaluating the institutional structure
469
 of the CDM is critical to assessing the extent to which 
the CDM is likely to contribute to sustainable development in CDM host countries.
470
 This is 
because the institutional structure of the CDM is crucial for implementing policies, 
establishing procedures, approving projects, monitoring and certifying emission 
reductions.
471
 Furthermore, the institutional structure of the CDM is central to ensuring that 
the CDM achieves it dual objectives.  
Table 4.1: Overview of the CDM Institutions 
Body/Institution  Composition  Role Decision-making 
COP/MOP 1. All Parties to 
the KP. 
 
2. Convenes 
annually. 
1. The governing body of the KP 
and the ultimate authority over 
the CDM. 
2. Approves the 
recommendations made by the 
EB. 
3. Designates operational entities 
that are accredited by the EB.   
Makes decisions 
for the effective 
implementation of 
the KP, including 
the CDM. 
 
Executive Board 
(EB) 
10 members and 
10 alternate 
members elected 
by the 
COP/MOP.  
 
1. Supervises the CDM under 
the authority and guidance of the 
COP/MOP. 
2. Approves and registers CDM 
projects. 
3.    Approves baselines and   
monitoring methodologies. 
4.    Reviews small-scale project 
procedures. 
5.    Issues CERs. 
 6.   Accredits DOEs. 
7.    Interprets the decisions of 
the  COP/MOP 
 
 
 
 
Prepares technical 
and decision papers 
for review and 
adoption by the 
COP/MOP. 
Panels  1. Technical 
experts 
nominated by the 
EB. 
The panels assist the EB in the 
execution of its tasks. 
1. CDM-AP: Supports the EB in 
the accreditation of DOEs.  
1. The expert 
panels do not make 
decisions. 
2. They undertake 
                                                 
469
 Ganapati and Liu define institutional structure as the “manifest arrangement of relationships between 
government and non-government organisations for implementing CDM projects.” S. Ganapati and L. Liu 
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Policy Review 717 – 739. 
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 D. Feaver and N. Durrant, ‘A regulatory analysis of international climate change regulation’ (2008) 30(4) 
Law & Policy 394 at pg. 395.  
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2.  There are 3 
panels: the 
Accreditation 
Panel (CDM-AP); 
the 
Methodologies 
Panel (Meth 
Panel); and the 
Small-Scale Panel 
(SSC Panel).   
 
2. Meth Panel: develops 
guidelines for baseline 
calculations and monitoring 
methodologies. 
2a. Reviews new baseline and 
monitoring methodologies.  
3. SSC Panel: makes 
recommendations on simplified 
modalities and procedures for 
small-scale CDM projects. 
technical 
assessments and 
make 
recommendations 
to the EB. 
 
 
Working Groups 
 
1.  Technical 
experts 
nominated by the 
EB 
2. The EB has 
established two 
groups: The 
Afforestation and 
Reforestation 
Working Group 
(A/R WG); and 
the Small-Scale 
Working Group 
(SSC-WG) 
 
  
1. Act as consultative bodies to 
the EB 
2.  Review submissions from 
stakeholders 
3. Undertake technical 
assessments  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Same as above 
 
 
Review and 
Issuance Team 
(RIT) 
 
 
1.  Experts 
nominated by the 
EB 
 
 
 
The RIT  assists the EB and: 
1.  Considers requests for 
registration of CDM projects 
2. Considers requests for 
issuance of CERs submitted to 
the EB 
3. Makes recommendations to 
the EB on CDM projects that 
require review 
4. Makes recommendations to 
the EB on requests for issuance 
of CERs that require review 
 
 
 
Same as above 
DOE 1. Private 
companies 
accredited by the 
EB and 
designated by the 
COP/MOP 
  
  
1. Validates proposed CDM 
projects on behalf of the EB 
2. Verifies and certifies emission 
reductions achieved by 
registered CDM projects 
 
None 
UNFCCC 
Secretariat 
UN professional 
staff 
The Secretariat directly and 
indirectly supports and links the 
various actors participating in 
the CDM. The Secretariat:  
1. Prepares minutes of meetings. 
2. Drafts decisions and 
guidelines 
3. Reviews some of the 
documentation submitted by 
project participants, such as the 
None 
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project design documents 
 
DNAs 1. An 
administrative 
unit of the host 
country 
2. Usually located 
within the host 
country’s 
ministry of 
environment or 
energy 
1. Approves CDM projects 
2. Confirms that projects are 
voluntary and assist the host 
country in achieving sustainable 
development 
3. Influences CDM policies 
within the participating country 
 
 
 
 
   
None 
Adapted from C. Streck, ‘The governance of the Clean Development Mechanism: the case for strength and 
stability’472 
 
4.2.1 The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Protocol (COP/MOP) 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) refers to the Parties to the UNFCCC
473
 and the Meeting 
of the Parties (MOP) refers to the Parties to the KP. The Conference of the Parties serves as 
the Meeting of the Parties, and when this occurs it is known as the COP/MOP.
474
 The 
COP/MOP has authority over, and provides guidance to the EB in its supervision of the 
CDM.
475
 Therefore, the EB supervises the CDM under the authority and guidance of the 
COP/MOP.  
(a) Composition of the COP/MOP 
The COP/MOP is composed of all Parties to the UNFCCC that are also Parties to the KP.
476
  
                                                 
472C. Streck, ‘The governance of the Clean Development Mechanism: the case for strength and stability’ (2007) 
2 Environmental Liability 91 at pg. 93.  
473
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (New York) 9 May 1992, in force 24 
March, 1994. Reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 849.  
474
See Article 13 of the KP. This structure is intended to reduce costs and streamline management of the 
UNFCCC and the KP processes. See CDM Rulebook, ‘Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties’ (COP/MOP) www.cdmrulebook.org/pageid/438 (CDM Rulebook Website, 14/2/201).   
475
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs 2 and 3. Also see Article 12(4) KP. 
476
 Article 13(1) KP. Also see:  Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex Paragraph 2; and Section 3.2.1(c) of Chapter 3, on the 
ratification of the KP. 
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(b) Characteristics of the COP/MOP 
The COP/MOP meets annually. The meeting of the COP/MOP is open to all Parties to the 
UNFCCC that are also Parties to the KP. The meeting is also open to observers; these are 
Parties to the UNFCCC that are not Parties to the KP. However, decisions under the KP can 
only be taken by Parties to the Protocol.
477
  
(c)  Functions of the COP/MOP 
In general, the COP/MOP regularly reviews the implementation of the KP and takes 
decisions necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the Protocol,
478
 such as 
establishing subsidiary bodies that it deems necessary for effective implementation.
479
 The 
CDM rules also state the functions of the COP/MOP in relation to the CDM. These functions 
include taking decisions on the EB’s recommendations, such as on the EB’s rules of 
procedure,
480
 designating DOEs based on the accreditation of private entities by the EB and 
the accreditation standards contained in Appendix A of the CDM rules,
481
 and reviewing the 
annual reports of the EB, as well as the regional and sub-regional distribution of DOEs and 
CDM projects.
482
 The COP/MOP does this review to promote the accreditation and 
designation of private entities from developing countries as DOEs and to ensure that there is 
an equitable distribution of CDM projects.  
 
With regard to the V & R requirements, which are the focus of this thesis, the COP/MOP is 
responsible for providing the rules governing the CDM, which contains the V & R 
requirements.
483
 Decision 3/CMP.1, which contains most of the V & R requirements, is a 
                                                 
477
 Article 13(2) and (6) KP.  
478
 Article 13(4) (a - j) Ibid. 
479
 Article 13(4) (h) Ibid. 
480
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs 3(a) and (b). 
481
 Ibid. Annex, Paragraph 3(c). 
482
 Ibid. Annex, Paragraphs 4(a), (b) and (c).   
483
 Recall that the COP/MOP has the general mandate to review the implementation of the KP and takes 
decisions necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the Protocol.  
150 
 
decision of the COP/MOP. However, it does not have specific functions with regard to their 
implementation and supervision. The COP/MOP provides general policy guidance regarding 
the CDM, but the EB and the other institutional bodies, such as the DOEs, are the ones that 
are generally required to implement and supervise these decisions. Consequently, the 
functions of the COP/MOP will not be further examined, as the COP/MOP is not directly 
involved in supervising the fulfilment of the V & R requirements. 
 
4.2.2 The Executive Board (EB) 
The KP established the EB as a governing body to supervise the implementation of the 
CDM.
484
 Similarly, the CDM rules provide the EB with the mandate to supervise the CDM, 
whilst remaining fully accountable to the COP/MOP.485 In addition to the general supervisory 
role provided in the KP, the CDM rules provide additional rules relating to the EB’s 
functions, membership and rules of procedure.
486
  
 
(a) Composition of the EB 
The EB is composed of 10 members and 10 alternate members appointed from Parties to the 
Protocol
487
 and are formally elected by the COP/MOP.
488
 They are elected for a term of two 
years and are eligible to serve a maximum of two consecutive terms.
489
 The 10 members 
                                                 
484
 Article 12(4) of the KP. See also UNEP Risoe Centre and Baker and McKenzie, Legal Issues Guidebook to 
the Clean Development Mechanism (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development, 2004), 22. 
485
  Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 5. 
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 Ibid. Annex, Paragraph 5(a-p). 
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 Ibid. Annex, Paragraph 8(b). 
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consist of one member from each of the five UN regional groups,
490
 two members from 
Annex I Parties; two members from non-Annex I Parties; and one representative of the small 
island developing States.
491
   
 
(b) Characteristics of the EB 
(i) Environmental Integrity and Impartiality: the integrity of the CDM and its governing 
body is essential to its success and acceptance; therefore, the CDM rules prohibit EB 
members from having pecuniary or financial interest in CDM projects.
492
 EB members are 
also prohibited from having pecuniary or financial interest in DOE organisations.
493
 At the 
start of each meeting, members of the EB must confirm that in carrying out their duties, they 
are not influenced nor have any interest in any CDM project or DOE, and objections 
regarding this confirmation can be made by stakeholders, including private or public 
entities.
494
 Furthermore, once elected, EB members act in their personal capacity and do not 
represent their individual countries when serving as members of the Board.
495
 Therefore, 
when performing their role, EB members are not acting as government officials and would 
therefore not be entitled to any privileges and immunities as representatives of their 
countries.
496
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http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=1241 (IETA Website, 22/11/ 2010). 
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However, in spite of the safeguards built into the CDM rules to prevent conflict of interest of 
a financial, political or personal nature, EB members may, nevertheless, be faced with 
conflict of interest situations when carrying out their duties. This is because EB members, 
while serving as members of the Board, may also serve concurrently as negotiators for their 
country during climate change negotiations and may also represent their DNA.
497
 For 
instance, in a study by Streck and Lin which compared the list of EB members and the 
representatives of country DNAs in 2007, they noted that there were possible conflict of 
interest situations arising as a result of overlap in responsibility of EB members and their 
responsibilities to their national DNA office.
498
 According to them, apart from serving as EB 
members, some of the EB members also represent their national DNA office in all aspects of 
the CDM, from the purchase of CERs, to the sale of CERs.
499
  
 
A look through the current list of EB members indicates, for instance, that the current vice 
chair of the EB, Martin Niall Hession, also works for the UK DNA- he is responsible for 
management and advice on UK project assessment and approval.
500
 The Chair of the EB, 
Maosheng Duan, acts as an advisor to the Chinese DNA as well as being a member of the 
EB.
501
 A recent empirical study of the EB’s decision-making process examined, among other 
issues, the role and influence of EB members’ nationality on the recommendations and 
decisions of the EB to register CDM projects, and the relevance of political-economic versus 
                                                 
497
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498
 C. Streck and J. Lin, ‘Making markets work: a review of CDM performance and the need for reform’ (2008) 
19(2) EJIL 409 at pg. 424. See also J. Sepibus, ‘The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – a legal 
analysis of its institutional and procedural shortcomings’ (2009) Swiss National Centre of Competence in 
Research (NCCR) Working Paper No 2009/24, 17. 
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500
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 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Members/files/bio_duan.pdf (‘Composition of the CDM Executive Board for 
2011’ UNFCCC Website, 10/06/ 2011). This information was correct as of August, 2011. 
153 
 
technical determinants of EB decision making.
502
 The study concluded that countries with 
representation on the EB board have a higher chance of swaying decisions in favour of their 
national governments and private investors.
503
  
 
(ii) Non-Binding Decisions: The decisions of the EB are not formally binding on Parties and 
other entities that participate in the CDM. However, it is generally accepted by Parties and 
entities participating in the CDM that the decisions of the EB are de facto binding on them.
504
 
Therefore the validity of the EB’s decisions is based on the acceptance and submission by 
Parties and entities to them.
505
 This is discussed in greater detail in Section 4.3 below 
 
(iii) Relevant Expertise: EB members must possess appropriate technical and/or policy 
expertise to serve on the Board.
506
 However, because of the increasing number of technical 
and methodological issues that arise from CDM projects, these issues are sometimes beyond 
the expertise of EB members.
507
 For that reason, the CDM rules allow the EB to establish 
expert panels and working groups to assist it in supervising the CDM. This chapter discusses 
some of these expert groups and committees in Section 4.2.3 below.  
 
(c) Functions of the EB 
(i) Makes Recommendation to the COP/MOP 
                                                 
502
 F. Flues et al., ‘What determines UN approval of greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing 
countries?’ (2009) 145 (1-2) Public Choice 1 at pg. 2.  The study is based on nearly 1000 projects and 250 
methodologies discussed by the EB up to October 2007.  
503
 Ibid at 5. 
504
 C. Streck and J. Lin, (2008), 417. 
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 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraph 8(c). 
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 C. Streck, (2007), 97. Streck notes that although EB members are usually qualified to exercise an oversight 
function on the CDM, they are however inundated with various technical details.  
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The EB makes recommendations to the COP/MOP on further modalities and procedures for 
the CDM and on any amendments or additions to the rules of procedure for the EB.
508
 For 
instance, the EB is in charge of methodologies for the CDM, it approves new methodologies, 
including baseline and monitoring methodologies, to ensure that GHG reductions are real, 
measurable and additional.
509
 The EB is also responsible for the accreditation of operational 
entities and makes recommendations to the COP/MOP for the designation of these 
operational entities as DOEs.
510
 This also includes responsibility to re-accredit, suspend and 
withdraw the accreditation of operational entities.
511
  
 
(ii) Registration and Review of Proposed CDM Projects 
The EB is responsible for registering proposed CDM projects. The DOE submits a request for 
registration to the EB, together with the validation report, the PDD, and the LoA of relevant 
Parties.
512
 The registration of the proposed CDM project is automatic eight weeks after the 
DOE submits the request for registration.
513
 However, if a Party involved in the project or at 
least three members of the EB express concerns, then the project enters a review phase.
514
 A 
proposed project is reviewed, for example, because of issues relating to the V & R 
requirements
515
 and the EB must complete its review within 30 days.
516
  
 
(iii) General Functions Linked to the V & R Requirements 
                                                 
508
 Decision 3/CMP.1, Annex, Paragraphs (5) (a) and (b). 
509
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In addition to these specific functions, the EB also has general functions linked to the V & R 
requirements. The CDM rules provide that the EB shall make recommendations to the 
COP/MOP on further modalities and procedures for the CDM,
517
 the approval of new 
methodologies for establishing baselines, monitoring plans and project boundaries.
518
 These 
functions of the EB in relation to the V & R requirements for the CDM, as well as its overall 
functions to supervise the CDM are analysed below. 
  
Analysis of the Role and Performance of the EB
519
  
The COP/MOP provides general policy guidance on the governance of the CDM while the 
EB translates this general policy guidance into specific guidance at project level. However, in 
translating this general policy guidance, its decisions on the CDM must be consistent with 
provisions of the KP, the CDM rules, and general principles of international law.
520
  
 
The main role of the EB is to supervise the CDM.
521
 The supervisory role of the EB includes, 
inter alia, recommending further modalities for the CDM to the COP/MOP, approving new 
methodologies relating to, inter alia, baselines, and monitoring plans, accrediting operational 
entities and addressing issues relating to observance of modalities and procedures for the 
CDM by project participants and/or DNA and report on them to the COP/MOP.
522
 In addition 
to these, Decision 4/CMP.1 provides the procedure for review of a proposed CDM project
523
 
and the EB supervises the process. The request for review of the decision to register a 
                                                 
517
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518
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519
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proposed CDM project must be related to issues associated with the validation 
requirements.
524
  The duties of the EB can be categorised into regulatory and administrative 
functions in the governance of the CDM. Its administrative function includes providing the 
COP/MOP with a report of its meetings while its regulatory function includes approving new 
methodologies relating to, inter alia, baselines, monitoring plans and project boundaries. 
 
In addition, the EB exercises supervisory role in relation to the V & R requirements. For 
instance, Paragraph 5(n) states that the EB should address issues relating to observance of 
modalities and procedures for the CDM by project participants and/or operational entities, 
and report on them to the COP/MOP.
525
  Although on the face of it, it appears as though the 
EB has the authority to ensure the effective fulfilment and implementation of the V & R 
requirements by project participants and the host country, including those that would promote 
sustainable development in CDM host countries, however, a closer look at the regulatory 
functions of the EB and the V & R requirements indicate that the EB only has direct control 
and oversight over those V & R requirements that are relevant for fulfilling the emission 
reduction objective of the CDM.
526
 This is because the EB has guidelines and minimum 
standards for fulfilling those requirements that are related to the emission reduction objective 
of the CDM, for example, the requirement for additionality and baseline and monitoring 
methodology. Furthermore, although the CDM rules provide that the EB should address 
issues relating to the fulfilment of the modalities and procedures for the CDM by project 
participants and/or DOEs, but in common with many of the provisions relating to the 
governance of the CDM in the CDM rules, this provision is very broad and vague. The EB’s 
duty, to ensure that the modalities and procedures for the CDM are observed by project 
                                                 
524
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participants and DOEs, does not stipulate how it should do this. Therefore, for requirements 
that are fulfilled and implemented by the host country, such as stakeholder participation and 
EIA, the EB does not appear to have the authority to question how the host country has 
implemented them or how the project participants have fulfilled them. However, for 
requirements, which are classified as international in this chapter and which are not relevant 
to sustainable development in the host country, there are detailed rules for their fulfilment, 
such as additionality and baseline and monitoring requirement.  
 
As such, it is not feasible for the EB to supervise either the fulfilment or the implementation 
of those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development since the manner of 
the fulfilment and the implementation of those requirements depend on standards in CDM 
host countries. Therefore, the current role of the EB, in ensuring that those V & R 
requirements are fulfilled and implemented in a manner that will promote sustainable 
development, is restricted to ensuring, through a checklist that those requirements are 
fulfilled in CDM host countries by project participants. Furthermore, as highlighted in 
Chapter 3, because the CDM rules and the EB did not provide minimum standards and 
guidelines for fulfilling those requirements, but leaves it up to the host country to determine, 
the EB cannot, rightly, review how these requirements have been fulfilled and implemented. 
Finally, the EB cannot supervise the fulfilment of the V & R requirements because the DOE 
validates projects on the basis of voluntary participation of Parties, additionality of project, 
and long term benefits to climate change only and the decision of the EB to register a project 
is based on the validation report of the DOE and nothing else. As a result, the EB cannot go 
outside the terms of the DOE’s validation report.527 Therefore, the EB does not appear to 
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have the authority to question how the host country has implemented V & R requirements or 
how the project participants have fulfilled them.  
 
Ideally, to promote sustainable development, the role of the EB should extend to translating 
general policy guidance into specific guidance at project level and guiding host countries in 
the effective implementation of those requirements. However the power to do this is limited 
by various issues such as the sovereign rights of nations and the acceptance of those 
standards and guidelines by sovereign host countries.
528
 According to Cruickshank et al., 
“[t]he current governance of the global commons through the prism of national sovereignty 
remains one of the most fundamental obstacles to progress.”529  
 
The EB faces challenges, with regard to its general duty to supervise the CDM, which will 
likely affect the achievement of the dual objective of the CDM. For instance, the EB has been 
criticised by CDM participants for inconsistencies and unpredictability in its decisions and 
decision-making process.
530
 Research studies have attributed the inconsistences and 
unpredictability to reasons such as the ambiguity of COP/MOP decisions,
531
 rotation of the 
EB members which results in lack of institutional memory and therefore inconsistencies in 
                                                 
528
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the Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012, accessed on 4/4/2012). See also M Ivanova (2011). ‘Global governance in 
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the EB decisions, the level of technical knowledge of members of the EB
532
 and what Streck 
refers to as ‘political interests’ and ‘horse-trading.’533  
 
Furthermore, the EB has been criticised for its lack of precedent, due to the fact that it is not 
bound by its previous decisions. This lack of predictability and certainty is regarded as a 
major drawback for efficient CDM supervision and governance.
534
 For instance, Krey and 
Santen in their assessment and analysis of CDM methodologies note that a majority of CDM 
methodologies have remained valid for less than a year and that two of the methodologies are 
currently in their ninth version.
535
  
4.2.3 EB Panels and Working Groups 
The CDM rules provide the EB with the mandate to establish committees, panels or working 
groups to assist it in the supervision of the CDM.
536
 Therefore, to assist it in carrying out its 
supervision of the CDM, the EB established the: Methodologies Panel (Meth Panel); CDM 
RIT; Accreditation Panel (CDM-AP); the Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group 
(A/R WG); and the Small-Scale Working Group (SSC WG). While EB members may be 
qualified to exercise general oversight of the CDM, they are however overwhelmed with the 
technical details of various project classes.
537
 Consequently, the EB depends on expert panels 
and working groups to assist it in fulfilling its functions and responsibilities under the CDM. 
The expert panels do not make decisions regarding the CDM; instead, they undertake 
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technical and expert assessments upon which the EB bases its decisions. In addition to these 
groups, the UNFCCC Secretariat acts as the administrative centre for the EB and the CDM.  
 
The following section will discuss and analyse the functions and role of only those expert 
panels that have responsibilities to supervise the V & R requirements. Therefore, the 
functions and role of the RIT and the UNFCCC Secretariat will be discussed and analysed 
below. This section will not analyse the functions and the role of the Meth panel, CDM-AP, 
A/R WG, and SSC WG, as they are not involved in the supervision of the fulfillment of the V 
& R requirements. 
  
(a) Registration and Issuance Team (RIT) 
The RIT was established to assist the EB in its task of considering requests for registration of 
proposed projects that have been validated by DOEs, as well as requests for issuance of CERs 
submitted to the EB by DOEs.
538
  
(b) Composition and Characteristics of the RIT 
The RIT is composed of not less than 20 members.
539
 Members of the team are selected by 
the EB based on a public call for experts posted on the UNFCCC website, and members are 
then selected from a shortlist compiled by the Secretariat.
540
 The selection observes the 
principle of regional balance and relevant work experience.
541
  
 
According to Krey and Santen, the RIT was set up in early 2006 as a second layer of 
independent assessment of CDM projects after criticism of the quality of the validation 
                                                 
538
 Terms of Reference and Procedure for a Registration and Issuance Team (RIT) (Version 5.1), Twenty-Ninth 
Meeting Report 14
th
 -16
th
 February 2007, Annex I4, Paragraph 1. Hereinafter referred to as CDM-EB-29 
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reports and the DOEs.
542
 RIT members are paid by the EB for the appraisal work they 
undertake on behalf of the EB.
543
 The RIT operates under the guidance of the EB.
544
 Experts 
appointed to the RIT are expected to possess, inter alia, relevant working experience, of at 
least four years on methodological issues and monitoring and verification experience related 
to project-based mechanisms.
545
  
 
(c) Functions of the RIT 
In carrying out its role, the RIT appraises the PDD and the supporting document of proposed 
CDM projects.
546
 RIT members are required to declare any perceived conflict of interest in 
any of the case they assess and they are required to treat with strict confidentiality, any 
confidential information which they obtain in the process of work.
547
 The terms of reference 
of the RIT provides that the appraisal should assess, in particular, the application of the 
baseline and monitoring methodology, additionality, and the determination of baseline in the 
proposed CDM project.
548
 The RIT either recommends the project for registration or 
highlights issues that need further clarification to the EB, and the EB decides whether or not 
to request a review of the validated project.
549
  
Analysis of the Role and Performance of the RIT 
Unlike the COP/MOP and the EB, the terms of reference of the RIT are directly related to the 
supervision of the V & R requirements. Apart from appraising the request for registration and 
                                                 
542
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supporting documentation submitted by the DOE, the terms of reference of the RIT specify 
that in its appraisal, the RIT member should focus on only the application of the baseline and 
monitoring methodologies, additionality test and determination of baseline of the proposed 
CDM project.
550
 These are V & R requirements that will enhance the achievement of the 
emission reduction objective of the CDM, but not the sustainable development objective. 
Therefore, the terms of reference of the RIT specifically do not require appraisal of the 
fulfilment of the V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for achieving sustainable 
development. 
 
 Another seemingly small, but crucial, weakness, of the RIT is the fact that its members work 
individually. RIT members do not work together and are in different locations.
551
 Members 
are also most likely to have varied experience and qualifications,
552
 which would likely result 
in a less coherent appraisal of registration requests overall.
553
 The creation of the RIT has 
resulted in an increase in the scrutiny of projects and the weeding out of non-additional 
projects.
554
   
4.2.4 The UNFCCC Secretariat  
The climate change secretariat was established by the UNFCCC
555
 to provide general 
secretarial functions for the convention and its Parties.  
                                                 
550
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or any related discipline. 
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(a) Composition and Characteristics of the UNFCCC Secretariat 
The UNFCCC Secretariat is staffed by paid career staff with administrative functions. The 
Secretariat serves as the ‘institutional memory’ for the CDM;556 it acts as the administrative 
centre for the CDM and provides administrative services to the COP/MOP, the EB and other 
CDM actors.
557
 More importantly, the UNFCCC Secretariat supports and links all relevant 
actors in the CDM by providing a means for them to co-ordinate their activities and functions 
in a cost-efficient manner.
558
  
 
(b) Functions of the UNFCCC Secretariat 
The CDM rules provide that the Secretariat shall service the EB.
559
 To do this, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat receives, reproduces and distributes to EB members and alternate members, the 
minutes of EB meetings.
560
 It translates the EB’s decisions into all six official languages of 
the UN and makes those decisions publicly available.
561
 Furthermore, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat assists the EB in keeping and maintaining relevant CDM information, and also 
performs any other function that the EB may require.
562
 
 
In addition to its administrative duties, the EB, in 2007, made further changes to the 
procedure for the appraisal of request for registration for proposed CDM projects. Under 
these changes, in addition to the RIT’s appraisal of registration request, the UNFCCC 
Secretariat conducts a ‘completeness-check,’ upon the receipt of a request for registration of a 
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proposed CDM project.
563
 The ‘completeness-check’ is a further examination by UNFCCC 
Secretariat to ensure that all necessary documents have been submitted and the registration 
fees have been paid.
564
 The documents required to conduct the completeness check are the: 
PDD; validation report of the DOE; LoA from all Parties involved in the proposed CDM 
project; letter of voluntary participation from the DNA of each of the project participants; 
modalities of communication form; and registration request form.
565
  
 
Furthermore, the guideline reaffirms that all information relating to the demonstration of 
additionality, and determination of the baseline requirements, should be presented in a 
transparent manner in the PDD.
566
 In addition, the UNFCCC Secretariat is required to ensure 
that the version of methodology applied by the project participants is valid, at the point of 
submission and request for registration.
567
 The UNFCCC Secretariat thereafter makes a 
recommendation to the EB for registration of the project or highlights issues that need to be 
addressed by the DOE before the project can be registered.
568
  
Analysis of the Role and Performance of the UNFCCC Secretariat 
Similar to the appraisal process for requests for registration conducted by the RIT, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat is only required to check those V & R requirements that are relevant for 
the emission reduction objective of the CDM. For instance, the UNFCCC Secretariat is 
required to check that all information relating to the demonstration of additionality, and 
determination of the baseline requirements are presented in a transparent manner in the 
                                                 
563
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PDD.
569
 The ‘completeness check’ does not include an assessment or appraisal of the 
effective fulfilment of the stakeholder participation process, EIA and the sustainable 
development contributions of proposed CDM projects. The UNFCCC Secretariat is only 
required to check that those requirements have been fulfilled, not how they were fulfilled. 
However, the appraisal of registration request by RIT members and the ‘completeness-check’ 
conducted by the UNFCCC Secretariat have led to an increase in the number of rejected and 
reviewed projects.
570
 Schneider notes that the EB has largely delegated the technical 
assessment of projects to the RIT and the UNFCCC Secretariat, and that the EB only reviews 
projects where the RIT or the UNFCCC secretariat raises issues of concern or further 
consideration by the EB.
571
 
 
4.2.5: Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) 
DOEs validate proposed CDM projects on the basis that project participants are participating 
voluntarily without coercion, emission reduction is additional to any that would have 
occurred in the absence of the proposed project, the project results in real, measurable and 
long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change,
572
 and all the V & R 
requirements related to sustainable development. 
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(a) Composition of DOEs 
There are currently 41 entities accredited by the EB and designated as operational entities by 
the COP/MOP.
573
 DOEs are usually private consultancy firms or certification companies 
providing CDM validation and certification services.   
(b) Characteristics of DOEs 
The EB accredits DOEs according to the accreditation standards contained in Appendix A of 
the CDM rules. Upon accreditation, the EB makes a recommendation to the COP/MOP that 
the entity be designated as an operational entity.
574
 Although DOEs are paid by the project 
participants for their validation, verification and certification services, the DOE acts as an 
agent of the EB,
575
 it is accountable to the COP/MOP through the EB and is bound to observe 
all CDM rules and relevant decisions of the COP/MOP and EB.
576
  
 
To safeguard the environmental integrity of the CDM, DOEs must demonstrate that they or 
their sub-contractors have no real or potential conflicts of interest with the project 
participants.
577
 Furthermore, to address the possible conflict of interest situation that may 
arise as a result of the fact that project participants pay the DOE to act as agents of the EB, 
the EB may do the following: conduct spot-checks of DOEs at any time; ensure that DOEs 
are in compliance with the accreditation standards; and recommend to the COP/MOP to 
withdraw or suspend the accreditation of a DOE, if it no longer meets the accreditation 
standards.
578
 
                                                 
573
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(c) Functions of DOEs 
DOEs operate under contractual agreements with project participants to validate and confirm 
that proposed projects satisfy the V & R requirements.
579
 In validating proposed CDM 
projects, DOEs are also required to ensure that they comply with applicable laws of the CDM 
host countries.
580
  
 
The CDM Manual provides that DOEs shall be guided by the following terms when 
validating and verifying information provided by project participants: accuracy of 
quantitative and non-quantitative data;
581
 conservative information that is not 
overestimated;
582
 relevant information that ensures compliance with the CDM 
requirements;
583
 credible information that is authentic and able to inspire belief or trust,
584
 
reliable information, such that the quality of evidence is accurate and credible and able to 
yield the same results on a repeated basis;
585
 completeness of validation, such that all relevant 
information for assessment of GHG emission reductions and the information supporting the 
methods applied are included in the validation report;
586
 and a validation opinion that 
provides confirmation of GHG emission reductions or removal by a proposed CDM 
project.
587
 In addition to the terms for validation, the CDM Manual provide that DOEs shall 
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be guided by the principles of consistency, transparency, impartiality, independence and 
safeguarding against conflicts of interest, and confidentiality.
588
  
Analysis of the Performance of DOEs 
The CDM rules are vague and they provide little guidance to DOEs for validating the V & R 
requirements that are tools for achieving sustainable development.
589
 However, the CDM 
Manual provides further clarification to assist DOEs in validating CDM projects.
590
 While the 
further clarification provided is a step in the right direction, the clarification still falls short of 
providing DOEs with the necessary authority to supervise the V & R requirements in a way 
that would promote sustainable development. In other words, the CDM Manual, like the 
CDM rules, fails to provide guidelines and minimum standards for fulfilling those V & R 
requirements that are tools for achieving sustainable development.  
 
For example, the CDM Manual clearly states that, in validating the requirement for 
confirmation from host Party DNA that the project assists it in achieving sustainable 
development, the DOE is required to determine that the LoA confirms the contribution of the 
proposed CDM project to the sustainable development and no more.
591
 There is no 
requirement for the DOE to establish how the DNA arrives at this conclusion and there is no 
indication in the LoA of how the DNA arrives at this conclusion. Furthermore, the CDM 
projects assessed in Chapter 5 indicates that there is little evidence that host countries give 
serious consideration to the sustainable development contributions of the projects they 
approve. It is also most likely that host countries assume that CDM projects will contribute to 
                                                 
588
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their sustainable development without deliberate action on their part to ensure that this is the 
case. 
 
In addition, in validating the requirement for analysis of environmental impacts and EIA, the 
CDM Manual only requires that DOEs should determine, through a document review and/or 
using local official sources and local experts, whether the project participants have 
undertaken an analysis of environmental impacts and an EIA, if required by the host Party.
592
 
DOEs are not required to ensure that the analysis of environmental impacts conducted is 
sufficient for the proposed project. In addition, in situations where the result of the 
environmental analysis indicates that the project will result in adverse environmental impacts, 
DOEs are not required to determine whether, based on the analysis of the environmental 
impacts, the decision not to conduct an EIA is appropriate.   
 
With regards to validating stakeholder participation, the CDM Manual provides that DOEs 
should validate the requirement by means of document review and interviews with local 
stakeholders as appropriate,
593
 in order to determine that: comments by local stakeholders 
that can reasonably be considered relevant for the proposed CDM project have been 
invited;
594
 the summary of the comments received from the stakeholder participation process 
and provided in the PDD is complete;
595
 and the project participants have taken due account 
of any comments received and have described this process in the PDD.
596
 If it is properly 
implemented, this is a useful provision for ensuring that the process of stakeholder 
participation adopted by the project participant is effective. However, this provision still 
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leaves room for inconsistent interpretations by DOEs. For instance, the provision that the 
DOE should ensure the adequacy of the stakeholder participation process by means of 
document review and interviews with local stakeholders is vague, as the provision does not 
specify: how and what the DOE should use to base its decision to conduct interviews with 
stakeholders; and how the interview should be conducted. Therefore, the effective 
implementation of this provision depends on the interpretation that the DOE gives to it. 
 
Furthermore, the CDM Manual specifies that in validating the stakeholder participation 
process, the DOE should ensure that local stakeholders that can reasonably be considered 
relevant for the proposed CDM project have been invited.
597
 This could be yet another 
excellent opportunity for the DOE to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are involved in the 
consultation process. However, without providing guidelines, it is a challenge for DOEs to 
come to a decision on ‘whether relevant stakeholders have been identified and their 
comments sought by CDM project participants’. The CDM Manual however, provides the 
required guidelines. It provides that the validation opinion of the DOE should describe the 
steps it has taken to ensure the adequacy of the stakeholder participation process
598
 and also 
state its opinion on the adequacy of the process adopted by the project participants.
599
  
 
Ultimately, DOEs do not have the requisite authority to validate the effectiveness of the 
fulfilment of the V & R requirements that are tools for promoting sustainable development. 
As discussed above, with regard to confirmation of sustainable development, stakeholder 
participation and the environmental analysis and EIA, the DOE can only check whether or 
not these have been done. The DOE has not been given the authority to assess the adequacy 
                                                 
597
 Ibid. Paragraph 129(a). 
598
 Ibid. Paragraph 130 (a). 
599
 Ibid. Paragraph 130 (b). 
171 
 
of what has been done
600
. For stakeholder participation however, the CDM Manual does 
provide useful guidance to the DOEs on how to examine and evaluate the adequacy of the 
stakeholder participation process adopted by the project participants. Although it is not clear 
what the effect would be if the DOE was of the opinion that stakeholder participation was not 
adequate, at least on the face of it, this seems to give DOEs the authority to go beyond the 
fact of whether or not stakeholder participation has been undertaken, to assess the adequacy 
of the process. This should be the same for all V & R requirements that promote sustainable 
development, such as the confirmation of sustainable development, environmental analysis 
and EIA.  
 
With regards to their general CDM functions, recent studies rating the performance of DOEs 
conclude that the overall rating for all DOEs is relatively low because of the high number of 
projects that are rejected, reviewed or requested for corrective action by the EB.
601
 
Schneider’s assessment of the performance of DOEs grouped their performance into three 
phases: phase 1 (until the end of 2005), in which the EB had to assess each project submitted 
for registration by DOEs; phase 2 (2006), during which the EB established the RIT to 
appraise the PDDs and other supporting documents of each proposed CDM project, and to 
highlight issues that required further consideration by the EB; and phase 3 (from 2007), 
during which the UNFCCC Secretariat started the ‘completeness check’ on each project 
submitted by DOEs for registration, in addition to the assessment conducted by the RIT.
602
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Schneider notes that the number of projects that have been reviewed or rejected for 
registration have increased with each of these phases.
603
 Figure 4.2 below illustrates this fact. 
However, as shown in Chapter 5, projects were mainly rejected by the EB for their failure to 
prove additionality or to apply the appropriate baseline and monitoring methodologies. None 
of the 84 rejected projects assessed in this thesis were rejected for their failure to comply with 
any of those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development in the CDM, 
such as stakeholder participation and EIA. Therefore, the increase in the number of rejected 
projects, on the face of it, has little do to with the CDM’s contribution to sustainable 
development.  
Figure 4.2: Share of Reviewed and Rejected Projects by the EB 
 
Source: L. Schneider604 
 
A more recent study by Schneider and Mohr rated the performance of DOEs, focusing on the 
outcome of the request for registration submitted by the DOE to the EB, and whether the 
DOE had dealt with the fulfilment of the V & R requirements by the project participants 
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adequately.
605
 The following five DOEs were rated by the authors: Bureau Veritas 
Certification Holding SAS (BVC); DNV Climate Change Services AS (DNV); SGS United 
Kingdom Limited (SGS); TÜV NORD CERT GmbH (TÜV-Nord); and TÜV SÜD Industrie 
Service GmbH (TÜV-Süd). The study noted that the rating for the DOEs was low because of 
the high number of proposed CDM projects that have been rejected, reviewed or sent back to 
the DOE for corrective action by the EB.
606
 The study rated the DOEs in relation to their 
validation of the fulfilment of the V & R requirements.
607
 The result of the ratings is as 
follows:
608
 TÜV-Nord has a D rating with 0.66 points; TÜV-Süd has a D rating with 0.65 
points; BVC obtained an F rating with only 0.43 points; SGS obtained an E rating with 0.54 
points; and DNV obtained 0.64 points but it had a F rating because its accreditation was 
suspended at the time of the rating.
609
 Of the five DOEs rated, TÜV-Nord and TÜV-Süd have 
the best performance. BVC has a poor performance because of its high share of rejected 
projects or projects sent back for corrective action, while SGS’s performance is average.610 
Given that DOEs act as agents of the EB and their responsibility is to ensure that project 
participants have fulfilled the V & R requirements, this is an indictment on the overall quality 
of the audit and validation of proposed CDM projects.  
 
In addition, some DOEs have been suspended and subsequently reinstated after spot checks 
undertaken at their offices revealed procedural breaches. For example, the following DOEs 
were suspended for failing to follow CDM procedures and inspection rules. In November 
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2008, the accreditation of the Det Norske Veritas (DNV) was suspended and later reinstated 
in February 2009. Similarly, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS UK) was suspended in 
2009 and TUV SUD in March 2010.  
 
This suggests that there are some lapses in the validation of CDM projects by DOEs. For 
instance, the assessment and analysis of rejected projects in Chapter 5 indicates that some 
projects were rejected for failing to fulfil basic V & R requirements that the DOE should have 
picked up on during the validation process, such as project start date. For instance, ‘Capex 
S.A. – Agua Del Cajón Thermal Power Plant – Open To Combined Cycle Conversion’ was 
rejected for registration by the EB because the start date of the project was before 1st January 
2000.
611
   
 
Several reasons could be proffer for the lapses in the performance of DOEs. One reason could 
be the possible conflict of interest in the relationship between DOEs and project 
participants.
612
 Although DOEs are accredited by the EB and act as its agents in the 
validation of proposed CDM projects, they are hired and paid by the project proponents. 
Another possible reason could be the highly competitive market of validating, verifying and 
certifying CDM projects. This has possibly increased the pressure on DOEs to carry out 
validation and verification as quickly as possible, thereby resulting in procedural lapses and 
                                                 
611
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non-compliance. According to Schneider, the race to attract more validation business has 
resulted in the falling of standards.
613
  
 
Also, while the number of projects rejected by the EB and the number of projects going 
through the review process has increased since 2007, there are very few instances where the 
DOE rejects the validation of projects for failing to fulfill the V & R requirements. For 
instance, Michaelowa cited just one example of a DOE that publicly rejected the validation of 
a proposed hydro project in China because it became clear during the review process that the 
project start date did not conform to the CDM rules and the investment analysis proving the 
additionality of the project was dishonest.
614
  However, note that this rejection was only made 
after the project had been sent to the EB by the DOE and that the DOE had earlier confirmed, 
through its validation report, that the project had fulfilled the V & R requirements, and 
requesting that the project be registered as a CDM project. The request for review was made 
by the EB and it was only then that the DOE disassociated itself from the project.
615
 
 
Addendum 
Although the CDM Manual was replaced with the CDM VVS, there is very little difference 
in the validation requirements and means of validation contained in both provisions.
616
 As 
such, the CDM VVS has the same shortcomings as the CDM Manual; it provides little 
guidance to DOE for validating those V & R requirements that are tools for promoting 
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sustainable development. For example, the validation requirement for contribution to 
sustainable development in the CDM VVS states that the DOE shall confirm that the DNA 
has ‘considered’ whether the proposed CDM project assists the host Party in achieving 
sustainable development. In addition, the means of validation states that the DOE shall 
determine whether the LoA by the DNA of the host Party confirms the contribution of the 
proposed CDM project to the sustainable development of the host Party.
617
 The provisions in 
the CDM VVS with regards to validating the contributions to sustainable development 
remains vague because it does not establish parameters for determining how the DNA should 
‘consider’ whether the proposed CDM project assists the host Party in achieving sustainable 
development. The validation of this requirement is therefore dependent on the subjective 
opinion of the DOE because the DNA is not required to show how it arrived at the 
confirmation that the project contributes to sustainable development and there is no indication 
in the LoA of how the DNA arrives at this conclusion. Therefore, the DOE can only assume 
‘consideration’ of sustainable development contribution from the LoA.  
 
The clarification on validating the requirement to conduct environmental analysis and EIA is 
also insufficient. Specifically, the CDM VVS did not attempt to change or provide further 
clarification for fulfilling this requirement. Paragraph 134 of the CDM VVS states that the 
DOE shall determine whether the project participants conducted an analysis of the 
environmental impacts, including transboundary impacts, and whether those impacts are 
considered significant by the project participants or the host Party. To validate this 
requirement, the DOE is only required to assess the fulfilment of the requirements by means 
of a document review and/or using local official sources and expertise.
618
 The CDM VVS 
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does not provide further guidance to the DOE, on instances where the impacts are significant 
and an EIA is deemed not necessary by the project participants and the DNA. The DOE is 
only required to base its validation report on whether the project participants have undertaken 
an analysis of environmental impacts and, if required by the host Party, an EIA. 
619
 
 
With regards to the requirement for stakeholder’s participation, there is very little difference 
in the provisions of the CDM Manual and the CDM VVS. The means of validation are the 
same for both,
620
 however there is a slight difference in the validation requirement. Both the 
CDM VVS and the CDM Manual state that the DOE shall determine whether the project 
participants have completed a local stakeholder consultation process. The CDM VVS adds an 
additional validation requirement that that the DOE shall determine whether due steps were 
taken by project participants to engage stakeholders and solicit comments.
621
  
 
Overall, the CDM VVS is only a slight improvement on the CDM Manual. This is to be 
expected because the CDM VVS, like the Manual, can only prescribe validation steps that are 
contained in the CDM rules and the CDM PS. Therefore, where the CDM rules and the CDM 
PS do not prescribe additional steps for project participants to fulfil, then the CDM VVS 
cannot seek to validate additional requirements that are not contained in the CDM rules and 
the CDM PS.  
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4.2.6: Designated National Entity (DNA)  
(a) Composition and Characteristics of DNAs  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the CDM rules do not prescribe the structure or model for 
establishing DNAs. However, generally, countries participating in the CDM adopt inter alia, 
the single government model, two-unit model.
622
 Each Party wishing to participate in the 
CDM must establish a DNA.
623
 Thus DNAs must be established by both the Annex I Party 
participant and the non-Annex I Party.
624
 The DNA of a country is the principal point for 
CDM activities in both Annex I and non-Annex I countries.
625
  
(b) Functions of DNAs 
The DNA of both Annex I and non-Annex I Parties approves proposed CDM projects 
through the issuance of a LoA.
626
 For Annex I Parties, a LoA from the Annex I DNA must 
confirm that the Party has ratified the KP and that its participation is voluntary. Thus, the role 
of the Annex I country DNA in the validation and registration process is limited to the 
granting of a LoA. However, for non-Annex I Parties, the host country DNA must confirm 
that: the Party has ratified the KP; participation in the CDM is voluntary; and the project 
contributes to sustainable development in the host country. The DNA issues the LoA upon 
confirmation of these additional requirements and any other country specific requirements.
627
  
 
The CDM rules are sparse on the functions and role of DNAs.
628
 Therefore Parties, especially 
non-Annex I Parties, could bestow additional responsibilities on their DNAs, above the 
minimum requirements specified in the CDM rules. The role of the DNA in the CDM can be 
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broadly classified into regulatory and promotional functions.
629
 The regulatory function 
involves establishing an approval process for proposed CDM projects and in the case of 
CDM host country, confirmation of sustainable development contribution of the proposed 
CDM project. This regulatory function is a prerequisite for the validation and registration of 
proposed CDM projects and it must be performed by all DNAs involved in the CDM 
project
630
 The promotional functions of the DNA are not mandatory.
631
 For example, it has 
been suggested that the DNA can assume the following promotional roles: promote CDM 
activities and organise training activities for various stakeholders;
632
 assist in the 
identification of investment opportunities;
633
 and identify priority areas for CDM project 
implementation.
634
  
Analysis of the Role and Performance of DNAs  
The DNA is a key part of the validation and registration process. This is because the DNA 
implements the fulfilment of the V & R requirements in the host country and they ensure that 
national rules and regulations are adhered to by project participants. Another key role of the 
DNA is the approval and issuance of the LoA. This is because without the host country 
approval, and the issuance of a LoA, proposed projects cannot proceed to project validation 
and registration. Unfortunately, it appears that host country DNAs have not utilised the 
authority that this role confers upon them to ensure that CDM projects promote their 
sustainable development priorities. For instance, none of the host countries analysed in this 
thesis requires that the sustainable development benefits described in the PDD should be 
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monitored alongside the V & R requirement to monitor and verify GHG reductions 
achieved.
635
 In the same vein, none of the DNAs require that sustainable development 
contribution should be verified at the verification stage, before the project is certified and 
awarded CERs. In other words, a project that claims in the PDD (before gaining approval 
from the DNA) that it will, for example, commit a percentage of the CERs to community 
development programmes and fails to do so is unlikely to be penalised by the CDM host 
country DNA.
636 
 
The absence of guidelines and minimum standards for the fulfilment and implementation of 
the V & R requirements should be considered a challenge and an advantage by DNAs. This is 
because DNAs do not require approval from the COP/MOP or the EB to establish national 
additional criteria that will promote their development priorities. The V & R requirements are 
mere checklist of requirements and DNAs can go over and above those requirements to 
provide guidelines and standards that will ensure that CDM projects contribute to the 
sustainable development objectives of host countries. Having said this, it is important to 
acknowledge that the competitive nature of the CDM, and host countries’ desire to attract 
CDM projects and the foreign investment it brings, may impede host countries from going 
over and above what is required by the V & R requirements and the CDM PS and VVS adds 
very little to the required minimum.  
4.3 Do the COP/MOP and EB Have the Competence to Prescribe Minimum 
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Standards or Guidelines for the Fulfilment of the V & R requirements for 
CDM Projects?
637
 
The analysis of the V & R requirements in Chapter 3 indicates that the V & R requirements 
do not provide minimum standards regarding the fulfilment of those V & R requirements that 
promote sustainable development in CDM host countries.
638
 The CDM rules regarding the 
fulfilment of those V & R requirements only provides checklist of what should be fulfilled 
and not minimum standards on how those requirements should be fulfilled. Furthermore, the 
analysis in Chapter 3 also indicates that the CDM PS and the VVS do not go far enough to 
prescribe the required minimum standards and guidelines lacking in the CDM rules, for 
fulfilling those V & R requirements that promote sustainable development. In addition, 
Chapter 3 concluded that minimum standards and guidelines, for the fulfilment of the V & R 
requirements, are essential to ensure that the CDM achieves its sustainable development 
objective.   
 
Having analysed the roles and functions of relevant CDM governing institutions that have 
authority over, and supervise, the CDM, this section considers if these institutions can 
prescribe minimum standards for fulfilling those V & R requirements that promote 
sustainable development.
639
 It does this bearing in mind that this thesis has established that 
the CDM’s institutional body has prescribed minimum standards and guidelines for fulfilling 
and implementing those V & R requirements that are relevant for the effective governance of 
the emission reduction objective of the CDM.  
                                                 
637
 H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change, 11. The authors suggests that “Global governance 
therefore encompasses the numerous activities which are significant both in establishing international rules and 
in shaping policy through ‘on-the-ground’ implementation even when some such activities originate from actors 
that, technically speaking, are not endowed with formal authority.” 
638
 Recall that most of the V & R requirements are fulfilled according to national rules and legislations in the 
CDM host country and that the CDM rules provide that it is the host country’s prerogative to decide if a project 
contributes to its sustainable development priorities. Indeed, the DOE is only required to have received a written 
confirmation from the host party confirming that the project assists it in achieving sustainable development. 
639
See conclusions reached in Chapter 3.  
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The COP/MOP and the EB are international organisations, and like any international 
organisation, they have only such powers as have expressly been conferred on them by their 
constituent instruments or that can be implied from those instruments.
640
 The analysis of the 
competence of the COP/MOP and the EB to prescribe minimum standard or guidelines, for 
those V & R requirements that promote sustainable development, will be answered in three 
parts: does the COP/MOP have the competence to prescribe minimum standard or guidelines 
for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements? Does the EB also have the competence to 
prescribe guidelines or minimum standards for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements? If 
the answer is no, can such powers be implied from their constituent instruments?  
 
The COP/MOP is an example of an international organisation created by an international 
agreement amongst States.
641
 The COP/MOP, like any other international organisation, has 
only such powers that are expressly conferred on it by its constituent agreement (the KP and 
relevant COP/MOP decisions, such as Decision 3 CMP.1).
642
 The COP/MOP, by virtue of the 
UNFCCC, the KP and the CDM rules, has a broad mandate to review and promote the 
effective implementation of the UNFCCC and the KP.
643
 Article 13(4) of the KP provides 
that “[t]he Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make, within its 
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.” Furthermore, 
                                                 
640
 See: P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 6th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2009), 297; D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); M. Shaw, International Law 6
th
 edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
1297. See also:  R. Flathman, ‘Legitimacy’ in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds.), A Companion To Contemporary 
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1995), 527. 
641
 P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, 126-127. 
642
 Ibid. at 301. 
643
 See Articles 7 and 13 of the UNFCCC and the KP respectively, basically the same provisions. Also see:  
Paragraph f of Article 13 of the KP; and D. Feaver and N. Durrant, ‘A Regulatory analysis of international 
climate change regulation’ (2008) 30(4) Law & Policy 394 at pg. 406. 
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Article 13(4) (f) of the KP provides that the COP/MOP can make recommendations on any 
matter necessary for the implementation of the KP.
644
 Therefore, the provision of Art 13(4) is 
broad enough to allow the COP/MOP to recommend guidelines and minimum standards for 
the effective fulfilment and implementation of the V & R requirements. 
 
With regards to the second part of the question, i.e. does the EB also have the competence to 
prescribe guidelines or minimum standards for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements, the 
answer is also yes. Article 12(4) of the KP provides that the CDM shall be subject to the 
authority and guidance of the COP/MOP and be supervised by the EB. The CDM rules also 
affirm the supervisory role of the EB; it mandates the EB to supervise the CDM, whilst 
remaining fully accountable to the COP/MOP.645 For instance, in their supervision of the 
CDM, the EB makes recommendations to the COP/MOP on further modalities and 
procedures for the CDM, as appropriate,
646
 as well as recommendations for amendments or 
additions to its rules of procedure.
647
 The wordings of Article 12(4) and the provisions of the 
CDM rule therefore suggest a delegation of authority to the EB by the COP/MOP. This 
therefore implies authority to act as a regulatory body for the implementation of the CDM 
and to ensure the mechanism achieves its dual purpose. In accordance with its duty to act as a 
regulatory body for the implementation of the CDM and to ensure the mechanism achieves its 
cost-effective emission reduction objective, the EB provides guidelines to ensure the effective 
fulfilment and supervision of some of the V & R requirements, such as the ‘Tool for the 
demonstration and assessment of additionality.’648  
                                                 
644
 Furthermore, Paragraph 2 of the CDM rules states that the COP/MOP shall have authority over and provide 
guidance to the CDM. 
645
 Ibid. Paragraph 5. 
646
 Ibid. Paragraph 5(a). 
647
 Ibid. Paragraph 5(b). 
648
 The latest version of the additionality tool (Version 05) was adopted at EB 39, Annex 10, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/039/eb39_repan10.pdf  (UNFCCC Website, 16/8/ 2011). 
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In the same vein, the EB can, and should, provide guidelines and minimum standards for the 
fulfilment of those V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable 
development. The introduction of guidelines or minimum standards would not pre-empt the 
sovereignty of host countries to define their development priorities according to their own 
needs. This is because the guidelines or minimum standards, although not binding on Parties, 
it will act as a guide and it will provide minimum standard for fulfilling V & R requirements 
in a way that promotes sustainable development. For example, the ‘Tool for the 
demonstration and assessment of additionality,’ is not binding on project participants, but it is 
widely used by project participants as a general framework to demonstrate additionality.
649
 
Despite its challenges,
650
 there is no doubt that the additionality tool has helped to set 
minimum standards and guide project participants in proving the additional reduction that are 
likely to occur as a result of the implementation of the proposed CDM projects.  
 
In addition, this author believes that the fact that a sovereign State is a Party to the UNFCCC 
and the KP, it has invariably curtailed some of its sovereign rights in this regard. This is 
because States have increasingly conferred broader public powers of governance on 
international organisations. Furthermore, the issue of State consent in the acceptance of the 
decisions of international organisations has been eroded.  According to Sarooshi, 
“[i]nternational organizations have increasingly themselves interpreted their powers – even of 
binding decision – in an expansive manner that blurs the role of State consent.” If a host country 
accepts to host CDM projects, it can safely be assumed that it has ‘self-imposed’ the authority 
of the CDM’s institutional bodies and invariably consents to their authority to prescribe, for 
                                                 
649
A. Michaelowa, ‘Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: changes in additionality definitions and 
regulatory practices over time’ in D. Freestone and C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, 
Copenhagen and Beyond, 54.  
650
 See discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 for discussion on the additionality test.  
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example, minimum standards and guidelines for fulfilling the V & R requirements that are 
necessary for promoting sustainable development.
651
 According to Streck 
If the COP/MOP decisions do not display any clear legally binding effects on 
the Parties to the treaty; this is far less the case for the decisions of the EB. 
Furthermore, it appears from the last five years of CDM implementation that 
while the decisions of the board do not have a formally binding effect on the 
Parties to the Protocol, their effect has been accepted as de facto binding on 
entities that participate in the CDM, which includes both Parties to the Protocol 
and private and public sector legal entities.
652
  
4.4 Conclusion 
The CDM is an ever evolving mechanism. It is arguably one of the most innovative 
experiments in international law to date. For example, it facilitates private-public 
partnerships, which is essential to address the ‘multi-level’ challenges of climate change.653 
However, as with most innovative mechanisms, there is room for improvement, especially 
with regard to its institutional framework, which is relevant for the effective supervision of 
the V & R requirements.
654
  
 
This chapter has analysed whether the institutional structure of the CDM can effectively 
supervise the fulfilment of the V & R requirements, so as to promote the sustainable 
development objective of the CDM. The chapter concludes that the KP, the CDM rules, the 
CDM Manual and the CDM VVS do not confer sufficient authority on the the CDM’s 
                                                 
651
 C. Streck and J. Lin, (2008), 417. 
652
 C. Streck, (2007) 95.  
653
 See: C. Streck, (2007), 99 and H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change, 4. 
654
 J. Sepibus, ‘The environmental integrity of the CDM Mechanism – a legal analysis of its institutional and 
procedural shortcomings’, 14. Sepibus notes that despite the various procedural and institutional safeguards built 
into the registration process for CDM projects, the process is not sufficient. 
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institutional bodies, to ensure the effective implementation and supervision of those V & R 
requirements that will promote the sustainable development objective of the CDM.  
 
This is because the CDM rules and the CDM Manual do not confer on the DOEs the 
authority to go beyond the checklist and ensure that those V & R requirements that will 
contribute to sustainable development are fulfilled in a way that will promote sustainable 
development in the host country. For instance, apart from the additionality test and the 
baseline and monitoring methodologies, the other V & R requirements such as stakeholder 
participation and EIA are implemented by the host country, without guidelines or minimum 
standards for their fulfilment. As it is, CDM’s institutional bodies can only check whether 
these requirements have been fulfilled on the face of it – they do not have the authority to 
assess how the requirements have been fulfilled and whether the fulfilment has been done in 
such a way as to promote or ensure sustainable development. Furthermore, although the 
CDM VVS provides some clarification that will assist the DOE in its validation of some of 
the V & R requirements, the clarification does not go far enough to ensure effective 
supervision of those V & R requirements that are essential for achieving sustainable 
development in CDM host countries by the CDM‘s institutional bodies. This is a key failing 
of the current CDM rules, which affects the institutional strength and capacity of the CDM’s 
institutional body and their ability to implement and supervise effectively the V & R 
requirements. 
 
The authority of the EB to impose minimum standards and guidelines for fulfilling the V & R 
requirements, especially those that promote sustainable development, has been established in 
this chapter. However, there is reluctance on the part of the EB to prescribe minimum 
standards and further guidelines for fulfilling those V & R requirements that will promote 
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sustainable development. This author can only speculate that one of the reasons for the 
reluctance, to prescribe minimum standards and guidelines, stem from the wish of the EB to 
respect the sovereignty rights of States to prescribe national rules and regulations that will aid 
the fulfillment of the V & R requirements implemented by CDM host countries. However, to 
ensure that the dual objectives of the CDM are effectively supervised, the CDM’s 
institutional bodies should not adopt a ‘hands-off policy’ on supervising the effective 
implementation of the sustainable development objective of the CDM. Furthermore, DNAs 
should utilise their prerogative to define sustainable development priorities, to ensure that 
CDM project contributes to sustainable development in host countries.  
 
This chapter restates the recommendation made in Chapter 3 that the EB should provide 
guidelines and minimum standards for ensuring that V & R requirements are fulfilled, 
implemented and supervised to promote sustainable development. The following chapter 
examines how the V & R requirements have been fulfilled in practice by project participants 
and the CDM’s governing bodies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FULFILMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
THE VALIDATION AND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 examined the suitability of the V & R requirements and the institutional 
structures of the CDM and the ability of both to promote the CDM’s sustainable development 
objective. The overall conclusion reached is that they are both limited in their capacity to 
promote the sustainable development objective of the CDM. The purpose of this chapter is to 
determine whether, despite these lapses, the V & R requirements for CDM projects are 
effectively fulfilled by project participants, implemented by host country DNAs and 
supervised by the CDM’s institutional body in a way that promotes sustainable development 
in CDM host countries. To do this, this chapter assesses
655
 and analyses selected registered 
and rejected CDM projects. The purpose of the assessment and analysis of registered CDM 
projects is to determine how project participants fulfil the V & R requirements that are 
regarded as tools for achieving sustainable development and how the DNA implements those 
requirements to determine whether the fulfilment and implementation of the requirements 
promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. Rejected projects are assessed and 
analysed to determine how the CDM’s institutional bodies supervise the fulfilment of those 
requirements. This will allow a conclusion to be reached about the extent to which the 
CDM’s institutional body, notably the EB, ensures compliance with those V & R 
requirements that can promote sustainable development in CDM host countries.  
 
This chapter answers the second part of the main research questions, i.e. how are the V & R 
                                                 
655
 Note that the assessments of the registered and rejected projects are set out in Appendix 3 of this thesis.  
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requirements for CDM projects fulfilled, supervised and implemented in practice, and has the 
practical application of V & R requirements helped or hindered the promotion of sustainable 
development? 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections: Section 1 outlines the method used for the 
assessment of the registered and rejected projects, together with the percentage of projects, 
sectoral scopes and host countries assessed; Section 2 presents the findings from, and analysis 
of, the assessment of the registered projects; and Section 3 presents the findings from, and 
analysis of, the assessment of the rejected projects.  
 
5.2  Project Selection and Methodology for Assessment
656
 
As explained above, this chapter undertakes a critique of the fulfilment and implementation 
of the V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development. 
For this, selected registered projects are analysed to determine how the requirements are 
fulfilled and implemented by project participants and DNAs and selected rejected projects are 
analysed to determine how the requirements are supervised by the CDM’s governing 
structure.
657
 
(a) Selection of Registered Projects 
For the initial assessment of registered projects, 100 registered CDM projects were selected 
from the UNFCCC project database.
658
 At the time of project selection in January 2008,
659
 
                                                 
656
 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 for a detailed discussion of methodology. 
657
 See Chapter 3 for analysis of the V & R requirements.  
658
 See Appendix 1 of this thesis for a list of the CDM projects assessed. See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3, for a 
more detailed discussion of how and why projects have been selected. 
659
 The projects assessed in this thesis were selected in 2008, which is when this author began assessing and 
analysing the projects. The projects were selected from all registered projects as at December 2007, which is the 
cut-off date chosen in order to allow time for project analysis and the presentation of findings in the thesis 
within the time allowed for a PhD thesis. See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3 for a more detailed explanation of the 
thesis methodology, including the selection of projects assessed and analysed. 
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there were over 1000 registered CDM projects in the UNFCCC project pipeline and 10% 
(100) of those projects were selected. The 100 registered projects consist of 32 small-scale 
and 68 large-scale CDM projects. Of these 100 CDM projects, 83 are Annex I-sponsored 
projects and 17 are unilateral.
660
 Projects are also selected from all the sectoral scopes
661
 that 
had projects registered under them as at the date of project selection. The CDM projects were 
selected from the following 24 developing host countries. The breakdown of the projects 
assessed by countries and number of projects are: 8 host countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Honduras (4), Colombia (3), Chile (6), Guatemala (1), Argentina (2), Brazil (6), 
Mexico (7) and Bolivia (1); 10 in Asia: China (20), Republic of Korea (4), Bangladesh (1), 
India (25), Malaysia (4), Israel (1), Vietnam (1), Indonesia (1), Philippines (1) and Pakistan 
(1); 4 in Africa: South Africa (4), Nigeria (1), Tanzania (1) and Egypt (1); and 2 in Europe: 
Armenia (1) and Moldova (3). See Figure 5.1 below for the percentage of selected projects 
implemented in each of these countries.  
                                                 
660
Note that the proportion of Annex I to unilateral projects in this thesis is not representative of the proportion 
of Annex I to unilateral projects in the UNFCCC CDM project pipeline. Annex I sponsored project are projects 
that Annex I Parties or their entities sponsor as project participants. An Annex I project can be bilateral or 
multilateral. A bilateral CDM project involves an Annex I Party or entity investor and a host developing 
country. A multilateral CDM project involves two or more Annex I Party investors and a CDM host country. 
Examples of multilateral CDM projects are those administered by international financial agencies such as the 
World Bank, where investors contribute to a multilateral fund and the funds are used to invest in CDM projects 
in order to generate carbon credits. Unilateral CDM projects refer to CDM projects that do not have an Annex I 
Party or entity as project participants (sponsors) of a CDM project. See Appendix 1 of thesis for a list of the 
projects assessed.  
661
 There are fifteen sectoral scopes for CDM projects.  The list of sectoral scopes is based on the list of sectors 
and sources contained in Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. The scopes are: Energy industries (renewable-/non-
renewable sources) (scope 1); Energy distribution (scope 2); Energy demand (scope 3); Manufacturing 
industries (scope 4); Chemical industry (scope 5); Construction (scope 6);  Transport (scope 7); Mining/Mineral 
production (scope 8); Metal production (scope 9); Fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil and gas) (scope 10); 
Fugitive emissions from production and consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride (scope 11); 
solvents use (scope 12); Waste handling and disposal (scope 13); Afforestation and reforestation (scope 14); and 
Agriculture (scope 15). Scopes 1 to 9 are industrial sectors and 10 to 13 are sectors based on sources of GHG 
emissions. A CDM project could be registered under one sectoral scope or more. See ‘CDM project activities’ 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html  (UNFCCC Website, 12/12/ 2010).  Also see ‘Methodologies 
linked to sectoral scopes’ http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/sectoral sectoral scopes.html  (UNFCCC Website, 12/12/ 
2010). 
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of 100 Projects Selected and Assessed by Host Country 
 
 
 
As at December 2007, only 12 of the 15 sectoral scopes had projects registered under them 
and the 100 projects were selected from the 12 scopes as follows: 16 CDM projects from 
energy industries (renewable-/non-renewable sources (sectoral scope 1); 14 from energy 
demand (sectoral scope 3); 9 from manufacturing industries (sectoral scope 4); 13 from 
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Figure 5.1:  Percentage of Selected Projects Implemented in Each 
CDM Host Country  
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chemical industry (sectoral scope 5); 1 from transport (sectoral scope 7); 7 from 
mining/mineral production (sectoral scope 8); 1 from metal production (sectoral scope 9); 9 
from fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil and gas) (sectoral scope 10); 12 from fugitive 
emissions from production and consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
(sectoral scope 11); 10 from waste handling and disposal (sectoral scope 13); 1 from 
afforestation and reforestation (sectoral scope 14); and 7 from agriculture (sectoral scope 15). 
The following sectoral scopes did not have registered CDM projects at the time of project 
selection: energy distribution (sectoral scope 2); construction (sectoral scope 6); and solvents 
use (sectoral scope 12). The position remained the same for these sectoral scopes as of 1
st
 
May, 2012. See Figure 5.2 below for percentage of selected projects by sectoral scope.  
 
Figure 5.2: Percentage of CDM Projects Assessed by Sectoral Scope 
 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, to determine if there has been an improvement in the way the V & R 
requirements have been fulfilled and implemented over time, 20 registered CDM projects 
were selected from the UNFCCC’s project pipeline from 1st of January 2012 to 21st May 
2012. The projects were also selected from all the sectoral scopes that had projects registered 
under them as at the date of project selection. The CDM projects were selected from 
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following 6 developing host countries. The breakdown of the projects assessed by country 
and number of projects are: Senegal (1); India (4); Vietnam (2); Guatemala (1); China (11); 
Pakistan (1). The analysis of this further study is presented in Section 5.3.5 below. See Figure 
5.3 below for percentage of selected projects. 
Figure 5.3: Addendum: Percentage of Projects Assessed by Host Country 
 
(b) Selection of Rejected Projects  
84 rejected CDM projects across all the sectoral scopes were assessed. At the time of project 
selection in December 2008,
662
 there were 84 rejected projects and all of these projects were 
assessed for this thesis.
663
 The rejected CDM projects assessed consist of 38 small-scale and 
46 large-scale projects, and of 36 Annex I sponsored and 48 unilateral projects.
664
 
Furthermore, the projects were proposed to be implemented in 17 host countries as follows: 8 
host countries in Latin America: Honduras (3 projects), Panama (1 project), Chile (1 project), 
                                                 
662
 The cut-off date for rejected project selection is 1 December, 2008, which is a year later than the cut-off date 
for registered projects. Similar to the registered projects, the cut-off date for rejected projects was decided in 
order to allow time for project analysis and the presentation of findings in the thesis, within the time allowed for 
a PhD thesis. 
663
 There are currently 3,176 registered CDM projects in the UNFCCC’s project pipeline and 197 rejected CDM 
projects. See ‘CDM: project activities’ http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/index.html , (UNFCCC Website, 
19/6/2011). See Chapter 1, Section 1.6 for a detailed explanation of the project selection process. 
664
 See Appendix 2 of thesis for a list of the rejected CDM projects assessed. 
Addendum: Percentage of Projects 
Assessed 
China
India
Vietnam
Guatemala
Senegal
Pakistan
194 
 
Guatemala (2 projects), Argentina (1 project), Brazil (18 projects), Bolivia (1 project), and 
Mexico (3 projects); 7 in Asia: China (7 projects), India (35 projects), Republic of Korea (2 
projects), Indonesia (1 project), Philippines (1 project), Sri Lanka (3 projects)  and Malaysia 
(3 projects); 1 in Africa: Equatorial Guinea (1 project); and 1 in Europe: Republic of 
Macedonia (1 project). The following host countries dominate the rejected projects analysed: 
India (45%); Brazil (22%); China (10%); and Mexico (4%). See Figure 5.4 below for the 
percentage of rejected projects assessed by host country. 
 
Figure 5.4: Percentage of 84 Rejected Projects Selected by Host Country 
 
 
In terms of scope, the rejected projects assessed for this study were proposed in the following 
5 sectoral scopes: 61 projects were rejected for registration in sectoral scope 1; 8 in sectoral 
scope 3; 11 in sectoral scope 4; 3 in sectoral scope 13 and 1 in sectoral scope 10. See Figure 
5.5 below for the percentage of rejected projects assessed by sectoral scope. 
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of Rejected Projects Assessed by Sectoral Scope 
 
 
Also, in terms of project type, 48 of the projects are unilateral while 36 are Annex I 
sponsored projects. Further analysis of the data reveals that rejected CDM projects in 
developing countries that do not have a large share of CDM projects, and are not dominating 
the CDM market share, are usually unilateral projects.
665
 See Figure 5.6 below. 
 
Figure 5.6: Percentage of Unilateral and Annex I Rejected Projects 
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 Countries such as Bolivia, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Honduras, Philippines, Republic of Macedonia,  
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More recent rejected projects were not assessed for this thesis. This is because the author 
decided that additional assessment of rejected projects will not significantly improve the 
conclusions made in this thesis. A pilot study of recent rejected projects on the UNFCCC’s 
website indicated that projects were still rejected for the same reasons presented in Section 
5.4 below.   
(c) Methodology for Analysis of Registered and Rejected Projects
666
 
For the assessment of registered projects, this chapter examines the PDD of each selected 
project and determines how the requirements have been fulfilled.  The issue of - how the 
requirements have been fulfilled - is examined in only 4 of the 6 requirements, namely,  
confirmation of sustainable development contribution, stakeholder participation, 
environmental analysis and EIA, and in the case of the requirement for baseline and 
monitoring methodology, this requirement is assessed and analysed for whether, in addition 
to monitoring the emission reductions achieved, CDM projects assessed in this study will also 
monitor the sustainable development indicators of the projects. For the following reasons, the 
additionality test is not assessed for how it has been fulfilled: (a) it involves technical and 
complex issues that require specialist knowledge to effectively assess and analyse; (b) 
although it will contribute to sustainable development in a global context through the 
reduction and avoidance of GHGs in the atmosphere, it is not considered a tool that will 
necessarily promote sustainable development in the host country; and (c) the data required to 
analyse it is often not available publicly. Furthermore, the information and the data used to 
prove the additionality of CDM projects has been criticised as being highly subjective, 
unsubstantiated and difficult to replicate independently.
667
 In any case, as explained in 
                                                 
666
 Relevant information of all projects, both registered and rejected projects, is available on the UNFCCC 
website under ‘Project activities’ http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/index.html (UNFCCC Website, 16/6/2011). 
667
 L. Schneider, ‘Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and lessons learned’ 
(2009) 9 Climate Policy 242 at pg. 250. 
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Chapter 3, these requirements are not part of the tools for achieving sustainable development 
and, therefore, not analysing them does not detract from the value of the analysis conducted 
in this chapter.  
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the analysis made herein is based on the information contained in the 
PDD only. This is because the pilot study indicated that it was not necessary to analyse the 
validation report of the DOE for the following reasons: the validation report of the DOE 
basically echoes what is reported in the PDD and it does not contain additional information 
that will enhance the analysis made herein; as discussed in Chapter 3, the DOE does not have 
the requisite authority to validate the adequacy of the fulfilment and implementation of the V 
& R requirements that are tools for promoting sustainable development; and the DOE can 
only check whether these have been fulfilled and implemented and not how.   
 
For rejected projects, this chapter examines the EB’s decision to reject a proposed CDM 
project’s application for registration. The purpose of this is to come to a conclusion on the 
extent to which the EB is supervising the V & R requirements that are tools for promoting 
sustainable development in CDM host countries. The assessments of the registered and 
rejected projects are set out in Appendix 3 of this thesis and the analyses derived from the 
assessments are set out below. The analysis highlights differences and similarities in host 
country approaches, sectoral scope differences and similarities, innovative practices of host 
countries, and CDM projects with commendable practices. 
5.3. Fulfilment and Implementation of Validation and Registration 
Requirements - Analysis of Registered CDM Projects 
The V & R requirements that are generally regarded as tools for promoting sustainable 
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development will not promote sustainable development in the CDM unless they are 
effectively fulfilled, implemented and supervised.
668
 Therefore, this section analyses the 
fulfilment and implementation of the V & R requirements to determine whether and how this 
will enhance the sustainable development objective of the CDM.  The analyses are set out 
below according to the requirements being analysed. 
5.3.1 Written Confirmation of Sustainable Development Contribution of CDM 
Project 
The participation requirements consist of: ratification of the Kyoto Protocol; establishment of 
a DNA; confirmation of voluntary participation and written confirmation by the host Party 
DNA that the proposed CDM project assists it in achieving sustainable development.
669
 Only 
the requirement for written confirmation of sustainable development will be analysed in this 
section. This is because the requirement for ratification and DNA establishment are basic 
requirements that must be fulfilled once by all countries before they can participate in the 
CDM. To facilitate an analysis of this requirement, the host countries’ LoAs are assessed.670 
 
From the analysis, there is little evidence from the LoAs assessed that host countries give 
serious consideration to the sustainable development contributions of the projects they 
approve. This is because CDM host countries have adopted a catch-all, vague and standard 
confirmation that projects assist them in achieving sustainable development. The LoAs 
usually contain a standard statement by the DNA confirming that the project contributes to 
sustainable development. There are no details provided of the sustainability criteria used by 
the host country to come to the conclusion that the project will contribute to sustainable 
development. Furthermore, host countries have little incentive to require strong sustainability 
                                                 
668
 See the discussions in Chapters 1 and 3. 
669
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website. 
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criteria that could dampen investment.
671
 Therefore, the host country’s assessment is usually 
perfunctory. 
 
For instance, the LoA of ‘Rio Blanco Small Hydroelectric Project’ simply stated that the 
project will assist Guatemala in achieving sustainable development, and nothing else.
672
 As 
with most of the other LoAs assessed, there is no indication of the criteria and the indicators 
with which proposed CDM projects were assessed, to arrive at this conclusion. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, there are no guidelines on the content of such LoA and means of proving that 
the project contributes to the host country’s sustainable development and the criteria that 
were used to arrive at that conclusion. Project participants are, more likely than not, unsure of 
the sustainable development criteria which the DNA uses to assess and confirm project 
contribution to sustainable development. It seems this is one of the reasons why project 
participants keep the section on sustainable development in the PDD very vague.
673
 This will 
affect validation of this requirement by the DOE; because there are no defined criteria from 
the DNA and guidelines from the CDM rules, the DOE will invariably validate and confirm 
that the project will assist the host country in achieving sustainable development, irrespective 
of whether the project does or not.  
 
Therefore, there are two issues for analysis here: (a) do robust approval procedures contribute 
in more and varied ways to sustainable development in those countries than projects hosted in 
countries without such robust procedures? and (b) how do the CDM projects assessed in this 
thesis contribute to sustainable development in CDM host countries? These issues will be 
                                                 
671
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672
 CDM Project reference 0028 available at 
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Section 5.5 below on the approval procedure of select DNAs.  
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discussed below. This thesis recognises that the discussion of these two questions is not 
strictly relevant for the analysis of the fulfilment and the implementation of the V & R 
requirements made in this chapter, however, they become relevant because the answers to the 
two questions justify the recommendations made in Chapters 3 and 6 for minimum standards 
and guidelines for the V& R requirements. 
(a) (i) Do CDM Projects in Host Countries with Robust Approval Procedures 
Contribute in More and Varied Ways to Sustainable Development in those Countries 
than Projects Hosted in Countries without such Robust Procedures? 
The participation requirement presupposes that host country DNAs will establish CDM 
project approval procedure, including defining sustainable development criteria for proposed 
CDM projects. On the face of it, this is logical because it is the host country that will benefit 
from projects that promote its sustainable development objectives, and suffer from 
unsustainable projects. Therefore, the sustainable development contributions of CDM 
projects should align with the host countries’ defined sustainable development criteria.674 
This section will examine the CDM approval procedures of China, Brazil and India. It 
discusses the approval procedures used in these countries and determines whether the 
procedures promote sustainable development in these countries. This analysis will allow 
conclusions to be reached on whether robust approval procedures, for proposed CDM 
projects, will promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. The basis for the 
comparison of the approval procedures of these three countries is that they have the largest 
number of projects assessed and analysed for this study
675
 and they are presently dominating 
the UNFCCC CDM project pipeline. Furthermore, this study chose to analyse China because 
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of its discriminatory tax scheme. Brazil was selected because of the additional standards and 
guidance it established for the fulfilment of those V & R requirements that will promote 
sustainable development in CDM host countries. India was selected in order to compare its 
approval procedure with China and Brazil.  
 
CDM Approval Process in China 
China has a structured institutional framework for the governance and implementation of 
CDM projects. China’s ‘National Climate Change Programme’ outlines its objectives, basic 
principles, key areas of action, as well as policies and measures to address climate change.
676
 
The main law governing the approval process for CDM projects in China is the ‘Measures for 
Operation and Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China’ (China 
CDM Measures), which sets out the rules, measures for CDM project implementation, and  
the national agencies responsible for CDM project activities in China.
677
 The National 
Coordination Committee on Climate Change (the Committee) is at the head of the structure 
and is responsible for reviewing national CDM policies, rules and standards, approving 
members of the Board, and reviewing other CDM issues that it deems necessary.
678 
A 
National CDM Project Board (the Board) is also instituted under the Committee.
679
 The 
responsibilities of the Board include, inter alia, reviewing the following aspects of proposed 
CDM projects: participation requirement; baseline methodology and emission reductions; 
                                                 
676
 China’s National Climate Change Programme,   
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf . (China Climate Change Info-Net Website, 
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 China CDM Measures, Article 14. 
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vice chair of the Board, other Board members are the State Environmental Protection Administration, China 
Meteorological Administration, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Agriculture. See Article 15 Ibid. 
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price of CERs; funding of the proposed project and technology transfer; crediting period; 
monitoring plan; and the sustainable development effectiveness of proposed CDM projects in 
China.
680
 The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is a member of the 
Board and it also serves as the appointed DNA of China.
681
 Its responsibilities are to: receive 
CDM project applications; approve CDM projects jointly with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); issue LoAs on behalf of the 
Government of China; and supervise implementation of CDM project activities.
682
 
 
There is a clear procedure for approving CDM projects. The approval procedure in China 
consists of the following 5 steps: project participants submit required documents to the 
NDRC; the  NDRC invites independent experts to review the documents and provide their 
comments; the National CDM Board also reviews the application documents and makes its 
decision accordingly; based on the recommendations of both review processes, the NDRC 
approves or rejects the application in accordance with the decision made by the National 
CDM Board, and issue the LoA on behalf of the Chinese Government to the applicant. 
 
The institutional structure and approval process established for the approval of proposed 
CDM projects in China allows for checks and balances between the Committee and the Board 
in the approval of proposed CDM projects. For example, both the Committee and the Board 
review proposed CDM projects independently of each other. The dual examination of 
proposed CDM projects ensures that proposed projects are considered for their sustainable 
development benefits. In addition, because the Board is composed of different agencies with 
various professional experiences and skills, the approval process will benefit from the varied 
                                                 
680
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681
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682
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experience of the Board members. Furthermore, the different agencies have defined roles and 
responsibilities, albeit there may be instances of overlap in duties.
683
 As noted earlier and 
discussed in the following section, CDM host countries can introduce additional national 
measures to ensure that CDM projects contribute to their sustainable development 
objectives.
684
  
 
Measures to Ensure Sustainable Development Contribution of Proposed CDM Projects 
China has defined its development priority areas as energy efficiency, renewable energies, 
and methane capture and utilisation, to act as a guide to CDM project developers and to steer 
CDM projects towards those areas in order to promote its sustainable development. Article 4 
of China’s CDM Measures states that “[t]he priority areas for CDM projects in China are 
energy efficiency improvement, development and utilization of new and renewable energy, 
and methane recovery and utilization.” In addition, Article 10 stipulates that proposed CDM 
projects should promote the transfer of EST to China.   
 
To ensure that it attracts CDM projects to its defined priority areas, China established a 
discriminatory taxation scheme for different types of CDM projects. Article 24 of China’s 
CDM Measures establishes the taxation scheme on the proceeds of CERs from CDM 
projects. The scheme is discretionary because the taxation rate levied on CERs varies 
according to the relevance of the project to China’s defined priority areas.685 The tax rate 
levied on CERs ranges from 2% for projects in the priority areas of energy efficiency, 
renewable energies and methane capture and utilisation, 30% for N2O projects and as much 
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as 65% for HFC and PFC projects.
686
 The differences in the tax levied on CDM projects 
reflects China’s strategy to encourage the implementation of CDM projects that contribute 
most significantly to its sustainable development priorities.
687
  
 
The Chinese CDM policy rewards projects that contribute to its developmental priorities 
through lower taxes and tax breaks, and penalises those that do not, through higher taxes and 
levies. Therefore, although it hosts HFC and PFC projects, it places a higher tax on their CER 
proceeds because they do not fall within its priority areas for sustainable development. The 
revenue generated by the Government constitutes a special fund used to support sustainable 
development in China.
688
 However, this obvious discrimination has not discouraged investors 
from investing in CDM projects in China. China is possibly the only CDM host country that 
has successfully screened CDM projects against its defined sustainable development 
strategy.
689
  
 
Furthermore, China does not define its sustainable development priorities along the lines of 
social, economic and environmental components of sustainable development. Rather, the 
CDM projects are evaluated on the basis of their alignment with the areas defined as priority 
areas for sustainable development; energy efficiency improvement, development and 
utilisation of new and renewable energy, and methane recovery and utilisation.
690
 According 
to a 2009 EU-China CDM Facilitation Project Report, hydropower, energy efficiency and 
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wind power represent the majority of China’s CDM projects to date.691 This is an indication 
that China’s use of CDM projects to promote its sustainable development strategy has been 
successful.  
 
CDM Approval Process in Brazil 
The Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change (CIMGC) acts as the Brazilian 
DNA.
692
 For the approval of CDM projects, the Brazilian DNA produced a ‘Manual for 
Submitting CDM Project Activities to the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate 
Change aimed at obtaining a Letter of Approval from the Brazilian Government’ (Manual).693 
The Manual brings together, in a single document, the standard for CDM project approval in 
Brazil. It facilitates the submission of CDM projects in Brazil, and provides minimum 
standards and guidelines to guide project participants in the fulfilment of the V & R 
requirements, especially those requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting 
sustainable development, such as stakeholder participation. For example, the Manual 
provides a format of the letter of invitation with which stakeholders to a proposed CDM 
project should be invited for stakeholder consultation.
694
 Furthermore, the format lists 
specific information that should be included in the letter of invitation, such as the name and 
type of project and the proposed project’s contribution to sustainable development.695 In 
addition, the Manual makes provision for stakeholders who lack internet access to request in 
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writing a printed copy of the PDD and other attached documents from the project 
participants.
696
  
 
The Manual also provides guidance to project participants on relevant stakeholders. For 
instance, it provides a minimum list of relevant stakeholders that should be invited to 
comment on proposed CDM projects in Brazil.
697
 The Manual provides that, as a minimum, 
the letters of invitation should be sent to the following stakeholders: city hall of each town 
involved in the proposed CDM project; the city council of each town involved in the 
proposed CDM project; state environmental body; municipal environmental bodies; Brazilian 
NGO Forum and Social Movements for the Environment and Development; community 
associations whose purposes are directly or indirectly related to the proposed project; 
Attorney General of the State involved or the Attorney General for the Federal District and 
Territories; and the Federal Attorney General.
698
 In addition, the Manual seeks to ensure that 
proposed CDM projects comply with environmental and labour legislation in force in the 
country, through a declaration of compliance signed by national project participants.
699
 The 
DNA in Brazil will issue a LoA once it is satisfied that the proposed CDM project contributes 
towards Brazil’s sustainable development. Otherwise, the proposed project activity can be 
placed under review or it may be approved with conditions.
700
  
 
Measures to Ensure the Sustainable Development Contribution of Proposed CDM Projects 
Brazil defines five sustainable development criteria for proposed CDM projects. The five 
criteria for assessing proposed CDM projects in Brazil are local environmental sustainability, 
                                                 
696
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net job creation, income distribution, training and technological development, and regional 
integration and articulation with other sectors.
701
 The Manual specifically states that “[i]t is 
important to emphasise the contributions that can indeed be attributed to implementation of 
project activity, clearly separating them from other possible benefits. …It is worthwhile 
noting that reductions in greenhouse gas emissions do not configure a contribution to local, 
but to global, environmental sustainability.”702 The Manual further provides that it is not 
compulsory for the proposed project to fulfill all the above-stated criteria, and it recognises 
that the sustainable development contributions of CDM projects vary according to the 
sectoral scope of each project activity.
703
  
 
CDM Approval Process in India 
The National Clean Development Mechanism Authority (National CDM Authority) is the 
DNA in India.
704
 The DNA is hosted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). 
There are several government agencies responsible for CDM project approval in India. The 
Secretary of the MoEF acts as the chairperson of the DNA, other members of the National 
CDM Authority include the Foreign Secretary, Finance Minister, Secretary of Non-
Conventional Energy Sources, Secretary of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Secretary of the 
Ministry of Power, Secretary of the Ministry of Planning Commission or their nominees.
705
  
 
The National CDM Authority receives proposed CDM projects for approval.
706
 Before a 
proposed project is issued a LoA, the National CDM Authority reviews proposed CDM 
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projects to ascertain if it fulfils the sustainable development objectives of India
707
 and the 
likelihood that it would be successfully implemented.
708
 During the review of proposed CDM 
projects, the National CDM Authority can invite officials and experts from government, 
financial institutions, consultancy organisations, non-governmental organisations, civil 
society, legal profession, industry and commerce, as it may deem necessary, for technical or 
professional advice on proposed CDM projects.
709
 To further evaluate proposed CDM 
projects, project participants are required to make a presentation to the authority.
710
 The 
National CDM Authority can recommend additional requirements to ensure that a proposed 
CDM project meets its sustainable development objectives and complies with the national 
legal framework.
711
  
 
Measures to Ensure Sustainable Development Contribution of Proposed CDM Projects 
India defines its sustainable development criteria for CDM projects as social well-being, 
environmental well-being, technological well-being and economic well-being.
712
 The DNA 
considers proposed CDM projects as contributing to India’s social well-being if it alleviates 
poverty, creates additional employment, removes social disparities and contributes to the 
provision of basic amenities to the people.  Project contributes to economic well-being if it 
creates additional investment consistent with the needs of the people, and it contributes to 
environmental well-being if it positively impacts on resource sustainability, biodiversity, 
human health and reduces the levels of pollution in general. Technological well-being is 
defined as transfer of EST that is comparable to best practices globally, within the country as 
                                                 
707
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well from other developing countries.
713
  
 
Analysis of China, Brazil and India’s Efforts to ensure that Proposed CDM Projects assist them 
in Achieving Sustainable Development 
Given that defining and implementing sustainable development, in national and international 
law, is challenging,
714
 the three countries define the sustainable development criteria for 
proposed CDM projects differently. However, the procedure adopted by China appears to be 
the most effective at ensuring that CDM projects contribute to its defined sustainable 
development objectives and goals. Although China’s taxation method might be criticised for 
being discriminatory, the reality is the reverse and China currently has over 45% of the total 
number of registered CDM projects in the UNFCCC project database,
715
 and 20% of the 
projects assessed in this thesis are implemented in China.
716
 Therefore, China’s 
discrimination between CDM projects has not deterred investors. In fact, China has been able 
to use the CDM as a vehicle to promote its sustainable development priorities. By contrast, 
CDM host countries in Africa, who have minimal sustainable development criteria and 
additional requirements
717
 that could dampen investment, have less than 2% of the total 
number of registered CDM projects in the UNFCCC project database.
718
 This suggests that 
investors are not discouraged by rules and regulations, on the contrary, rules and regulation 
encourages investment confidence. Huq and Reid have attributed this to the fact that 
“…regulation and transparency lower the risk to the investors, and increase the likelihood 
                                                 
713
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that investments will have benefits that will last longer than the current policy maker’s term 
of office.
719
   
 
Brazil’s guidance provides added value by supplementing the CDM rules with minimum 
standards and guidelines for fulfilling those V & R requirements that will promote 
sustainable development. Furthermore, the approval process clearly sets out what is expected 
from project participants to fulfil the V & R requirements for CDM projects, such as 
conducting stakeholder participation. However, Brazil does not have priority areas for 
assessing the sustainable development contribution of proposed CDM projects. For instance, 
Brazil defines its sustainable development priorities broadly and they correspond with the 
generally accepted economic, environment, social and technological development pillars of 
sustainable development, without providing indicators for assessing these criteria. Also, 
India’s definition of its sustainable development criteria for proposed CDM projects is similar 
to Brazil’s. The dangers of adopting broad sustainable development goals is that, it is most 
likely that, virtually all proposed CDM projects will fit within Brazil and India’s broad 
sustainable development criteria.
720
  
 
Unlike Brazil, India’s approval process does not provide additional guidance for fulfilling 
those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development.  As discussed later in 
this chapter, the result is that fulfilment of the V & R requirements for promoting sustainable 
development are inconsistent and vary significantly between projects, leading to an ad-hoc 
approach by project participants in India. Like Brazil, India’s defined sustainable 
development criteria for approving proposed CDM projects is broad and unlikely to achieve 
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the success that China has, in directing CDM projects towards its development priorities. 
Furthermore, although the approval process for proposed CDM projects in India states that 
the DNA, in approving projects, will seek to prioritise projects in accordance with national 
priorities, it is unclear how the DNA does this in India. Such broad sustainable development 
priorities may be perceived to boost the volume of CDM projects implemented in these 
countries, but the result is that of the three approval procedures, China and Brail are most 
likely to be successful at promoting the countries’ sustainable development. The strategy 
adopted by India seems weak and unlikely to steer CDM projects towards priority areas that 
are necessary to achieve sustainable development in both countries.  
 
In establishing additional approval procedures and requirements that will promote their 
sustainable development, host countries have to be mindful of their obligations under 
international and regional treaties and agreements. For example, one of the fundamental 
principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) trading system is the principle of 
‘national treatment’ which states that imported and locally-produced goods and services 
should be treated equally. This principle of ‘national treatment ‘of giving others the same 
treatment as one’s own nationals is also found in all the three main WTO agreements.721 
While China’s approach of guiding CDM projects towards its defined priority areas is 
commendable, its discriminatory tax system is a breach of its obligations under international 
trade rules such as the WTO.  
 
To ensure that proposed CDM projects contribute to sustainable development in host 
countries, two things are essential; a structured approval procedure for assessing and 
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approving CDM projects and defined sustainable development criteria, indicators and 
parameters for assessing the sustainable development impact of proposed projects. However, 
this is not the norm with host countries and this obviously limits the capacity of their DNAs 
to select and address specific sustainable development objectives and it makes the following 
analysis difficult.  
(a)(ii) How Do the CDM Projects Assessed in this Thesis Contribute to Sustainable 
Development in CDM Host Countries?  
The analysis revealed that predictably, the sustainable development benefits of CDM projects 
vary from project to project. Analysis of the sustainable development claims made in the 
PDDs shows that the most prevalent sustainable development benefits in the PDDs assessed 
are transfer of technology, employment generation, improved air quality, and what is referred 
to here as direct benefits.
722
 Consequently, the analysis below is based on these. Note that the 
analysis made here is based on the sustainable development claims contained in the PDDs. 
The claims are impossible to verify because the CDM rules do not require monitoring of 
sustainable development contributions during the implementation of the project. Although 
there is no requirement to demonstrate how projects contribute to sustainable development, 
project participants usually include the sustainable development contributions of the project 
in the section describing the proposed project.
723
 97 of the PDDs assessed describe how the 
projects will contribute to the host country sustainable development. The other 3 projects did 
not mention sustainable development at all in their PDDs.
724
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(i) Technology Transfer 
The CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer mandate compared to its sustainable 
development mandate. However, Paragraph 34.7 of Agenda 21 establishes that technology 
transfer is an essential requirement for sustainable development.
725
 The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer as  
A broad set of processes covering the flows of know‐how, experience and equipment 
for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as 
governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs and 
research/education institutions. It comprises the process of learning to understand, 
utilize, and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to 
local conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies.
726
  
 
In addition, Andersen et al. state that “[t]echnology transfer is the intentional ‘passing on’ of 
technology or know-how from one party to another, commonly by purchase, investment or 
agreements for cooperation.”727 Information about technology transfer in the CDM projects 
assessed has been collated from the PDDs.
728
 53 of the projects claim to have transferred 
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the appropriate section, it became necessary to search for the term throughout the PDD to ascertain if there was 
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technology to CDM host countries, although it was difficult to certify if these are ESTs. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the PDDs indicates that when a CDM project claims to have 
involved transfer of technology to the host country, the practice of ‘transfer of technology’ is 
usually interpreted by project participants to mean the supply and installation of imported 
equipment, and the import of equipment and training of local staff in the use and maintenance 
of the imported equipment. When analysed further, 20 of the projects involved the transfer 
(import) of equipment
729
 and 33 of the projects involved the transfer of equipment and 
training of local staff in the use and maintenance of the imported equipment.
730
 For example, 
while ‘HFC23 Decomposition Project of Zhejiang Juhua Ltd, China’ states that the project 
will install a set of preheated steam decomposition facility which is imported from Japan,
731
 
‘Factory energy efficiency improvement in compressed air demand and supply in Malaysia’ 
states that although the technologies to be adopted for the project require high and special 
skills to be implemented properly, the local employees will be trained by the annex I project 
participant, in the proper utilisation and operation of the equipment.
732
    
 
Technology transfer claims vary across the sectoral scopes and the analysis made herein 
indicates that some variables affect transfer of technology in the CDM. Transfer of 
technology in the CDM is greatly influenced by whether a project is unilateral, or Annex I 
                                                                                                                                                        
transfer of technology or not. See CDM project reference: 0616 (sectoral scope 13); 0379 (sectoral scope 15); 
0499 (Sectoral scope 11); and 0197 (sectoral scope 15).  
729
 CDM project reference: 0028, 0194, 0606, and 0771 (sectoral scope 1); 0123, 0160, 0159 and 0173 (sectoral 
scope 3); 0116, 0490, 0765, and 0099 (sectoral scope 5); 1027 (sectoral scope 9); 0193, 0232, 0151, 0001, and 
0767 (sectoral scope 11); 0048 (sectoral scope 13); and 0401 (sectoral scope 15).  
730
 CDM project reference: 0045, 0078, 0717, and 0492 (sectoral scope 1); 1372 , 0677 and 0832 (sectoral scope 
3); 1186 and 0247  (sectoral scope 4); 0557, 0837, 0752, 0922, 0698 and 0961 (sectoral scope 5); 0902 and 0892 
(sectoral scope 8); 0153, 0152, 0605 and 0553 (sectoral scope 10); 0003, 0115, 0011, 0306, 0550, 0499,  and 
0868 (sectoral scope 11); 0503, 0008 and 0908 (sectoral scope 13); and 0105 and  0120 (sectoral scope 15. 
731
 CDM reference 0193, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/E/5/Z/E5ZHNT07RRDV0RH4ESDSKDNIJS12S0/JUHUA_HFC23_PDD_EN
G051123%20without%20first%20page%20and%20track%20changes.pdf?t=czJ8bTYyaXdkfDAkjQeAJANpi7f
2y4MHecmZ , 2. 
732
 CDM reference 1372, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/B/4/W/B4WKR9FSS4EP6LNTDTXTWNCJ8EF18A/SSCPDD-
DENSO.pdf?t=dHh8bTYyamtmfDC2hlJED7qLnyMl1kpdg2Cz, 3. 
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sponsored. Obviously, CDM projects with Annex I participants are more likely to claim 
transfer of technology to the host country than a unilateral CDM project activity.
733
 49 of the 
83 Annex I-sponsored projects claimed transfer of technology, while only 4 of the 17 
unilateral projects claimed transfer of technology.
734
 For example, ‘Cuyamapa Hydroelectric 
Project,’ and ‘Cortecito and San Carlos Hydroelectric Project,’ are both registered in sectoral 
scope 1 and implemented in Honduras.
735
 While the former project, an Annex I sponsored 
project claimed to involve transfer of technology, the latter project based in the same country 
and registered under the same sectoral scope is a unilateral project with no transfer of 
technology.  
 
Generally, transfer of technology is not common in unilateral projects.  However, unilateral 
projects that claim transfer of technology are usually described as ‘first of its kind’ test cases 
in the host countries.
736
 For example, although ‘Landfill Gas Extraction and Utilization at the 
Matuail landfill site, Dhaka, Bangladesh’ is a unilateral project, it claims to be a test case in 
Bangladesh that will be closely monitored by other dumpsite/landfill owners. The project 
claims transfer of technology through the involvement of foreign expertise and training 
consultants from Netherlands for the initial stages of the project.
737
 Similarly, ‘Santa Cruz 
landfill gas combustion project,’ a unilateral project in Bolivia, claims transfer of gas 
extraction flaring technology and waste management principles.
738
 The PDD claims that the 
                                                 
733
 S. Seres and E. Haites, ‘Analysis of technology transfer in CDM projects’, 18. 
734
 CDM project reference: 0078 (sectoral scope 1); 0832 (sectoral scope 3); and 0048 and 0908 (sectoral scope 
13). 
735
 CDM project reference 0045 and 0051, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1110827392.89 and 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1114669200.15 respectively. 
(http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html  (UNFCCC Website, 20/11/2010). 
736
 CDM project reference 0078 (Bangladesh), 0895 (India) sectoral scope 1, 0832 (India) sectoral scope 3, 0496 
(India) sectoral scope 10, 0048 (Bolivia), 0908 (Tanzania) sectoral scope 13 and 0945 (India) sectoral scope 15. 
737
 CDM project reference 0078 (sectoral scope 1). 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/FS_334865036/WWR_CDM_PDD_LFG%20v7_0.pdf?t=RDV8MTI5NTI2Nj
Q3MS4wOA==|q-QPbNnEoOlJOR3xc3HlINSUPb8=, 3. (UNFCCC Website, 20/11/2010).  
738
 CDM project reference 0048 (sectoral scope 13), 
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gas extraction plant and flare will be manufactured in Europe and shipped to Bolivia for 
installation.
739
 Technology transfer in unilateral projects could be as a result of the capacity 
building efforts of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental organisations 
(IGOs), and civil society groups. For example, SouthSouthNorth is an NGO that facilitates 
capacity-building in developing countries in the area of climate change and social 
development. One of its projects, a unilateral project, is the first CDM project in Africa and 
the first Gold Standard project worldwide.
740
   
 
Technology transfer is more likely in some sectoral scopes. This could be due to the fact that 
certain scopes require highly sophisticated equipment that are not readily available locally 
and require specialist training. All the projects assessed in sectoral scope 11 claimed transfer 
of technology to the host country.
741
 This could be due to the fact that sectoral scope 11 
projects require highly specialised equipment and specialist knowledge.
742
 In addition, 11 of 
the 13 projects assessed in sectoral scope 5 involved transfer of technology.
743
 Also, for 
sectoral scopes 11 and 5, the high number of projects with transfer of technology is probably 
due to the fact that all the projects in both scopes are Annex I sponsored projects.  
 
Certain technologies are more diffused in developing countries than other technologies. Only 
8 of the 16 projects in sectoral scope 1 transferred technology to the host country.
744
 Sectoral 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/FS_993733516/CDM_PDD_FINAL%20070205.pdf?t=NnB8MTI5NTI3MTE1
NC40Mw==|l2cegQPpgmcuT6bY90Lllt3UZXE=, 3. (UNFCCC Website, 17/1/2010). 
739
 Ibid. at 5. 
740
 See the SouthSouthNorth website at http://www.southsouthnorth.org/ (17/1/2010). 
741
 CDM project reference 0193, 0232, 0151, 0001, 0767, 0003, 0115, 0011, 0306, 0550, 0499 and 0868. 
742
 Sectoral scope 11 projects involve the capture and destruction of emissions from the production and 
consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. 
743
 CDM project reference 0116, 0490, 0557, 0765, 0698, 0837, 0752, 0922, 0099, 0961, and 1113. 
744
 Sectoral scope 1 projects are energy industries such as renewable and non-renewable energy projects while 
sectoral scope 11 projects involve the capture and destruction of emissions from the production and 
consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride which requires highly specialised equipment and 
specialist knowledge. See CDM project reference 0028, 0194, 0606, 0771, 0045, 0078, 0717, and 0492. See also 
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scope 1 projects are renewable and non-renewable energy projects such as biomass, 
hydroelectric power, wind, and solar energy projects.
745
 The technologies for some renewable 
energy projects, such as hydroelectric power, are widespread in developing countries as a 
result of capacity building efforts of UN organisations and the World Bank and partly 
because of the CDM. Therefore it is increasingly difficult for sectoral scope 1 projects to 
claim transfer of technology. For example, according to the PDD of ‘Cortecito and San 
Carlos Hydroelectric Project,’ an Annex I sponsored project, technology was not transferred 
to the host country because there is previous experience with hydro power technology in 
Honduras.
746
 In addition, sectoral scope 1 projects have the highest percentage in the 
UNFCCC project pipeline, and they also make up the highest number of the projects assessed 
in this thesis. Therefore, the technologies deployed in this sector will often be readily 
available in CDM host countries.  
 
Technology transfer is poor in some sectoral scopes as a result of prevailing circumstances in 
host countries. CDM projects registered in sectoral scope 4 (manufacturing industries) and 
sectoral scope 8 (mining and mineral production) reported little transfer of technology. For 
example, only 2 of the 10 CDM projects assessed in sectoral scope 4
747
 and only 2 of the 7 
projects assessed in sectoral scope 8
748
 claimed to have transferred technology to the host 
                                                                                                                                                        
S. Seres and E. Haites, ‘Analysis of technology transfer in CDM projects’, 18. 
745
 A. Dechezleprêtre et al., ‘Invention and transfer of climate change mitigation technologies on a global scale: 
a study drawing on patent data’ (2008), 24-25. Final report CERNA Research Programme on Technology 
Transfer and Climate Change, 
http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Documents/Invention_and_transfert_of_climate_mitigation_technologies_on_a_glob
al_scale:_a_study_drawing_on_patent_data.pdf  (CERNA Website, 11/1/ 2011). However, note that not all 
renewable and non-renewable energy technologies, such as geothermal energy, are readily available and 
diffused in developing countries. 
746
 CDM Project Reference 0051, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/B/H/Y/BHYLIMEF2ORJV3641D5XKCU0GP7TWS/Cortecito_Revised%20P
DD.pdf?t=MUV8MTMwOTExNzY5Ni43OA==|yu_kHek7rDOc_vZSCsnsAOV4t-w=. (UNFCCC Website, 
15/6/2011).  See also CDM project reference 0113, 0122, 0253, and 1127 (sectoral scope 1).  
747
 CDM project reference 0247 and 1186, both implemented in Malaysia. 
748
CDM project reference 0902, and 0892. (China). 
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country. Mining is one of the major industries in China and it is more likely that mining 
technologies will already be prevalent in China, including ESTs. 
   
Technology transfer claims vary across host countries. There is a greater tendency for 
projects in countries with lower levels of development and with fewer projects in the CDM 
project pipeline to claim transfer of technology, compared to projects in other developing 
countries with higher levels of development and a higher share of CDM projects.
749
 For 
instance, the following CDM projects in Guatemala,
750
 Pakistan,
751
 Vietnam,
752
 and 
Nigeria,
753
 all claimed transfer of technology to the host countries. This may be because these 
projects are the only CDM projects implemented in the host countries at the time of project 
selection, and as such, they are ‘first of its kind’ projects. It could also be that these countries 
each have only one project out of the total number of projects assessed for this thesis. 
However, where countries classified as economies in transition or newly industrialised 
economies, such as India, Brazil or China, host a CDM project, an Annex I participant does 
not guarantee transfer of technology to those countries.
754
 This is regardless of the size or the 
sectoral scope of the projects. Therefore, with the exception of India, Brazil and China,
755
 
foreign participation positively affects the rate of transfer of technology to CDM host 
countries.  
 
Overall, India and China have the lowest rate of technology transfer for the projects assessed, 
                                                 
749 CDM Project reference 0078, 0606 (sectoral scope 1), 0160, 0159, 0173, 1372 (sectoral scope 3), 047, 1186 
(sectoral scope 4), 0557 (sectoral scope 5), 0152, 0553 (sectoral scope 10), 0048, 0908 (sectoral scope 13), 0492 
(sectoral scope 15). 
750
 CDM Project reference 0606 (sectoral scope 1). 
751 CDM Project reference 0557. 
752
 CDM Project reference 0152. 
753
 CDM Project reference 0553. 
754
 CDM project reference 0183, 0361, 0717, 0024 (sectoral scope 4), 0840, 1135, 1230, 1250, 0770 (sectoral 
scope 8), 0255, 0340 (sectoral scope 3). 
755 CDM Project reference 0113, 0253 (sectoral scope 1), 0255, 0340, 0866 (sectoral scope 3), 0183, 0361, 0717 
(sectoral scope 4). 
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irrespective of sectoral scope, project size or the participation of Annex I entities. Thus, of the 
15 Annex 1 CDM projects implemented in India and assessed for this thesis,
756
 only 6 
transferred technology to India.
757
 In China, only 11
758
 of the 20
759
 projects transferred 
technology, despite the fact that all 20 projects are Annex I sponsored projects. The low rate 
of technology transfer can also be a positive indicator of sustainable development. For 
example 5 of the projects in India claim that the technology utilised has been developed 
through in-house research and development.
760
 This is a commendable effort that will go a 
long way in promoting sustainable development in India, provided the in-house technology 
builds on, or is at par, with the environmentally safe technology available worldwide. As 
developing countries continue on the path to sustainable development, they should rely less 
on developed countries and adapt and develop technology in-house, through research and 
development activities. Technologies developed locally have an added advantage of being 
developed to suit local circumstances. For instance the DNA in India encourages transfer of 
technology from regional, international and also within the country. This practice will 
encourage the transfer of technology and knowledge between developing countries, thereby 
promoting sustainable development.  
 
Technology transfer is important for the CDM because it may facilitate the transfer and 
utilisation of EST in developing countries, which is essential for achieving sustainable 
                                                 
756
 CDM Project reference: 0113, 0253, and 0717 (sectoral scope 1); 0123, 0255, 0340, 0686, 0677, and 0866 
(sectoral scope 3); 0183, and 0361 (sectoral scope 4); 0115, 0001, and 0499 (sectoral scope 11); 0935 (sectoral 
scope 13).  
757
 CDM project reference: 0717 (sectoral scope 1); 0123 and 0677 (sectoral scope 3); 0115, 0001, and 0499 
(sectoral scope 11). 
758
 CDM project reference 0771, 0837 (sectoral scope 5), 0902, 0892 (sectoral scope 8), 0193, 0232, 0011, 0306, 
0550, 0868, and 0767 (sectoral scope 11). 
759
 CDM Project reference: 0771, and 1127 (sectoral scope 1); 0837, and 1083 (sectoral scope 5); 0840, 0902, 
0892, 1135, 1230, 1250, and 0770 (sectoral scope 8); 0193, 0232, 0011, 0306, 0550, 0868, and 0767(sectoral 
scope 11); 0547 (sectoral scope 14); and 1301 (sectoral scope 15). 
760
 CDM project reference 0361, 0473, 0717, 0847, 1070, 0382, and 0496. Also see CDM Project reference 
0698 (sectoral scope 5), a Brazilian CDM project also used emission reduction technology developed in house 
by the project proponents, although this is not the norm for projects implemented in Brazil. 
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development and addressing climate change.
761
 However, the practice of transfer of 
technology adopted by the project participants is predominantly the transfer of equipment not 
previously available in CDM host countries, including training and information necessary to 
operate the equipment.
762
 None of the PDDs assessed in this study transferred commercial 
information necessary to replicate the technology/equipment in the host country. While this is 
the ideal means of technology transfer, it faces challenges. For instance, most of the 
equipment and technology transferred in CDM projects were developed by private 
commercial companies, with the principal aim of making profits from their innovation and 
investment. In addition, the issue of patents and intellectual property presents challenges to 
the diffusion and replication of technologies. Andersen et al. attribute the success of the 
Montreal Protocol in the area of technology transfer to the fact that a significant number of 
the technologies employed were voluntary transfer of technologies, processes and the 
introduction of best practices.
763
  
 
To promote sustainable development in the CDM, transfer of technology must result in not 
just the transfer of the physical equipment, but the knowledge necessary to use that 
equipment and the development of local knowledge such that the technology can be 
replicated and used extensively. Furthermore, CDM host countries can play an important role 
by including technology transfer as one of the conditions for the approval of proposed CDM 
projects.
764
  For instance, transfer of technology is one of the approval criteria used by the 
                                                 
761
 Wilkins, Technology Transfer for Renewable Energy: Overcoming Barriers in Developing Counties, 43. See 
also: J. Sepibus, ‘Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate technology transfer’ (2009) 
Working Paper No 2009/42 NCCR Trade Working Papers, http://phase1.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP6/CDM%20and%20technology%20transfer%2020%20october%20finalf
inal.pdf . (NCCR Website, 11/1/ 2011). 
762
 Recall the definition of transfer of technology by the IPCC.  
763
 Andersen et al., Technology Transfer for the Ozone Layer: Lessons for Climate Change, 295. 
764
 S. Seres and E. Haites, ‘Analysis of technology transfer in CDM Projects’ (2008), 18. Report prepared for the 
UNFCCC Registration & Issuance Unit CDM/SDM, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport/TTrep08.pdf (UNFCCC Website, 16/3/2011).  
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DNA in Malaysia when approving proposed CDM projects.
765
 The analysis of projects 
implemented in Malaysia and assessed for this study indicates that all the projects claim 
transfer of technology to the host country.
766
   
 
Finally, an important caveat to this discussion is that it has not been possible to determine 
from the information provided in the PDDs the type of technology that was transferred to the 
CDM host country; whether the transfer of technology facilitates the utilisation of EST. 
Without this information, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the claims of 
technology transfer made in the PDDs contribute to sustainable development in the CDM 
host countries.   
 
(ii) Employment Generation 
Host country sustainable development criteria for CDM projects generally include 
employment generation as one of the indicators of sustainable development in a CDM 
project.
767
 Employment generation is the most common contribution to sustainable 
development claimed by project participants for this study. 66 of the PDDs claim that 
employment will be created in CDM host countries as a result of the implementation of CDM 
projects.
768
 51 of the projects create permanent jobs while 15 create temporary jobs. The 
                                                 
765
 P. Curnow and G. Hodes (eds.), Implementing CDM Projects: Guidebook to Host Country Legal Issues 
(Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development, 2009), 26. 
766
 CDM project reference: 1372 (sectoral scope 3); 0247 and 1186 (sectoral scope 4); 0503 (sectoral scope 13). 
4% of the projects assessed are implemented in Malaysia. 
767
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.   
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6_GS_technical_docs/GSv2.1/Annex_I.pdf .  (The 
Gold Standard Website, 17/3/2011).  
768
 CDM project reference: 0028, 0045, 0253, 0194, 0606, 0717, 1127, and 1332 (sectoral scope 1); 0160, 0159, 
0173, 0261, 0340, 0079, 0866, and 1188 (sectoral scope 3); 0473, 0876, 0024, and 1186 (sectoral scope 4); 
0116, 0490, 0557, 0765, 0837, 0752, 0922, and 0099 (sectoral scope 5); 0672 (sectoral scope 7); 0902,  0892, 
1135, 1230, 1250,and  0770 (sectoral scope 8); 1027 (sectoral scope 9); 0153, 0616, 0605, 0879, 1080, and 0553 
(sectoral scope 10); 0115, 0193, 0011, 0306, 0550, 0001, 0868, and 0767 (sectoral scope 11); 0032, 0097, 0140, 
0197, 0503, 0008, 0935, and 0908 (sectoral scope 13); 0547 (sectoral scope 14); and 0105, 0120, 0401, 0945, 
and 1301 (sectoral scope 15). 
222 
 
temporary jobs are usually generated during the building and construction stages of the 
projects. The analysis indicates that there are no distinctions between the sectoral scopes and 
the 66 PDDs that claim that their projects generate employment are spread through the 
sectoral scopes. Furthermore, employment generation is not positively or otherwise affected 
by the sectoral scope of the project or if the proposed CDM project is an Annex I or unilateral 
CDM project. Moreover, the PDDs are usually silent specific details such as the estimated 
number of jobs created, and the qualifications and skills required for the jobs created, that is, 
whether the jobs requires skilled or unskilled labour.  
 
(iii) Other Direct Benefits to Local Communities 
To conduct an analysis of this section, the PDDs were assessed for other sustainable 
development benefits that do not fall under the category of benefits analysed above. This was 
necessary in order to capture the other sustainable development contributions mentioned in 
the PDDs that do not fall within the most common ones cited by project participants. Boyd et 
al. consider the ‘direct benefits’ of a CDM project to be those benefits that arise directly from 
the project, such as improved air quality, improved quality of life, education, health, water 
supply, poverty reduction and so on. They also  consider ‘indirect benefits’ to be those that 
occur where there are no direct benefits for local people, but there is a hypothetical 
improvement in environmental and social conditions, either globally or locally.
769
 This thesis 
adopts Boyd et al.’s definition of ‘direct benefits’ for the analysis below. Examples of direct 
benefits include improved air quality, provision of clean water, income generation, access to 
                                                 
769
 E. Boyd et al., ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: an assessment of current practice and future approaches 
for policy’ Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Working Paper 114 October 2007, 18. 
http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp114.pdf (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Website, 
8/5/ 2011). Boyd et al. assessed ten CDM projects for their environment and development benefits. Their study 
classified the benefits as ‘direct’ and ‘indirect benefits’ that accrue to the host country from CDM projects. See 
also A. Cosbey et al., ‘Realizing the development dividend: making the CDM work for developing countries’, 3. 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/climate_realizing_dividend.pdf (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) Website, 2/1/2011). 
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healthcare, access to education, skills enhancement, energy provision, energy sufficiency, and 
infrastructural development.
770
   
 
59 of the CDM projects claim the projects will contribute to improved air quality in CDM 
host countries.
771
 CDM projects improve air quality through improved odour in the 
atmosphere and reduced air pollutants such as Sulphur Oxides (SOx), Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx), suspended particulate matter, non-methane volatile organic compounds, dust, and fly 
ash. For example, ‘AWMS Methane Recovery Project MX06-S-51, Chiapas, México’ states 
in its PDD that the project “… will have positive effects on the local environment by 
improving air quality (i.e., reducing the emission of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) 
and odour)…”772 Furthermore, the projects also link improvement in air quality to health 
benefits in the local community.  For example, ‘Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy 
upgrade project, Khayelitsha (Cape Town; South Africa)’ claims that the proposed project 
will have significant environmental health benefits on the local community and its 
residents.
773
  
 
Commendably, 33 of the projects have put in place social programmes that will have positive 
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 K. Begg et al, ‘Encouraging CDM energy projects to aid poverty alleviation’ Report prepared for the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) June 2003, 14. Available at 
http://www.iesd.dmu.ac.uk/contract_research/publications/kb1.pdf  ( DFID Website, 4/8/ 2010).  
771
 CDM project reference: 0078, 0606, 0717, 0771, and 1127 (sectoral scope 1); 0079, 0123, 0159, 0160, 0173, 
0255, 0261, 0340,  0677, 0686, 0832, 0866, and 1188  (sectoral scope 3); 0024, 0473, 0847, and 0876 (sectoral 
scope 4); 0099, 0116, 0490, 0752,0832, 0961, 1011, 1083, and 1113 (sectoral scope 5); 0672 (sectoral scope 7); 
0770, 0840, 0892, 0902, 1230,   (sectoral scope 8); 1027 (sectoral scope 9); 0153, 0382, 0496, 0553, 0605, 
0616, 0879, and 1080 (sectoral scope 10); 0193 and 0550 (sectoral scope 11); 0032, 0008, 0140, 0197, 0908, 
and 0935 (sectoral scope 13); 0105, 0120, 0945,1092, and 1301(sectoral scope 15). 
772
 CDM project reference 0879, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/U/X/FUXO3X69QE61ZIOJ2IMAKNHTM0DJHB/PDD.pdf?t=OEl8MTMw
Njk1NjcxNi42OA==|TGVhCovJrPUqoymhTYpKbhrQYhU=, 5. (UNFCCC Website, 11/1/2011). 
773
 CDM project reference 0079, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_292989657/Kuyasa%20PDD%20Final-
2005.pdf?t=Mmh8MTMwNjk1NTExNC4zOQ==|mtZdQRjmo6gEFzfQXY5Ih14TymA=. (UNFCCC Website, 
11/1/ 2011). 
224 
 
impact on local communities.
774
 For example, ‘Cuyamapa Hydroelectric Project,’ aims to 
provide community development benefits that will contribute to the sustainable socio-
economic development of the region and the country. The PDD stated that a ‘Community 
Development Plan’ (CDP) has been created in consultation with the local people, to 
encourage self-managing community projects. Based on consultation with the community, 
project participants designed activities inter alia to improve the quality of life of women, 
introduced teaching aids to local schools, product marketing assistance and preventative 
health care.
775
 Also, in ‘Biomass thermal energy plant – Hartalega Sdn.Bhd, Malaysia,’ 
project participants commit to allocate 2.5% of the carbon credits revenues, annually, to 
support programmes that improve the quality of life of the local communities and the 
environment.
776
 In ‘Brazil NovaGerar Landfill Gas to Energy Project,’ the project 
participants pledge to donate 10% of the electricity generated onsite to the local community 
to provide lightning for local schools, hospitals and other public buildings.
777
  
 
Sectoral scope 1 had the highest numbers of PDDs with claims of direct benefit/programmes 
designed to benefit the local host communities (9 of the 16).
778
 The high number of PDDs in 
sectoral scope 1, with direct benefit claims, supports the findings of earlier research that rank 
the sustainable development benefits of different CDM projects. Renewable and non-
renewable energy projects, such as biomass, hydro, wind, and biogas energy projects have 
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 CDM project reference: 0028, 0045, 0051, 0113, 0122, 0253, 0606, 0895 and 0194 (sectoral scope 1); 0079, 
0173 and 0160, and 0677 (sectoral scope 3); 0024, 0473, 0876 and 1186 (sectoral scope 4); 0099, 0490, 0557 , 
0752 and 1011 (sectoral scope 5); 0672 (sectoral scope 7);  0616 and 0553 (sectoral scope 10); 0001and 0115 
(sectoral scope 11); 0008, 0032, 0140, 0503 and  0908 (sectoral scope 13); and  0547 (sectoral scope 14).  
775
 CDM project reference 0045 (sectoral scope 1) 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_276804390, 3. (UNFCCC Website, 20/8/ 2009). 
776
 CDM project reference 1186 (sectoral scope 4), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/KK2PNH73HCUIC0XIG9H6DMVWNQH36G, 3 
(UNFCCC Website, 15/8/ 2010). 
777
 CDM project reference 0008 (sectoral scope 13), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_609234123, 4. (UNFCCC Website, 15/8/ 2010).  
778
 The 9 CDM project are CDM project reference 0028, 0045, 0051, 0113, 0112, 0253, 0606, 0895, and 0194.  
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been assessed to have higher sustainable development benefits in the CDM.
779
 However, the 
claims of direct benefit were generally low in all the sectoral scopes analysed. None of the 
PDDs analysed in sectoral scope 8
780
 and only 2
781
 of the 12 PDDs in sectoral scope 11 
claimed direct benefits to the local community. All the projects analysed in sectoral scope 8 
(mining/mineral production) are implemented in China and as a result of China’s 
discriminatory taxation scheme for different types of CDM projects, CDM projects in this 
scope will be taxed a higher rate because projects in sectoral scope 8 do not fall within 
China’s defined priority areas for sustainable development.782 Therefore, it is unlikely that 
project participants are willing to go the extra mile to voluntarily commit additional funds for 
sustainable development programmes in local communities in China, after paying tax on the 
CERs earned from those projects. Similarly in sectoral scope 11, seven of the 12 projects are 
implemented in China and only 2 make claims of direct benefit to the local host communities. 
 
Although generally, sectoral scope 11 HFC projects are criticised for contributing little to 
sustainable development in the CDM,
783
 ‘GHG emission reduction by thermal oxidation of 
HFC 23 at refrigerant (HCFC-22) manufacturing facility of SRF Ltd,’ shows that 
commendable direct benefits to the local community is possible even in sectoral scope 11.
784
 
The project participants expressed their strong commitment to corporate social responsibility 
by committing funds to provide integrated watershed development, improving existing 
                                                 
779
 K. Olsen and J. Fenhann, ‘Sustainable development benefits of Clean Development Mechanism projects: a 
new methodology for sustainability assessments based on text analysis of the project design documents 
submitted for validation’ (2008) 36 Energy Policy 2819 at pg. 2828.  
780
 CDM project reference 0770, 0840, 0902, 0892, 1135, 1230, and 1250. 
781
 CDM project reference 0001 and 0115. 
782
 See the discussions in Section 6.3.2 below. 
783
 See the discussions in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2. Also Olsen and Fenhann, (2008), 2826. In their analysis of 
PDDs, the authors noted that “[a] ranking of project types has emerged… It supports the critique of HFC and 
N2O projects having the least SD benefits.” 
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 CDM project reference 0115 (sectoral scope 11), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/C71S3S0NXMHFZ9VBQSJ0NOXOE0DRHA, 41.  
(UNFCCC Website, 18/8/ 2010). 
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educational infrastructure, undertaking HIV/AIDS awareness amongst high risk groups, and 
improving the effectiveness of HIV/AIDS solution delivery in the community.
785
 Similarly, 
in ‘Project for GHG emission reduction by thermal oxidation of HFC 23 in Gujarat, India’ the 
project participants pledged to fund local programmes from the revenue generated through 
CERs earned from the project. According to the PDD, the funds will be used for selected 
community development activities such as, education, vocational training, hygiene and 
environment, water management and animal health.
786
 Furthermore, the project participants 
anticipate that the community development activities will contribute significantly to the well-
being of the local population, and alleviate poverty.
787
 Although it is not clear from the 
assessment, this author speculates that the decision to establish social programmes are 
probably made as part of the project participants’ corporate social responsibility programmes. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the CDM host government has any influence on the project 
participants’ decision to include sustainable development programmes in the implementation 
of the project.  
5.3.2. Stakeholder Participation
788
   
As discussed in Chapter 3, the stakeholder participation process is one of the V & R 
requirements and one of the tools for achieving sustainable development. If undertaken 
effectively, it should contribute to the CDM’s sustainable development objective. As 
highlighted in Chapter 3, an effective participation process should include some basic 
elements, which are: identification of relevant participants; access to information by the 
public; provision of information in a culturally-appropriate manner;
789
 the opportunity for the 
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 Ibid. 
786
 CDM project reference 0001 (sectoral scope 11), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_59491890, 83. (UNFCCC Website, 18/8/ 2010). 
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 Ibid.  
788
 Sections E, E.1, E.2 and E.3 of the PDD contain statements relating to stakeholder participation. 
789
 E. Petkova et al., Closing the Gap: Information, Participation and Justice in Decision-Making for the 
Environment (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2002), 17. According to the authors, “[g]lobally 
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public to provide informed, timely and meaningful input; and access to a review process to 
seek redress and remedy for any harm suffered.
790
 The stakeholder participation process for 
the CDM involves the following; identifying relevant stakeholders, inviting stakeholder to the 
consultation event, undertaking the stakeholder consultation event, which involves describing 
the project to the stakeholders and getting their comments on the project, and addressing the 
comments received from stakeholders.
791
 The analysis of the assessment of the fulfilment of 
stakeholder participation is presented below.  
 
(a) The Requirement for Stakeholder Participation was not fulfilled by all Projects  
Stakeholder participation, unlike the EIA requirement, is a compulsory validation and 
registration requirement for CDM projects. However, with the exception of the basic stages 
set out above, the process and the procedure for fulfilling this requirement are largely left to 
the host countries and project participants to decide. The analysis of whether all projects fulfil 
the requirement for stakeholder participation in this study shows that not all the projects 
actually conducted a stakeholder participation process. For example, some of the reasons 
given in the PDDs for non-compliance with this requirement include, inter alia, that the 
proposed project has no negative environmental impacts, the project will not affect anybody 
negatively, and that local stakeholders did not express their concerns about the project during 
the invitation stage.
792
 For example, stakeholder consultation was not undertaken for the ‘El 
Canada Hydroelectric Project’. According to its PDD “IFC carried out and prepared the 
Project Environmental and Social Review, which was published on the IFC web site and in 
                                                                                                                                                        
accepted norms must be translated into national-level policy frameworks in countries with different cultures…” 
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 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. Also see: Petkova et al., Closing the Gap: Information, Participation and 
Justice in Decision-Making for the Environment , 15; N. Eddy, ‘Public Participation in CDM and JI Projects’ in 
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 CDM project reference: 0606 (sectoral scope 1, India) 0123, 0255 (sectoral scope 3, India); 0247 (sectoral 
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the local press. This review was also available for public discussion in the El Palmar and 
Zunil municipalities. If required, the IFC documentation regarding the process is available for 
DOE review at the ENEL offices in Guatemala City. No concerns about the project were 
voiced by the local stakeholders during the process described above.”793 Its reliance on the 
Project Environmental and Social Review, which was published on its website and in the 
local press, only constitutes an invitation to stakeholders. The actual stakeholder consultation 
process therefore did not take place. Considering the fact that this is a hydroelectric CDM 
project with its associated impact on, inter alia, the local ecosystem and the possibility of loss 
of land, the rights of stakeholders could easily have been marginalised because they were not 
given the opportunity to be heard.   
   
Also, in ‘Demand-side energy efficiency programme in the ‘Humidification Towers’ of Jaya 
Shree Textiles’ stated in its PDD that “[s]ince the project activity implementation involves a 
set of installations in the Humidification Towers (not requiring major transportation or other 
energy inputs), and is relatively small scale it has no significant negative environmental 
impacts to noise, air or water pollution outside the facilities, therefore comments from the 
local population is [sic] not necessary.”794 Again this is inadequate because the analysis 
indicates that equipment suppliers are usually foreign based companies that do not have ties 
to the local community and that will not be impacted either way by the implementation of the 
project.  
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 CDM project reference 0606 (sectoral scope 1), 
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Website, 9/5/ 2011).  
794
 CDM project reference 0255 (sectoral scope 3, India). 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/1/L/R/1LR6N96Q8GDEY53EYRT0CU06NI6MBK/JST-EE-DS-PDD-
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The above projects clearly do not fulfil the requirement for stakeholder participation and 
technically, they should not have been validated by the DOE and registered as CDM projects. 
It is not enough to say that the project has no discernible negative environmental impacts.  
The stakeholder process is meant to protect the public interest that may be negatively 
impacted by proposed projects. The process is one of the few avenues for stakeholders to 
raise their concerns about proposed projects and to ensure that mitigating measures or 
alternatives are sought. This is also a missed opportunity to specifically solicit concerns that 
local stakeholders might have not just with regards to the project but with the operations of 
the company and how it affects local stakeholders.   
 
(b) The Process of Identifying Stakeholders is Unclear  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the CDM rules do not set out the process by which project 
participants should identify stakeholders. Apart from Brazil, the CDM approval procedure of 
most of the host countries in this study does not specify how project participants should 
identify relevant stakeholders. As a result of this, there are no standard processes for 
identifying stakeholders, even within the same host country and, unfortunately, project 
participants adopt the process that best suits them and their projects. The disadvantage of this 
is that the CDM rules do not safeguard the rights of stakeholders that may be affected by the 
implementation of proposed projects, particularly if they are perceived to be against the 
project. 
 
Furthermore, project participants, employees or the equipment supplier double as the 
stakeholder and the local community is side-lined from the consultation process.
795
 For 
example, in ‘Off gases utilisation from C – 03 washing tower in Primary Reformer as fuel’ 
                                                 
795
 CDM project reference: 0123, 0255 (sectoral scope 3, India); 0382 (sectoral scope 10, India). 
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the PDD states that “[t]he project activity has no discernible negative environmental impacts 
as it is a small activity of energy optimization and equipment installed are also relatively 
small (not requiring major transportation or other energy inputs) and because there are no 
other contributions to noise, air or water pollution outside the facilities, no outsider local 
stakeholders were identified in particular. In this view, employees of TCL, working in the 
plant where project activity has been implemented have been identified as local 
stakeholders.”796  Ideally, the stakeholder consultation process should create an opportunity 
for local companies and local community to interact and this did not happen in the project 
above. Proper consultation is also needed to prevent issues from escalating into disputes that 
may affect both parties negatively. For example, regular interaction between oil companies 
and local communities in Niger-Delta, Nigeria helps to control situations that, hitherto, lead 
to destruction of oil pipelines and kidnapping of oil company staff by the local communities. 
Furthermore, the project’s equipment supplier should not double as the stakeholder because 
his interest will be compromised, being the equipment supplier. In addition, it is unlikely that 
the equipment supplier would be an individual or organisation that is likely to be affected by 
the proposed CDM project because the analysis indicates that the equipment suppliers for 
CDM projects are usually foreign companies. Also, the identification of employees of project 
participants as stakeholders is inadequate. This is because employees are not independent 
parties and they are unlikely to voice concerns or negative comments for fear of reprisal or 
loss of job. In contrast, the approval procedure in Brazil specifies the minimum list of 
stakeholders that project participants should engage with during the stakeholder participation 
process. As a result of this guidance, the Brazilian DNA has effectively removed the 
possibility that relevant stakeholders might be overlooked or marginalised by project 
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 CDM project reference 0382 (sectoral scope 10), 
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participants during the consultation process. This process also ensures that as a minimum, the 
requirement for stakeholder participation is fulfilled by all CDM projects in Brazil. 
 
(c) The Process of Inviting Stakeholders Varies  
The second stage in the stakeholder participation process is inviting the identified 
stakeholders to the consultation event for the proposed CDM project. Again, Chapter 3 
identified that this should be done in a culturally-appropriate manner, using media to which 
the identified stakeholders can reasonably be expected to have access. So, for example, in a 
community that mainly relies on newspapers or radios and such like, this kind of media 
should be used, rather than the internet, to which the majority of the members of such a 
community may not have access. However, 32 of the PDDs did not indicate the methods used 
to invite stakeholders.
797
 For those that reported on how stakeholders were invited,
798
 the 
most widespread method used was the local media such as newspaper advertisements, 
television and radio announcements. 29 projects used this method to invite stakeholders as 
follows.
799
 13 projects used public notice such as a notice advertised on the village billboard 
to notify stakeholders of the consultation process.
800
  15 projects used letters and other similar 
means to invite stakeholders.
801
 3 projects used an advertisement on the company website 
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 CDM Project reference: 0866 and 1188 (sectoral scope 3); 0183, 1070, 0361, 1186 (sectoral scope 4); 0490, 
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only,
802
 and 8 projects used other random methods such as telephone,
803
 email
804
and personal 
consultation.
805
    
 
Given that the local circumstances that obtain in CDM host countries will be different, email 
may be the best option for inviting relevant stakeholders in a given community, while a 
notice posted on the village billboard may be the best option for relevant stakeholders in 
another community. However, it is important that stakeholders are invited and their 
comments solicited by using methods and procedures that suit local communities and their 
circumstances. For instance, in the project ‘Methane capture and combustion from swine 
manure treatment for Corneche and Los Guindos,’ the requirement for stakeholder 
participation was fulfilled by inviting comments from stakeholders solely through the 
company’s website.806  This is clearly an insufficient and inappropriate method to use as it 
would not ensure that the majority of stakeholders had access to relevant information about 
the proposed project and the effect of same on stakeholders. The only way relevant 
stakeholders would have found this information is if they happened, for whatever reason, to 
go to the company website. For those (probably the majority of the relevant stakeholders) that 
do not visit the website, they would not have had access to this information.   
 
There are good examples of the fulfilment of the stakeholder participation requirement by 
project participants. CDM projects implemented in countries such as Brazil
807
 and China,
808
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with standard procedures for the fulfilment of the V & R requirements, usually adopt 
appropriate means of inviting and engaging with stakeholders. A good example of 
stakeholder participation in China is ‘Huaibei Haizi and Luling Coal Mine Methane 
Utilization Project.’809 The project participants invited residents in Qujiang village (the 
nearest village to the proposed project) by displaying letters on village billboards for 10 
business days, inviting opinions from stakeholders. The method used to engage with 
stakeholders seems appropriate in this case. The project is located in a local community, 
where it is likely that access to the internet and other sophisticated means of communication 
is limited. Therefore, advertising the project on the village billboard will ensure that a high 
percentage of stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the project are given an 
opportunity to comment.  
 
‘Shanxi Yangcheng Coal Mine Methane Utilization Project’ another Chinese project 
demonstrates how to involve and solicit comments from stakeholders using the appropriate 
means of communication and involving different groups of stakeholders. Public comments 
were invited to evaluate the proposed project through public opinion questionnaires.
810
 
According to the PDD, “300 questionnaires were sent out during the investigation with a 
reply number of 295 (rate 98.3%). The participants with different education backgrounds 
were involved and a number of women were interviewed, which suggests a good 
                                                                                                                                                        
scope 15). 
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 CDM project reference 1250, 
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representation of this survey.”811 CDM projects implemented in countries with a standard 
process in place on how to invite and solicit comments from stakeholders are more likely to 
adopt appropriate means of communicating with stakeholders and soliciting comments on 
proposed CDM projects. Another example of good practice is ‘Yangquan Coal Mine 
Methane (CMM) Utilization for Power Generation Project, Shanxi Province, China.’812 In 
addition to the consultation required during the EIA process, the project participants 
conducted a separate open public meeting with the residents living near the proposed project 
site. The heads of village committees were sent letters inviting them and all members of the 
village to the meetings. In addition to the letters sent to the village heads, notices were posted 
on village notice boards.
813
 This is another example of effective engagement with 
stakeholders because reasonable and appropriate methods that are suitable to local 
circumstances were used so that stakeholders that may likely be affected, or that had 
questions, could attend the meeting.  
 
(d) The Stakeholder Participation Process is not always Adequate 
The third stage in the stakeholder participation process is the actual stakeholder consultation 
process. As highlighted in Chapter 3, there is no universally-accepted process for stakeholder 
participation. However, there are some elements that should be present in an effective 
stakeholder participation process. The elements include, inter alia, that the consultation 
should: be conducted in the appropriate language (of the local community/stakeholders being 
consulted); take place in a central location; stakeholders should be provided with a non-
technical summary of the project; and the consultation process should be organised jointly by 
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 Ibid at 49 PDD. 
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 CDM reference number 0892, 
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the project participants and an independent representative of the local community.
814
  
 
During the stakeholder participation process, varying processes and procedures were adopted 
to conduct the required stakeholder participation for CDM projects. The process and 
procedures adopted by project participants include: meetings;
815
 surveys;
816
 public opinion 
questionnaires;
817
 interviews;
818
 introduction of project concept at conferences; seminars and 
workshops;
819
 advertising in local newspapers and other media avenues to invite public 
comments;
820
 formal and personal letters;
821
 emails;
822
 telephone calls to identified 
stakeholders;
823
 and posting on the company website,
824
 or a combination of one or more of 
the above methods.
825
 However, the most widespread procedure adopted by project 
participants for stakeholder participation is the meeting. 
 
Regarding the methods used for the actual consultation event, it is difficult to conclusively 
state whether or not these are sufficient, because the sufficiency depends on the local 
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circumstances and what can be deemed ‘culturally-appropriate’ in any given circumstance. 
Obviously, ‘culturally-appropriate’ is location-specific and no general rules or conclusions 
can be reached in what should be generally regarded as culturally-appropriate. However, in 
order to be meaningful the process, as a minimum, should exhibit the elements of a 
meaningful consultation process highlighted earlier.  
 
For some of the projects, it does appear that the methods used for the actual consultation 
event may not have been culturally-appropriate, for example, conducting stakeholder 
consultation solely through the company website or by email. In such instances, relevant 
stakeholders may have limited access to media, may not have access to the internet or even 
the ability to read. For instance, ‘El Canadá Hydroelectric Project’ is an example of a project 
that used a culturally-inappropriate method to engage with stakeholders.
826
 The PDD stated 
that project participants “… prepared the Project Environmental and Social Review, which 
was published on the IFC website and in the local press. This review was also available for 
public discussion in the El Palmar and Zunil municipalities… No concerns about the Project 
were voiced by the local stakeholders during the process described above.” This is clearly 
insufficient because considering the type of project it is, the project participants ought to have 
made a better effort to engage effectively with relevant stakeholders. By way of contrast, ‘Brt 
Bogotá, Colombia: Transmilenio Phase II to IV’, a sustainable mass urban transport system 
project identified main stakeholders as the general public, persons living near construction 
sites of trunk routes and owners as well as drivers of existing baseline buses. This project 
conducted an exhaustive stakeholder participation process and this is reflected in the 
comments received. According to the PDD, the project participants participated in 36 fairs in 
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all communities of the District of Bogotá to inform stakeholders and get their comments on 
the project, a focal point was established where residents living close to the construction site 
could voice their concerns, workshops were organised as well as meetings. The project 
received more than 25,000 questions, complaints, requests for information, and suggestions 
from stakeholders on how to improve the proposed project, as a result of the wide coverage 
and publicity drive to sensitise stakeholders of the proposed project.
827
 
 
Although most of the projects conducted stakeholder participation process, the requirement is 
fulfilled according to environmental regulations and practices that exist or do not exist within 
CDM host countries. As a result the requirement is fulfilled using methods or procedures that 
are suitable for the project participants but not necessarily for the stakeholders.  This has 
resulted in practices that are at extreme points of the scale, from the most inclusive practices 
to tokenism. Furthermore, the absence of minimum standards for fulfilling the stakeholder 
participation requirement is likely to be of benefit to project participants. This is because they 
can choose participation process that suits their interests and those of their project only, 
without effectively engaging with stakeholders. The analysis shows that the stakeholder 
participation process adopted by project participants varies within the same country, and from 
country to country. For example, CDM projects implemented in the same host country and 
registered under the same sectoral scope used different methods of stakeholder participation. 
In sectoral scope 5, ‘Omnia Fertilizer Limited Nitrous Oxide (N2O) Reduction Project’ and 
‘Sasol Nitrous Oxide Abatement Project’ are both large Annex I sponsored projects 
implemented in South Africa. While the former conducted stakeholder participation through a 
public information forum, the latter conducted stakeholder participation through the 
                                                 
827
 CDM project reference 0672, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/E/6/L/E6LUMUUAQA83IUZAPO9XWBMS6BTSAB/PDD%20version%206-
09-06.pdf?t=VUJ8MTMwOTE0ODYzMC4wMQ==|ylAs43Cd5gD0tW6uI6sMK1FgTp4=, 65. (UNFCCC 
Website, 15/6/2011). 
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telephone, fax and email.
828
  
 
Generally, there is little evidence that project participants tailor the stakeholder participation 
process to accommodate the diversity of stakeholders and their different levels of knowledge. 
Furthermore, because CDM projects usually involve technical details that may be difficult for 
all stakeholders to understand, it is important that stakeholders have access to project details 
and that the details are presented in a manner they will understand, so that stakeholders are 
able to participate effectively in the consultation process. Only a few of the projects 
acknowledge the different levels of technical, general knowledge and skill of relevant 
stakeholders.
829
 For example, ‘N2O Emission Reduction in nitric acid plant Paulínia, SP, 
Brazil’ states that “[d]ue to the diversity of the stakeholders and different levels of knowledge 
of each stakeholder, Rhodia’s strategy was to develop a basic model of the invitation and a 
brief presentation about climate change, Clean Development Mechanism and the N2O 
Abatement project of Paulínia. Consequently, with this material, Rhodia technicians visited 
stakeholders and were able to adjust the approach and language for each stakeholder based on 
their knowledge. This strategy aims to guarantee that all of the stakeholders have enough 
information to provide comments.”830  
 
Only one of the projects assessed indicated that it communicated with stakeholders in the 
local language of stakeholders. ‘Methane recovery from waste water generated from wheat 
straw wash at Paper manufacturing unit of Shreyans Industries Limited (SIL)’ in its PDD 
                                                 
828
 CDM project reference 0752 and 0961, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/S7ZPOJ8E89VHCU7F88WD1LCX1PQESH, 54 and 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/S7ZPOJ8E89VHCU7F88WD1LCX1PQESH, 54 of PDD 
respectively. (UNFCCC Website, 18/1/2011). 
829
 CDM project reference: 0078 (sectoral scope 1) and 0116 (sectoral scope 5). 
830
 CDM project reference 1011, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/8/A/5/8A5IO1X4L4L6W92OQGQZFOF8B0VOBW/Brazil%20PDD.pdf?t=bG
J8MTMwNzE0NDM4Ni42OQ==|85gRSp2D7aIX2aAYdNCw7GOjX0U=, 60. (UNFCCC Website, 9/1/2011). 
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states that “[l]ocal language was used to communicate with stakeholders and project activity 
was briefed by SIL officials such that they can understand the activity and its associated 
impacts simply.”831 
 
Only two of the projects assessed consulted with stakeholders during the design stages of the 
proposed CDM projects. ‘Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade project, 
Khayelitsha (Cape Town; South Africa)’ consulted with local community during the design 
stage of the project.
832
 For example the PDD states that “[p]ublic participation in the Kuyasa 
low-cost retrofit CDM project activity has formed an integral part of the project design. This 
process was enabled through the specific structure of the project design team (PDT) as well 
as public meetings. Information on the project was also disseminated by means of varied 
local and international media, and was presented at various local and international 
conferences.”833 Also, ‘Rio Blanco Small Hydroelectric Project’ was initiated by the 
community and they were actively involved in its design and implementation. The PDD 
states that the stakeholders were involved in the development of the project and that several 
meetings between the members of the community, municipal authorities and other key 
organisations were arranged.
 834
 Furthermore, the PDD states that based on the comments 
received from the local community, the project participants and the local stakeholders were 
able to reach compromises on the project, such as the coordination of watershed reforestation 
                                                 
831
 CDM project reference 0935, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/S/3/N/S3NGEYC2I4TA1YMFG04G8K33AHO0FM/PDD.pdf?t=R1F8MTMw
NjMyNTA2MC43Mw==|xr7ZRVnwXkjM33hWaeCiBZ7N-Kg=, 25. (UNFCCC Website, 9/1/2011). 
832
 CDM Project reference 0079 (sectoral scope 3), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_305260458.  (UNFCCC Website, 20/1/2011).   
833
 http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_292989657/Kuyasa%20PDD%20Final-
2005.pdf?t=a2J8MTMwNjQ0ODEzNS43|lj_-dGdt_gQTMpRl4EtMJjepFNI=, Section G. (UNFCCC Website, 
20/1/2011). 
834
 CDM Project reference 0028, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_792172973/PDD%20Rio%20Blanco%202004-11-
04.pdf?t=elZ8MTMwNjQ0NTA5NC41OA==|3fhxPq_GzsygxbjDMyFbkjScxIw=, 21. (UNFCCC Website, 
20/1/2011).  
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activities with local students and the active participation of municipal authorities in the 
project.
835
 
 
Both projects highlight the importance and advantages of involving the local community at 
the design stage of a project. Consulting with relevant stakeholders during the design stages 
of proposed projects is important for certain types of CDM projects, for example, CDM 
projects such as hydroelectricity projects, biomass projects, transport projects and other 
projects that will deliver services to the local community. It is essential that the comments of 
stakeholders should be sought during the design stage of some CDM project types, especially 
projects that will be implemented in local communities. This is because early consultation 
may increase the likely success and implementation of certain proposed projects.
836
 For 
example, ‘Eecopalsa – biogas recovery and electricity generation from Palm Oil Mill Effluent 
ponds, Honduras’837 a GS project, conducted two rounds of stakeholder consultation, the 
initial public consultation required by the GS and the feedback session. The initial public 
consultation meeting took place at PALCASA’s facility where the biogas project was 
officially presented and a site visit was also arranged for stakeholders. Although members of 
the local community were not in attendance at the initial meeting, the project participants 
went a step further by paying a second visit to the Environmental Department of the 
municipality of El Progreso.
838
  
 
                                                 
835
 Ibid. 
836
  E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development under the Clean Development Mechanism: A Guide for 
Latin America, (London: Earthscan, 2009), 236-237.  According to Lokey, if the local community where a 
project will be implemented feels left out of the decision-making process, it is more likely to vandalise or 
sabotage the project. 
837
 CDM project reference 0492, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/0/G/3/0G35KM5TNN62XI53X4VG3UYS6NI1VF.1/PDD%20Bundle.pdf?t=U
098bTdrOGx4fDAMYRrSng6g2CDRzIpDSQaF. 
838
 Ibid. at 30. Although stakeholders were invited to the meeting through personal invitation and newspaper 
advert.  
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Unfortunately, the CDM rules do not have a grievance mechanism for stakeholders and none 
of the PDDs indicate that such a mechanism has been established by CDM host countries. 
The grievance mechanism is important because it gives stakeholders an avenue to raise 
complaints during the implementation of the project, after the project scales through the 
CDM validation and registration process.  
 
With regards to the implementation of this requirement by host countries, the analysis also 
shows that for the following host countries, the fulfilment of the requirement for stakeholder 
participation is ad-hoc and varies from detailed process to the barest minimum. This seems to 
be the case in South Africa,
839
 Chile,
840
 the Republic of Korea
841
 and India.
842
 For instance in 
India, some projects claimed to have interviewed identified local stakeholders during a recent 
exhaustive Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) study, and did so in three stages - local, 
regional and national - to invite comments on the proposed project.
843
 In contrast, other 
projects in India had minimal stakeholder consultation processes. For instance, ‘Energy 
efficiency through installation of modified CO2 removal system in Ammonia Plant’ stated in 
its PDD that “… because this project has no discernible negative environmental impacts, 
because the equipment installed is itself relatively small (not requiring major transportation or 
other energy inputs), and because there are no other contributions to noise, air or water 
pollution outside the facilities, no stakeholders other than the technology supplier was 
identified.”844 This indicates that some host countries make little effort to ensure that V & R 
                                                 
839
 CDM Project reference 0752 (sectoral scope 5), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-
CUK1162558371.82/view , 54. (UNFCCC Website, 20/1/2011). 
840
 CDM Project reference 0346 (sectoral scope 1), 0024 (sectoral scope 4), 0032, 0097, 0379 (sectoral scope 
13) and 0031 (sectoral scope 15). 
841
 CDM Project reference 0765, 0922, and 0099 (sectoral scope 5).   
842
 CDM Project reference 0113, 0253, 0717, and 0895 (sectoral scope 1), 0123, 0255, 0261, 0340, 0686, 0677, 
0832, 0866, and 1188 (sectoral scope 3), 0183, 0361, 0473, 0847, and 1070 (sectoral scope 4), 0003, 0193, and 
0499 (scope 11), and 0945 (sectoral scope 15). 
843
 CDM Project reference 0261, 0340 (sectoral scope 3) and 0113, 0253 (sectoral scope 1).   
844
CDM Project reference 0123, 
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requirements, such as stakeholder participation, that promote sustainable development are 
fulfilled effectively and consistently for all CDM projects. Instead, project participants are 
left to choose a process that best suits them and their projects. To sum up, implementation of 
the stakeholder participation requirement varies enormously. In some States, such as Brazil 
and China, there is detailed provision for stakeholder participation, which is generally applied 
in a consistent manner to all CDM projects. In other States, there is no such provision, and 
what is done in the name of stakeholder participation for CDM projects varies widely, 
sometimes even within the same State. 
5.3.3.  Environmental Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
845
 
The environmental analysis and EIA process are important processes for sustainable 
development because they aid the decision-making process of, for example, the regulator.
846
 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, the CDM rules require an analysis of the environmental impact 
of projects, including transboundary impacts. If the result of the environmental analysis is 
considered significant by the project participants or the host Party, the CDM rules provide 
that an EIA should be undertaken.
847
   
 
98 of the projects undertook an environmental analysis, whereas it is unclear if two of the 
projects conducted an environmental analysis.
848
 For instance, ‘Russfin Biomass CHP Plant 
Project’ did not state if it conducted an environmental analysis of the proposed project. The 
PDD states that “[t]he Forestal Russfin Plant does not need to enter the environmental impact 
evaluation system. This is due to the article 3.c, which states that power plants with capacity 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/C7XO4E94AHV6XLF0HS0NYDV5RURXT6/IGFL%20Final%20PDD-Post-
Validation-
20%20Oct%202005.pdf?t=Vm98MTI5NTgzODk4Mi43NA==|eaHqO6lHSssgD_Su9repWSUSoI8=. 
(UNFCCC Website, 20/1/2011).  Also see CDM project reference 0255 (sectoral scope 3). 
845
 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on the requirement for environmental analysis and EIA. 
846
 Glasson et al., Introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment, 7. 
847
 Decision 3/CMP.1. Annex, Paragraphs 37(c).  
848
 CDM project reference 0379 (sectoral scope 13). See also CDM project reference 0557 (sectoral scope 5),  
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lower than 3 MW do not cause a significant environmental impact to be evaluated by the 
designed environmental authorities.”849  From the statement in the PDD, it is difficult to 
determine if the project conducted an environmental analysis or not, particularly because the 
PDD uses a different language (environmental impact evaluation system).  Furthermore, it is 
not clear if not conducting an ‘environmental impact evaluation system’ refers to the 
requirement for environmental analysis or EIA. Also, ‘Catalytic N2O Abatement Project in 
the Tail Gas of the Nitric Acid Plant of the Pakarab Fertilizer Ltd (PVT) in Multan, Pakistan’ 
did not mention if it conducted the required environmental analysis, although the PDD states 
that EIA is not required for the proposed CDM project.
850
  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the CDM rules do not provide guidelines on how the requirement 
for environmental analysis should be fulfilled by project participants. As such, 19 of the 
PDDs did not report the outcome of the environmental analysis. For example, ‘Rithwik 6 
MW Renewable Sources Biomass Power Project’ merely states in its PDD that “[t]he 
environmental impacts are not considered significant”, and the environmental analysis that 
was used to reach that conclusion was not attached as an annex to the PDD.
851
 On the other 
hand, ‘Rio Blanco Small Hydroelectric Project’ provides a detailed report of the 
environmental analysis conducted and the result of the analysis in its PDD and also attached 
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 CDM project reference 0379 (sectoral scope 13), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/H/5/A/H5A93H9B0KKEFP8O01YLEN97F1HOV8/SSCPDDIgnisterra-
ver0011.pdf?t=bG58MTMwNjU5MTc3NC43Ng==|pRMcNaosKPk3pKddb5FdaSuigBc=, 33. (UNFCCC 
Website, 16/5/2011). 
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 CDM project reference 0557, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/4/X/I/4XIS6CBV4XDU6HG3IGM8MIR01VL4SB.1/PDD_Pakistan_Pakarab_
v1_0rev_final.pdf?t=Uk98MTMwNzIwMDM2MS43NQ==|syVcETUfYkrSCddjyeykUCnwDLQ=, 44. 
(UNFCCC Website, 16/5/2011). 
851
 CDM Project reference 0253, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/1/E/K/1EKCG93LMBAWD4X8QU76TZSNFR05OI/CDM-
PDD.pdf?t=c2d8MTMwNjQ0ODg1Ny4zNA==|zD2HShbiwtGtdFWlQPf0S7_xu-c=, 51. (UNFCCC Website, 
16/5/2011).  The following projects did not provide details of the outcome of the environmental analysis for 
proposed CDM projects in the PDDs, or as an annex attached to the PDD: 0557, 0765, 0698, 0922, and 1113   
(sectoral scope 5); 0382, 0496, 0616, 0605, 0879, 1080, (sectoral scope 10); 0048, 0197, 0379, 0503, (sectoral 
scope 11); 0105, 0120, 0945 and 0031(sectoral scope 15). 
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the full report as an annex to the PDD.
852
 Since environmental analysis is one of the V & R 
requirements, the author expected that all the PDDs will provide details of the outcome of the 
environmental analysis conducted through a summary in the PDD and an Annex to the PDD. 
 
Furthermore, because the standard for fulfilling the requirement for environmental analysis is 
not clear, it is possible that projects with negative environmental impacts are allowed to pass 
through the validation and registration process. This is a major omission because a project 
cannot be said to be sustainable if it reduces emission but results in negative impacts on 
environmental, social and economic sector in the host country.  For instance, although an EIA 
is not required in India, ‘Methane Recovery from Waste Water Generated from Wheat Straw 
Wash at Paper Manufacturing Unit of Shreyans Industries Limited (SIL)’853 conducted an 
environmental analysis of the proposed project, which indicated environmental impacts 
arising from the implementation of the project. As a result of this, a mitigation plan was duly 
put in place to monitor and mitigate those impacts. The PDD states that “[e]nvironmental 
impacts… have been identified due to the project activity and a mitigation plan to minimize 
the impacts has been drafted.”854   
 
58 of the projects assessed did not undertake EIAs,
855
 either because those projects fall under 
                                                 
852
 CDM project reference 0028, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_792172973/PDD%20Rio%20Blanco%202004-11-
04.pdf?t=elZ8MTMwNjQ0NTA5NC41OA==|3fhxPq_GzsygxbjDMyFbkjScxIw=, 21 and Annex 7. (UNFCCC 
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proposed CDM projects in the PDDs, or as an annex attached to the PDD: 0261, 0340, 0079, 0866, and 1188 
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 CDM project reference: 0078 ,0113, 0122, 0253and  0717 (sectoral scope 1); 0123, 0160, 0159, 0173, 0255, 
0261, 0340, 0686, 0079, 0677, 0832, 0866, 1188, and 1372 (sectoral scope 3); 0183, 0247, 0361, 0473, 0847, 
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categories of projects that do not require an EIA procedure in the host country, or the host 
country regulation does not require an EIA for any of its CDM projects, irrespective of the 
project’s possible impact on environmental, social and economic impacts. As such, the 
decision on fulfilment of EIA in the CDM belongs to the host country solely, although project 
participants can undertake EIAs voluntarily. Therefore, for this section, the analysis will be 
based on EIA practices of the host countries in this study.   
 
According to the PDDs, 13 of the 24
856
 countries hosting CDM projects assessed for this 
thesis do not require EIAs for all or most of the proposed CDM projects, irrespective of the 
size or sectoral scope of the projects. The countries are Bangladesh,
857
 Moldova,
858
 Israel,
859
 
India,
860
 Indonesia,
861
 Philippines,
862
 Bolivia,
863
 Tanzania,
864
 Pakistan,
865
 Mexico,
866
 South 
Africa,
867
 Malaysia,
868
 and Republic of Korea.
869
 It should be noted that, apart from India, the 
above cited host countries do not have the highest percentage of projects assessed for this 
thesis, and they do not have projects implemented in all the sectoral scope assessed for this 
thesis. So statistically, this affects the conclusion drawn from the above analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1070, 0876, 0024, and 1186 (sectoral scope 4); 0116, 0557, 0765, 0698, 0752, 0922, 0099, 0961, 1011, and 
1113 (sectoral scope 5); 0672 (sectoral scope 7); 1027 (sectoral scope 9); 0153, 0382, 0496, 0616, 0605, 0879, 
and 1080 (sectoral scope 10); 0003, and 0151 (sectoral scope 11); 0097, 0197, 0379, 0503, 0935, and 0908; and 
0105, 0120, and 0945 (sectoral scope 15).      
856
 See Figure 5.1 for percentage of projects implemented by developing countries 
857
 CDM project reference 0078 (sectoral scope 1). 
858
 CDM project reference 0160, 0159, 0173 (sectoral scope 3). 
859
 CDM project reference 1113 (sectoral scope 5). 
860
 CDM project reference:  0113, 0253, 0717 (sectoral scope 1); 0123, 0255, 0261, 0340, 0686, 0677, 0832, 
0866, 1188 (sectoral scope 3); 0183, 0361, 0473, 0847, 1070 (sectoral scope 4); 0382, 0496 (sectoral scope 10); 
and 0945 (sectoral scope 15). 
861
 CDM project reference 0616 (sectoral scope 13). 
862
 CDM project reference 0605 (sectoral scope 10). 
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 CDM project reference 0048 (sectoral scope 13). 
864
 CDM project reference 0908 (sectoral scope 13). 
865
CDM project reference 0557 (sectoral scope 5). 
866
 CDM project reference: 0180, 0879 and 0153 (sectoral scope 10); 0151 (sectoral scope 11); 0197 (sectoral 
scope 13); and 0120 and 0105(sectoral scope 15). 
867
 CDM project reference: 0079 (sectoral scope 3); 0752 and 0961 (sectoral scope 5); and 1027 (sectoral scope 
9). 
868
 CDM project reference: 1372 (sectoral scope 3); 0247 and 1186 (sectoral scope 4); and   0503 (sectoral scope 
13). 
869
 CDM project reference: 0922, 0099, 0765 (sectoral scope 5); and 0003 (sectoral scope 11). 
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CDM projects implemented in China and India represent a majority of the projects assessed 
for this thesis. The analysis shows that China required EIAs for all the 20 proposed CDM 
projects assessed in this study, irrespective of sectoral scopes or project size.
870
 However, 
majority of the projects in India did not conduct EIAs. Of the 25 projects assessed for this 
study in India, only 5 conducted EIAs and it seems that these projects have conducted EIAs 
voluntarily or to comply with their funding requirements.
871
 ‘Destruction of HFC-23 at 
refrigerant (HCFC-22) manufacturing facility of Chemplast Sanmar Ltd’ states in its PDD 
that “Indian Environmental Regulations do not require an EIA to be conducted for the project 
activity. However project proponent has conducted an EIA through an independent 
agency.”872 Similarly, ‘GHG emission reduction by thermal oxidation of HFC 23 at 
refrigerant (HCFC-22) manufacturing facility of SRF Ltd’ voluntarily conducted an EIA. 
According to its PDD, although India’s Environmental Protection Act 1986 does not require 
an EIA, the project participants have voluntarily conducted an EIA to be cognizant of the 
impacts and take mitigation measures as necessary”.873  
 
Overall, whether or not an EIA is undertaken depends on the host country’s environmental 
regulations and national approval procedure for CDM projects. Regrettably, the need to 
conduct an EIA is not influenced by individual projects and their possible impact on the 
                                                 
870
 CDM project reference: 0771, 1127 (sectoral scope 1); 0837 and 1083 (sectoral scope 5); 0840, 0902, 1135; 
1230, 1250, 0770 and 0892 (sectoral scope 8); 0193, 0232, 0011, 0306, 0550, 0868, and 0767 (sectoral scope 
11); 0547 (sectoral scope 14) and 1301 (sectoral scope 15). 
871
 CDM project reference: 0895 (sectoral scope 1); 0115, 0001, 0499 (sectoral scope 11); and 0935 (sectoral 
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pdf?t=UHB8MTMwNzIwMzk5MC45NA==|Tq70H9IJBSNi9KcnP3UJB58g1cI=, 27. (UNFCCC Website, 
22/5/2011).  
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 CDM project reference 0115, 
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Website, 22/5/2011). 
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environment. Indeed, while some host countries require EIAs for all projects irrespective of 
the sectoral scope or size of the project, other host countries do not require EIAs for any 
project, irrespective of projects’ likely impact on the environment, size or sectoral scope. It is 
hereby acknowledged that the circumstances of two proposed CDM projects will most likely 
be different, especially if they are proposed to be implemented in different host countries, in 
different sectoral scopes or in different environments within the same host country. As such, 
the need for an EIA should not only be a function of host country environmental regulations 
but the individual circumstances of proposed CDM projects should be a deciding factor as 
well.
874
 For instance, none of the 14 projects in sectoral scope 3 conducted EIAs
875
 and only 
1
876
 of the 9 projects in sectoral scope 4 conducted EIAs.
877
 These are clearly influenced by 
the environmental regulations in the host countries, despite the fact that some of the projects 
may have negative environmental and social impacts.  
5.3.4 Baseline and Monitoring Methodologies 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the CDM rules only requires the monitoring, verification and 
reporting of GHGs reduction achieved as a result of the implementation of CDM projects. 
The CDM rules and the CDM host countries do not require that the sustainable development 
impact of CDM projects be monitored, reported and verified as part of the verification and 
certification process before CERs are awarded.
878
 The analysis of this requirement will focus 
on whether, in addition to monitoring the emission reductions achieved, the sustainable 
development impacts will be monitored as well.  
                                                 
874
 See discussion in Chapter 3, on the GS requirement for the ‘Do No Harm’ assessment which was compared 
to the V & R requirement for environmental analysis.  
875
 Sectoral scope 3 projects are energy demand, and energy efficiency projects. CDM project reference: 0123, 
0255, 0261, 0340, 0686, 0677, 0832, 0866, and 1188 (India); 0079 (South Africa); 1372 (Malaysia); and 0160, 
0159, and 0173 (Moldova).  
876
 This is a project implemented in Argentina, CDM project reference 0876. 
877
 CDM project reference: 0183, 0361, 0473, 0847, 1070 (India); 0024 (Chile); and 1186 and 0247 (Malaysia). 
Sectoral scope 4 is manufacturing industry. 
878
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6 for detailed discussion on this requirement.   
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The PDDs analysed for this study contain several claims of sustainable development benefits 
that will accrue to the host country from the implementation of CDM projects.
879
 However, 
96 of the projects did not have a monitoring plan to monitor and verify the sustainable 
development impact of projects during implementation. Only 4 projects stated in their PDDs 
that the sustainable development impact of proposed CDM projects will be monitored.
880
 
‘Recovery of associated gas that would otherwise be flared at Kwale oil-gas processing plant, 
Nigeria’ states that it will introduce a sustainability monitoring plan to measure the 
sustainable development benefits of the proposed project.
881
 According to the PDD, the 
following sustainable development benefits will be monitored through the sustainability 
monitoring plan: increase of national energy and electricity supply in Nigeria without adding 
to existing levels of fossil fuel consumption; improvement in electricity transmission grids; 
provision of employment; transfer of technical knowledge to the local population; and 
contribution to rural poverty alleviation through the provision of reliable power supplies.
882
 
Also, in ‘Santa Cruz Landfill Gas Combustion Project,’ the sustainable development 
indicators of the project will be monitored through the sustainable development monitoring 
plan, which was attached to the PDD as an Annex.
883
 Some of the indicators to be monitored 
in this project include job creation, technology transfer, and air quality.
884
 Without 
monitoring, verifying and reporting the sustainable development contribution of CDM 
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 See Section 5.3.1 (b) above. 
880
 CDM Projects:  0553 (Nigeria) and 0152 (Vietnam) (sectoral scope 10); 0001 (sectoral scope 11); and 0048 
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3NDc1NS4wNA==|_zhWRGA3dESdM35a3jRyPgrP8Aw=, 46-47. (UNFCCC Website, 4/5/2011). 
884
 Ibid. 
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projects, some of the claims made in the PDDs become mere claims by CDM project 
participants. It is not enough for project participants to make claims of sustainable 
development benefits without a monitoring, verification and reporting mechanism to ensure 
that such benefits actually occur. Furthermore, the introduction of such a requirement would 
allow CDM host countries make informed choices on proposed CDM projects. 
   
5.3.5: ADDENDUM: Fulfilment and Implementation of Validation and Registration 
Requirements - Analysis of Registered CDM Projects 
In general, there is an improvement in the fulfilment and implementation of the V & R 
requirements that are tools for promoting sustainable development. Some of the 
improvements are in the fulfilment and implementation of the host countries’ confirmation of 
sustainable development contribution, host country approval procedure for proposed CDM 
projects and transfer of technology. The findings are presented below. Note that the analysis 
made here is based on the sustainable development claims contained in the PDDs only. These 
claims are impossible to verify because the CDM rules do not require monitoring of 
sustainable development contributions during the implementation of the project. 
5.3.5 (i) Written Confirmation of Sustainable Development Contribution of CDM Project 
Sustainable development claims made in the PDDs are more concrete and easy to monitor 
and verify. Some of the sustainable development claims made are power generation, access to 
clean energy and less dependence on coal and other fossil fuel,
885
 improved road 
infrastructure,
886
 and job creation.
887
 Power generation and access to clean energy is the most 
common sustainable development claim made by project participants, in the PDDs assessed. 
                                                 
885
 See the following CDM project: CDM project reference 6091, 6059, 5280, 5957, 5854,  5280, 5838 5552, 
4787, 5509;  5942 (Guatemala); 5615 (Viet Nam); and 4520, 5740,  5213, 5313 (India). 
886
 CDM project reference: 5313, 5213 (India); 4520 (Vietnam); and 6059 (China). 
887
 CDM project reference: 4787, 5509, 6091, 5280, 5957, 5838, 5844, and 5522 (China); 5313and 5740 (India); 
5942 (Guatemala); 5615 (Vietnam).  
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This has changed from previous analysis where employment generation was the most 
common sustainable development claim made by project participants. However, employment 
generation is still a common claim to sustainable development in the CDM.  
 
The analysis also indicates that some host countries have established additional requirements 
that can enhance the sustainable development objective of the CDM. For instance ‘Partial 
Substitution of Coal by Jatropha Fruits and Biomass Residues in the Production of Portland 
Cement’ in Senegal requires that CDM projects should conduct a Strategic Environmental 
Impact Assessment (SEA) in addition to the V & R requirement for EIA.
888
  Also, ‘Palo 
Viejo Hydroelectric Project’ in Guatemala requires an Environmental Management and 
Social Plan (ESMP) from project participants in order to assess and monitor possible negative 
impacts.
889
 The PDD states that “[t]o mitigate the impacts that the project could have on each 
issue, an Environmental Management and Social Plan (EMSP) was designed and included in 
the EIA. This EMSP suggests the preventive, control, mitigating, rehabilitation and 
monitoring of environmental measurements during construction and operation, derived from 
the impacts analysis…” 
 
With regards to transfer of technology claims made in the PDD, the incidence of technology 
transfer has reduced from the analysis made in Section 5.3.1. As highlighted earlier in 
Section 5.3, certain technologies are more diffused in some developing countries such as 
China and India.
890
 This may be due to the fact that sectoral scope 1 renewable energy 
projects make up the bulk of the projects assessed for this addendum, and generally, energy 
                                                 
888
 CDM Project reference 5626, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/2/L/I/2LI5DBXJ9TY6W4UMRP0OQEHA3C7KG8/5626-
%20PDD.pdf?t=bFF8bThmaGFlfDAc7hG26ZqBjLpLm5waZLzi, 97. 
889
 CDM project reference 5942, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-
CUK1332751491.14/view. 
890
 S. Seres and E. Haites, ‘Analysis of technology transfer in CDM projects’, 18.  
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efficiency and renewable energy EST technologies are highly diffused in developing 
countries.
891
 For instance, 16 of the 20 projects assessed for this addendum are sectoral scope 
1 projects implemented China,
892
 India,
893
 Vietnam
894
 and Guatemala.
895
 None of the projects 
in China and India claim transfer of technologies for these projects. This finding is in line 
with earlier findings in Section 5.3 supra, where, sectoral scope 1 projects in china and India 
were less likely to claim sustainable development. Therefore, the present findings indicate 
that through the diffusion of renewable energy technologies, the CDM is successful in 
providing access to cleaner energy, thus promoting sustainable development. Another key 
improvement with regards to technology transfer in the CDM is that the incidence of using 
in-house technology has increased in the CDM. As highlighted in Section 5.3.1 supra, locally 
developed technologies have an added advantage of being developed to suit local 
circumstances. For instance, Partial Substitution of Coal by Jatropha Fruits and Biomass 
Residues in the Production of Portland Cement’ stated in its PDD that technology to 
substitute coal with biomass in the project consisted of in-house design of a new and 
additional biomass fuel feeding system.
896
 The in-house design of ESTs is also encouraging 
the transfer of technology between countries in the same region and between developing 
countries. For instance, ‘Suoi Trang Hydropower Plant’ in Vietnam claims transfer of 
technology and equipment from China, although Switzerland is the Annex I country involved 
in the project and China is not a Party to the project.
897
  
  
                                                 
891
 Ibid.      
892892
 CDM project reference 5509, 4787, 5552, 5844, 5838, 5854, 5957, 5280, 6059, 6051, and 5021. 
893
 CDM project reference 5642, 5213, 5313, and 5740. 
894
 CDM project reference 5616 and 4520. 
895
 CDM project reference 5942. 
896
 CDM project reference 5626 available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/2/L/I/2LI5DBXJ9TY6W4UMRP0OQEHA3C7KG8/5626-
%20PDD.pdf?t=MGh8bThmaDlxfDDs3qzLfcvZghkF8IaM0M38 , 10. 
897
 CDM project reference 5615 available at  
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/A/B/2/AB20Y7ZF4H9L8IVMDESK3RPOQ6C1TU/Untitled%20%28uploaded
%2023%20May%2012%2012%3A07%3A43%29.pdf?t=V3V8bThnbGVpfDDSiVpjLbLRaqtL-9D7KjMx, 7. 
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A key finding of this analysis is that the CDM has been successful in promoting sustainable 
development in countries that have a structured approval procedure and that have defined 
their development priority areas for sustainable development.
898
 A key example is China. As 
highlighted previously in Section 5.3.1, China’s defined priority areas for sustainable 
development includes energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. 10 of the 11 projects 
assessed for this addendum, and implemented in China, are sectoral scope 1 renewable 
energy projects.
899
 This indicates that China’s discriminatory taxation scheme on CERs has 
discouraged sectoral scope 11 HFC projects that do not align with its defined priority area for 
sustainable development and that does not promote sustainable development generally, and 
its favourable taxation scheme for energy and renewable energy projects has succeeded in 
attracting CDM investment that promotes its sustainable development.  Furthermore, all the 
projects claim, inter alia, generation of cleaner energy, reduction of energy poverty, and 
improved access to energy, thus assisting China in fulfilling its sustainable development 
priority area.  
5.3.5 (ii) Stakeholder Participation 
The procedure for conducting stakeholder participation still varies from country to country 
and it also varies within the same country. The most common being meetings, followed by 
surveys and questionnaires. Furthermore, there were no indications in the PDDs that 
procedures that will enhance the stakeholders’ participation process are being implemented 
by host countries, such as provision of non-technical summary of PDD to stakeholders, and 
translation of proceedings into local language and consulting with stakeholders during the 
design stage of the project. However, 2 of the projects adopted some of these procedures in 
                                                 
898
 These countries were analysed earlier in Section 5.3.1. 
899
 CDM project reference: 5509, 4787, 5552, 5844, 5838, 5854, 5957, 5280, 6059, 6051, and 5021. 
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consulting with stakeholder.
900
 For instance, ‘Suoi Trang Hydropower Plant, Vietnam’ 
indicated in their PDDs that stakeholders will be presented with a non-technical summary of 
the PDD and that the proceedings of the meeting will be translated into local languages.
901
 
5.3.5 (iii) Environmental Analysis   
The fulfilment of this requirement still varies, although there is a slight improvement in the 
manner of fulfilment. For instance, some of the PDDs provide a detailed non-technical 
summary of the analysis report in the PDD,
902
 although none of the projects attached the 
report of the environmental analysis to the PDD. The fulfilment of the requirement for EIA 
remains the same because it is dependent on the host countries’ environmental regulations.   
5.3.5 (iv) Baseline and Monitoring Requirement  
None of the host countries require monitoring of sustainable development impact during 
project implementation. However some of the projects indicate in the PDD that the negative 
impacts identified, as a result of the environmental analysis conducted, will be mitigated. 
These projects have gone a step further by establishing mitigating measures to address the 
negative impacts identified.
903
  
 
Overall, there is an indication of an improvement in the fulfilment and the implementation of 
the V & R requirements. The overall effect of the improvement is that there is a correlation in 
the fulfilment and implementation of the V & R requirements that will promote sustainable 
development. For instance, projects with concrete sustainable development claims also tend 
to conduct detailed environmental analysis to identify likely negative impacts, and they also 
                                                 
900
 CDM project reference 5492 and 4520.  
901
 CDM project reference 4520, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/A/B/2/AB20Y7ZF4H9L8IVMDESK3RPOQ6C1TU/Untitled%20%28uploaded
%2023%20May%2012%2012%3A07%3A43%29.pdf?t=V3V8bThnbGVpfDDSiVpjLbLRaqtL-9D7KjMx, 25.  
902
 CDM project reference 5844 and 5552. 
903
 CDM project reference 4520, 5642 and 5626. 
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tend to establish mitigation measures to address the negative impacts identified and a project 
monitoring plan to monitor those impacts during project implementation.  
 
 
The overall effect of the improvement is that projects with concrete sustainable development 
claims also tend to conduct detailed environmental analysis to identify likely negative 
impacts, and they also tend to establish mitigation measures to address the negative impacts 
identified and a project monitoring plan to monitor those impacts during project 
implementation. The overall effect of this is that there is an obvious correlation in the 
fulfilment and the implementation of those V & R requirements that can promote sustainable 
development in CDM host countries, such that the result of one influences the fulfilment of 
the other.  
 
 
5.4 Supervision of the V & R requirements – Analysis of Rejected 
Projects 
This section analyses all the 84 projects that had been rejected by the EB as at the time of 
project selection in December 2008. As noted above, the EB is responsible for the oversight 
of the CDM and for ensuring compliance with the V & R requirements. The focus of this 
section is therefore on ascertaining how effective the EB is in supervising compliance with 
the requirements. To do this, rejected projects are analysed for the reasons for their rejection. 
This will allow the thesis to conclude on the extent to which the EB supervises the fulfilment 
of the V & R requirements, especially those requirements that are regarded as tools for 
promoting sustainable development. 
 
Of the 84 rejected projects, 48 are unilateral projects while 36 are Annex I sponsored 
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projects.
904
 This figure shows that rejection of proposed CDM projects is not significantly 
affected by whether they are unilateral or Annex I sponsored projects. Further analysis 
indicates that of the 84 projects, 50 were rejected for failing the additionality test,
905
 17 for 
using an incorrect baseline,
906
 12 for failing the baseline and monitoring methodologies 
requirement,
907
 3 for having incorrect project start dates,
908
 and 2 projects for inadequate 
documentation.
909
 Further analysis shows that projects in the different sectoral scopes were 
rejected by the EB for reasons that are particular to specific sectoral scopes. For instance: 
renewable and non-renewable energy projects (sectoral scope 1) are more likely to be 
rejected for the additionality test; manufacturing industry projects (sectoral scope 4) are more 
likely to be rejected for adopting the wrong baseline methodology to calculate the project’s 
baseline emissions; and energy demand projects (sectoral scope 3) mainly because the 
projects adopted the wrong monitoring methodology.  
 
This therefore suggests that the EB is supervising the fulfilment of the V & R requirements. 
However, the question is whether the EB is supervising the V & R requirements in a way that 
would promote the sustainable development objective of the CDM. From the figures 
presented above, it is clear that all these projects were rejected for failing to fulfil V & R 
requirements that relate to the emission reduction objective of the CDM, such as additionality 
and baseline and monitoring methodologies. The analysis of the fulfilment of the V & R 
                                                 
904
 See Figure 5.6 above. 
905
 Rejected project reference 0221, 0224, 0311, 0317, 0400,  0454, 0522, 0683,0715, 0977, 0990, 1014, 1016, 
1042, 1065, 1077, 1109, 1132,1173, 1184, 1195,1201,1204, 1217, 1235, 1252, 1297, 1331, 1377,  1383, 1398, 
1412, 1447, 1545 1611, 1494, 1669, 1702, 1707, 1710, 1718, 1725,  (Sectoral scope 1), 0754, 0854, 0861, 0863, 
1084, 1356,  1475 (Sectoral scope 4), and 1735 (Sectoral scope 13). 
906
 See: 0761, 0871, 0997, 1004, 1022, 1035, 1043, 1044, 1056, 1148, 1215, 1479, 1625, (Sectoral scope 1); 
0951, 0954 (Sectoral scope 4); 1285 (Sectoral scope 13); and 1846 (Sectoral scope 15). 
907
 See: 0988, 1023, 1030, 1050, 1055, 1057, 1058, and 1060 (Sectoral scope 3); 0859, 0929, 1041 (Sectoral 
scope 4); and 0457 (Sectoral scope 13). 
908
 See: 0443, 0964 (Sectoral scope 1); and 0972 (Sectoral scope 10). 
909
 See 0474 and 0410 (Sectoral scope 1). 0474 was rejected because the PDD and the validation report 
uploaded by the DOE with the request for registration were different in substance from those approved by the 
DNA of the host party.  0410 was rejected because the LoA of the DNA of the host party was not valid. 
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requirements in Section 5.3 indicates that the requirements that relate to sustainable 
development are not being fulfilled effectively, by CDM project participants, in a way that 
will promote sustainable development. However, despite this, the EB has registered those 
projects. This is essentially because the requirements have been fulfilled as provided for in 
the CDM rules and also because the CDM rules do not give the EB the required authority to 
supervise the V & R requirements in a manner that will promote sustainable development. In 
other words, the EB cannot reject projects for reasons outside what is allowed by the CDM 
rules. For instance, as long as a project conducts stakeholder participation and shows how 
comments received were addressed, the EB cannot reject the project on the basis that the 
method used to conduct stakeholder participation was not culturally-appropriate. This is 
because the CDM rules lack minimum standards and guidelines for fulfilling the 
requirements that will contribute to sustainable development. This is a key failing of the 
CDM rules and this prevents the EB from supervising those V & R requirements that 
contribute to the CDM’s sustainable development objective. 
5.5: Summary of Findings: Has the practical application of the V & R 
requirements helped or hindered the promotion of sustainable 
development? 
The analysis of written confirmation of sustainable development contribution of CDM 
Project
910
 shows that CDM projects in host countries with robust procedures for the 
fulfilment of the V & R requirements contribute, in more and varied ways, to sustainable 
development in those countries. Therefore, as seen in China’s unique tax scheme and in 
Brazil’s procedure for stakeholders’ participation, host countries can introduce requirements 
that are additional to the CDM’s V & R requirements in order to ensure that the CDM 
                                                 
910
 That is analysis of (a)(i) and (a)(ii): do CDM project in host countries with robust approval procedures 
contribute in more and varied ways to sustainable development in those countries than projects hosted in 
countries without such robust procedures?; and how do the CDM projects assessed in this thesis contribute to 
sustainable development in CDM host countries? 
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promotes their sustainable development goals. For instance, despite China’s discriminatory 
tax scheme on CERs, it currently dominates the UNFCCC project pipeline and this has not 
discouraged CDM investors from implementing projects in China. Additional host country 
requirements will clearly be issues that CDM investors will consider when choosing a host 
State, but it is unlikely to be the most important factor. This is because, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, national issues such as good governance, political stability, strong rule of law and 
a stable investment climate are likely to be more important to CDM investors.
911
 
 
The analysis of the sustainable development claims made by project participants in the PDD 
indicates that employment generation is the most common sustainable development claim 
made by project participants, in the PDDs assessed. This is followed by improved air quality, 
technology transfer and lastly, other direct benefits to local communities. The findings here 
align with the findings in Olsen and Fenhann’s assessment of 744 PDD for their sustainable 
development benefits. According to that study, “[e]mployment generation is the most likely 
impact of an average CDM project, with more than two-thirds of all projects (68%) 
contributing to this aspect of SD. Close to half of all CDM projects (46%) contribute to 
economic growth and slightly less (44%) to improved air quality…  Only a few projects 
contribute to the dimension ‘other benefits.”912 
 
There are four main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. First, given the limited 
capacity of the CDM to promote sustainable development as discussed in previous chapters, 
it is impressive how in practice, some projects do actually seem to do so. This is of course 
down to the efforts of the host country and the project participants and their commitment to 
                                                 
911
 See Chapter 1, Section 1.5. 
912
 Olsen and Fenhann, (2008), 2825. 
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promote sustainable development.  
 
Second, claims of sustainable development contribution by CDM project participants are 
commendable, especially those projects that go the extra mile to commit funds for 
programmes that alleviate poverty and build capacity in local communities. However, these 
claims may become empty promises unless CDM project participants act on the claims made 
in the PDDs. Regrettably, the CDM rules do not require that the sustainable development 
benefits of CDM projects should be monitored and verified as they do the emission reduction 
benefits of CDM projects.  
 
Third, the impression that comes across from analysis of CDM projects is that, to a large 
extent, achieving or promoting sustainable development is an afterthought for most CDM 
project participants and investors.
913
 There has also been much copying and pasting amongst 
the PDDs assessed, especially in the sustainable development contributions section. This is 
not restricted to certain host countries or sectoral scopes, it cuts across the host countries and 
sectoral scopes analysed.
914
  For instance, a couple of the PDDs assessed are all very similar 
in their wordings on the generation of employment. For example, ‘Catalytic N2O destruction 
project in the tail gas of three Nitric Acid Plants at Hu-Chems Fine Chemical Corp.’ states in 
its PDD that “[t]he project developer agreed to pay a share of the income of the CERs to the 
project operator, who is a major job provider in the region. Additionally, value and jobs will 
be created in the region especially during the construction work of the EnviNOX@-
                                                 
913
 A. Olhoff et al., CDM Sustainable Development Impacts (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate 
and Sustainable Development, 2004), 11. 
914
 For example, see CDM project reference: 0261 and 0340 (India) (sectoral scope 3); 0306, 0550, 0868, 0767, 
0306, 0193, 0232 (China) (sectoral scope 11); and 0902, 0892, 1135, 1230, 1250 and 0770 (China) (sectoral 
scope 8). 
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Systems.”915 Similarly, the ‘Catalytic N2O destruction project in the tail gas of the Nitric 
Acid Plant of Abu Qir Fertilizer Co.’ repeats this verbatim.916 Interestingly, these two CDM 
projects are implemented in Republic of Korea and Egypt respectively, they have different 
project participants, Germany and Austria and Germany respectively, but they are validated 
by the same DOE, TÜV SÜD.
917
 This suggests that the sustainable development claims made 
in the PDDs are empty claims, which are sometimes far-fetched. It also suggests that 
stakeholders were not given the opportunity to contribute or comment on the sustainable 
development impact of the project and that project participants themselves did not consider 
the sustainable development contributions of such projects at the design and pre-registration 
stages. 
 
Fourth, as a result of the lack of international criteria and indicators for assessing the 
sustainable development contributions of proposed CDM projects, it remains to be seen how 
much sustainable development will accrue to host countries in the CDM. This is because the 
sustainable development claims of project participants are not assessed using standard 
sustainability assessment tools. Furthermore, CDM projects are not monitored to verify that 
the sustainable development claims made by project participants in their PDDs are actually 
realised during the implementation of the proposed CDM project. The effect of this is that the 
sustainability criteria of host countries are made more ineffective, since there is no 
international requirement to assess and monitor projects for sustainable development impacts 
                                                 
915
 CDM project reference 0765 (sectoral scope 5).  
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/R/0/D/R0DM6YIHG2474ZGI9HIN8PUIV2F02D/PDD%20HU%20Chems%2
0final-1.pdf?t=bFd8MTMwNjAxNDU5NC4yNA==|kLu661SzU6dud34uRKzzzf7iRDY=, 84. (UNFCCC 
Website, 16/3/ 2011).  
916
 CDM project reference 0490 (sectoral scope 5). 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/T/0/5/T05RM2IYBWZBRTJI4TQSSE89WQTBK7.1/PDD_final.pdf?t=VTR8
MTMwNjAxNTA5Ny4wOQ==|xelpZOmIk5LA9N9540ejfH6ilTQ=, 67. (UNFCCC Website, 16/3/ 2011). 
917
 Also see: CDM project reference 0120 and 0105 (sectoral scope 5), both validated by TÜV SÜD, which 
contain identical paragraphs, “[t]his project activity will also increase local employment of skilled labour for the 
fabrication, installation, operation and maintenance of the specialized equipment.”    
260 
 
during implementation. Furthermore, the absence of follow‐up means projects are not held 
accountable for their effect on sustainable development indicators during project 
implementation. It is important to introduce a detailed ex ante assessment of potential impacts 
and ex post assessment to continuously monitor whether the claims made in the PDDs are 
correct and projects are not resulting in negative impacts. 
 
Sustainable development contributions can only be implemented successfully if it is 
supported by a structured stakeholder participation process. However, because the CDM rules 
do not provide minimum standards and guidelines on how to conduct stakeholder’s 
participation process, its fulfilment and implementation has been ad-hoc and haphazard. One 
of the biggest omissions is that the CDM rules do not have a grievance mechanism for local 
stakeholders. This is a missed opportunity for stakeholders to raise complaints during the 
implementation of the project. It is also a missed opportunity to guard against the possibility 
of negative impacts developing during project implementation, which were not visible or 
identified in the design phase.  
 
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the fulfilment of 
stakeholder’s participation process. Although some of the host countries have adopted 
practices that are worthy of emulation by other host countries, for example Brazil, the general 
trend with fulfilling this requirement is that the process is ill‐defined, poorly implemented 
and badly documented. For example, the PDDs for most of the projects analysed do not 
provide enough information about the stakeholder participation process, to allow a conclusion 
to be reached about whether or not the process is sufficient and would effectively contribute 
to sustainable development in the host countries. The PDDs contain insufficient information, 
and as a result, the CDM’s institutional bodies, including the EB and the DOE are not given 
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sufficient information to judge the effectiveness of the fulfilment of the requirement. 
 
Despite the above, all the projects analysed here have been registered, which means that the 
EB was satisfied with the fulfilment of the stakeholder participation requirement. This ties in 
closely with the issue of standards for fulfilling the V & R requirements. The PDDs contain 
the information they are required to contain and no more. Without standards for fulfilling the 
requirements, the EB has no basis for questioning the fulfilment of this requirement and other 
V & R requirements that are tools for promoting sustainable development. If there were, for 
example, standards or guidelines for fulfilling the stakeholder participation requirement, then 
the EB could question the fulfilment of the requirement based on these standards or 
guidelines, and in this way, ensure the effective fulfilment and supervision of the 
requirement.   
 
The fulfilment of the requirement for environmental analysis and EIA by CDM projects is 
unlikely to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. This is because it is 
impossible to independently verify the result of the environmental analysis conducted by 
project participants. Most of the PDDs only contain confirmation that the project does not 
result in negative environmental impact without attaching the result of the analysis to the 
PDD. Furthermore, project participants are not obliged to make the result available to 
stakeholders and the validator. This is an important omission because environmental analysis 
will highlight possible negative environmental or social impacts and it may also ensure that 
mitigating measures are established to address the negative impact identified. In contrast, the 
aim of the GS’s ‘Do No Harm Assessment’ is to gain an insight into the possible negative 
impacts that might result from the implementation of the project. Therefore, to ensure that the 
requirements for environmental analysis and EIA are effective tools for promoting 
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sustainable development, the requirement for environmental analysis should be replaced with 
the more structured ‘Do No Harm’ assessment of the GS. Furthermore, the requirement for 
EIA should be based on the outcome of the ‘Do No Harm Assessment’ rather than being 
based solely on the environmental regulations of the host country.   
 
The result of the analysis of confirmation of sustainable development contribution has a spill 
over effect on the requirement for baseline and monitoring requirement. This is because the 
weak sustainability assessment by host countries is further weakened by the absence of 
requirement to monitor and verify sustainable development impact of CDM projects. 
Furthermore, in the few countries that have well developed sustainability criteria such as 
Brazil and China, their sustainability criteria are undermined due to the lack of monitoring or 
verification of impacts during project implementation. 
 
Given that Chapter 3 concluded that the V & R requirements in the CDM rules and the 
additional requirements contained in the CDM PS and the CDM VVS are limited in their 
potential to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries, it is hardly surprising 
that the overall conclusion of the analysis made herein is that the fulfilment and the 
implementation of the V & R requirements that are tools for promoting sustainable 
development has not made much contribution to sustainable development in CDM host 
countries. In fact, it is surprising that some of the projects have made more contribution to 
sustainable development than can be reasonably expected.
918
  Furthermore, it is insightful that 
some of the projects highlighted in this study for commendable practices are GS projects; 
‘Kuyasa low-cost urban housing energy upgrade project, Khayelitsha (Cape Town; South 
                                                 
918
 CDM project reference 0001 (sectoral scope 11), 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_59491890, 83. (UNFCCC Website, 18/8/ 2010). 
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Africa)’ and  ‘Eecopalsa – biogas recovery and electricity generation from Palm Oil Mill 
Effluent ponds, Honduras’.919 The additional GS requirements provides the minimum 
standards and guidelines advocated in this thesis, which ensures that those requirements that 
will promote sustainable development in CDM host countries are effectively fulfilled by 
project participants and implemented by the host country.  
 
In view of the fact that developing countries rejected the proposed guidance from the EB on 
the criteria for measuring the sustainable development contribution of proposed projects,
920
 
and the conclusions made from the analysis of registered projects, it is important to examine 
reasons why developing countries are enthusiastic to host CDM projects which do not fulfil 
the sustainable development objective of the CDM or promote their sustainable development 
priorities. One key reason is that it is to the benefit of host countries to secure as many CDM 
projects as possible because of the investment that CDM projects bring into the host country. 
As a result of the attraction of foreign investment, it seems some host countries refrain from 
establishing stringent approval procedures and sustainability criteria that can dampen 
investment. The sustainability criteria established, if established at all, usually varies from 
country to country, the criteria are not precise, transparent and stringent in their application 
and the assessment process and the approval procedure of the DNAs are usually nominal. 
 
However, this is an erroneous view by developing countries because research studies, and the 
current distribution of CDM projects proves that rather than seek out countries with weak 
sustainability criteria for assessing projects, CDM investors are more likely to invest in 
                                                 
919
 CDM project reference 0079, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/F/S/_/FS_292989657/Kuyasa%20PDD%20Final-
2005.pdf?t=Mmh8MTMwNjk1NTExNC4zOQ==|mtZdQRjmo6gEFzfQXY5Ih14TymA=  and CDM project 
reference 0115, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/TUEV-SUED1151931954.52/view. (UNFCCC Website, 
11/1/ 2011). 
920
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2. 
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countries that have favourable investment climate, good governance, technical capacity to 
implement the CDM, political stability, existence of a strong rule of law and the availability 
of infrastructures, amongst other considerations.
921
 For example, according to Capoor and 
Ambrosi, China is the favourite choice for CDM investors because of its large size, 
economies of scale in origination, and favourable investment climate.
922
  
 
Another key reason is that the sustainable development benefits from a CDM project is not 
monetised in the current CDM reward system. Therefore, host countries and project 
participants have little incentive to establish mechanisms or measures that will promote 
sustainable development in CDM projects.
923
  
 
It is unacceptable that a mechanism that was established by the international community in 
response to the adverse effect of climate change on sustainable development should result in 
negative consequences for local stakeholder and the environment. The result of the analysis 
in Chapters 3 and 5 indicates that there is a high possibility that CDM projects could be 
resulting in negative impacts on the environment and the infringements of peoples’ rights. 
For example, the absence of a requirement to submit a sustainable development monitoring 
plan, and to monitor the sustainable development impact of projects during implementation, 
is a major failing of the V & R requirements. This thesis has demonstrated, through the 
                                                 
921
 See the World Bank’s ‘Investment Climate Assessments’, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTAFRSUMAFTPS/0,,content
MDK:20763282~menuPK:2153382~pagePK:51246584~piPK:51241019~theSitePK:2049987,00.html (World 
Bank, 2/04/2012). 
922
 K. Capoor and C. Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008 (Washington: World 
Bank, 2008), 26. 
923
 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2. 
265 
 
analysis of the GS requirement that the sustainable development impact of projects can be 
assessed prior to registration and monitored during implementation.
924
  
 
Furthermore, CDM host countries have an obligation to ensure that CDM projects 
implemented in their territory do not result in negative impacts on the environment and its 
citizens. For example, host countries have an obligation to ensure that the activities of CDM 
project participants do not result in the violation of human rights, which by extension results 
in the violation of international treaties, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.
925
 The COP recognised this obligation in Decision 1/CP.16, which stated that “… 
Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights”.926 
 
Ultimately, the responsibility to ensure that the CDM promotes sustainable development does 
not only lie with the CDM’s international body, it also lies with CDM host countries. 
Furthermore, CDM projects that results in negative impacts jeopardises the overall aim and 
objective of the CCR. Therefore, CDM host countries and the international community have 
a joint responsibility to ensure that the CDM is consistent in promoting sustainable 
development whilst reducing or avoiding GHG emissions.  
 
The analysis of rejected projects shows that the supervision of the fulfilment of the V & R 
requirements by the CDM’s institutional bodies is unlikely to promote sustainable 
development in host countries. Again, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and from the analysis 
of the reasons for the rejection of proposed CDM projects, it is clear that the CDM‘s 
institutional bodies, especially the EB and the DOE, do not have the authority to question the 
                                                 
924
 See Section 6.2.5 infra. 
925
 Adopted in June 27, 1981, see 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). Also see International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 6 I.L.M 368 (1967). 
926
 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Paragraph  8. 
266 
 
manner in which those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development in 
CDM host countries have been fulfilled. However, they have the authority to question the 
fulfilment of the additionality requirement and the monitoring, verification reporting 
requirements, requirements which although will contribute to sustainable development in a 
global context but will not necessarily contribute to sustainable development in CDM host 
countries. Furthermore, because the CDM rules do not give the EB the authority to ensure the 
effective fulfilment of those V & R requirements that will promote sustainable development 
in CDM host countries, any attempt by them to go beyond their authority and their mandate 
will be ultra vires. Therefore, this lack of authority prevents the EB from ensuring that the 
requirements that will promote sustainable development in CDM host countries are fulfilled 
effectively.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of registered CDM projects in this study demonstrates that the fulfilment of the 
V & R requirements by project participants is unlikely, in many cases, to promote sustainable 
development in CDM host countries. This is because as discussed in Chapter 3 and from the 
analysis above, the CDM rules lack minimum standards and guidelines to guide project 
participants in effectively fulfilling those requirements that are regarded as tools for 
promoting sustainable development. As a result of this, V & R requirements, such as 
stakeholder participation, are often not fulfilled in a way that will promote sustainable 
development in host countries. The assessment and analysis of more recent 2012 registered 
projects however recorded some improvement and there is an indication of a learning by 
doing’ amongst project participants and CDM host countries. However, the effective 
fulfilment and the implementation of the V & R requirements, that are regarded as tools for 
promoting sustainable development, remains uneven amongst the host countries.   
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As highlighted in Chapter 3, the ability of the CDM to promote sustainable development in 
CDM host countries can be enhanced through the introduction of minimum standards and 
guidelines for the fulfilment of those V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for 
promoting sustainable development. Ultimately, the V & R requirements for CDM should be 
an avenue to foster policy reforms in developing countries.
927
 To that end, the next chapter 
will make recommendations based on findings from this study. 
                                                 
927
 The ways in which the V & R requirements can foster policy reforms in CDM host countries have been 
discussed extensively in Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
“We surely have to hope for all our sakes that the forms of climate governance we are now 
busy constructing are up to the scale of the challenge we are faced with, and can deliver 
change within the time we have available to us to prevent the very worst scenarios of 
uncontrolled climate change.” 
- H. Bulkeley and P. Newell928 
 
“Two things can be said about the CDM: it has been successful in creating a dynamic carbon 
market, and it can certainly be improved.” 
- K. Olsen and J. Fenhann929 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
A widely shared view is that currently, the CDM does not significantly contribute to 
sustainable development in CDM host countries though sustainable development is one of the 
twin objectives of the CDM.
930
 The foundational chapters of this research presented some of 
the reasons cited. These include inter alia, that trade-offs exist between the twin objectives of 
the CDM and there are no market incentives in the CDM to promote its sustainable 
development objective.
931
 However, as highlighted in Chapter 5, despite the CDM’s 
challenges in promoting sustainable development in developing countries, it is important to 
acknowledge that the CDM is contributing to sustainable development in a select few host 
countries, such as Chain and Brazil. The CDM is likely to promote sustainable development 
in these countries not because of the governing and institutional structure of the CDM, but 
                                                 
928
 H. Bulkeley and P. Newell, Governing Climate Change (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 114. 
929
 K. Olsen and J. Fenhann, ‘Editorial’ in K. Olsen and J. Fenhann (eds.), A Reformed CDM – including new 
Mechanism for Sustainable Development (Roskilde: UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable 
Development, 2008), 5 at pg. 6. 
930
See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2. 
931
 Ibid.  
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because these countries have robust procedures in place to ensure that the CDM promotes 
their national development priorities and objectives.
932
 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to examine the suitability of the V & R 
requirements for CDM projects and the fulfilment, implementation, and supervision of the V 
& R requirements in practice, and whether these helps or hinders the promotion of 
sustainable development. This is because several of the CDM’s V & R requirements are 
regarded as tool for achieving sustainable development in international law and therefore, on 
the face of it, their effective fulfilment, implementation and supervision should help 
contribute to sustainable development in developing countries and to the CDM achieving its 
sustainable development objective. Consequently, to achieve the aim of this research, this 
thesis sought to answer two main research questions and two sub research questions: to what 
extent are the V & R requirements suitable for promoting sustainable development?; how are 
the V & R requirements fulfilled, supervised and implemented in practice, and has the 
practical application of the V & R requirements helped or hindered the promotion of 
sustainable development?
933
 The following sub-research questions were also addressed in this 
research: what is the meaning of sustainable development in international law and the CCR?; 
do the rules confer sufficient authority on the CDM’s institutional bodies to effectively 
implement and supervise the V & R requirements?   
 
To set the scene for the thesis, and to answer the first sub-research question, Chapter 2 
examined sustainable development in the context of the CDM, especially Article 12 of the 
KP and the CDM rules, which includes the V & R requirements, and it concluded that one of 
                                                 
932
 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1. 
933
 See Chapters 3 and 5 respectively for relevant discussion.  
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the key reasons for the current failure of the CDM to deliver on its sustainable development 
mandate is that the CCR particularly Article 12 and the CDM rules do not define the 
sustainable development that the CDM is established to promote. Therefore the following 
chapters considered if there were shortcomings in the V & R requirements themselves or if 
the shortcoming is from the fulfilment, implementation, and supervision of the V & R 
requirements that contribute to the CDM’s challenges in achieving its sustainable 
development objective. Chapter 3 examined the suitability of the V & R requirements and the 
further clarifications contained in the CDM PS and VVS, in order to determine if these 
requirements can contribute to the sustainable development objective of the CDM, this being 
the first part of the main research question. Chapter 3 concluded that the V & R requirements, 
especially those that are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development, are not 
suitable to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. Furthermore, the 
chapter concluded that although the CDM PS and the VVS provides additional clarifications, 
these do not go far enough to prescribe minimum standards and guidelines that are necessary 
for fulfilling and implementing those V & R requirements in a way that promotes sustainable 
development in CDM host countries.    
 
Given that Chapter 3 concluded that the V & R requirements and the additional clarifications 
are not adequate to promote sustainable development and in order to answer the second sub-
research question, Chapter 4 considered whether, despite the conclusion in chapter 3, the 
CDM’s institutional bodies can effectively supervise and implement the CDM V & R 
requirements, and whether they can through this supervision, promote sustainable 
development in CDM host countries. Chapter 4 concluded that CDM does not confer 
sufficient authority on the CDM’s institutional bodies to go beyond the checklist to determine 
the adequacy of the fulfilment and the implementation of V & R requirements that will 
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promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. The second part of the main 
research question was examined in Chapters 5. The chapter concluded that the fulfilment of 
the V & R requirements by project participants is unlikely, in many cases, to promote 
sustainable development in CDM host countries. This is because as discussed in Chapter 3, 
and from the analysis of registered projects in Chapter 5, the CDM rules lack minimum 
standards and guidelines that should guide project participants in effectively fulfilling those 
requirements that are regarded as tools for promoting sustainable development. Chapter 5 
also concluded that the supervision of the fulfilment of the V & R requirements by the 
CDM’s institutional bodies is unlikely to promote sustainable development in host countries. 
This is because, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, and from the analysis of the reasons for the 
rejection of proposed CDM projects, the CDM‘s institutional bodies, especially the EB and 
the DOE, do not have the authority to question the manner in which the V & R requirements, 
that will promote sustainable development in CDM host countries, have been fulfilled and 
implemented. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis believes that the V & R requirements for CDM projects should be an 
avenue to foster policy reforms in developing countries. However, the analysis in this thesis 
shows that the current fulfilment, implementation and supervision of the V & R requirements 
for CDM projects cannot foster policy reform in developing counties, which is necessary for 
achieving sustainable development.  
 
To address these problems, this thesis makes the following seven recommendations based on 
the outcome of the analysis of the V & R requirements, CDM rules, CDM PS, CDM VVS 
and registered and rejected projects. Obviously, some of the recommendations suggested 
herein will increase the costs of developing and implementing CDM projects. However, as 
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mentioned in Chapter 3, the additional cost and steps required to obtain GS certification were 
described by project participants as manageable. In addition, the recommendations made 
herein will improve the environmental integrity of the CDM and more importantly ensure the 
sustainable development objective of the CDM is fulfilled, implemented and supervised 
effectively.  
 
6.2 Recommendations 
6.2.1 Minimum Standards and Guidelines for Fulfilling the V & R requirements 
for CDM Projects   
Chapter 3 concluded that the V & R requirements that are regarded as tools for achieving 
sustainable development are not suitable to promote sustainable development and that the 
CDM PS and VVS do not provide the minimum standards and guidelines required to ensure 
their fulfilment and implementation promotes sustainable development. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends that the EB should introduce compulsory minimum standards and guidelines for 
fulfilling those V & R requirements that are generally regarded as tool for achieving 
sustainable development. This is important because CDM host countries are at different 
levels of development and as a result, standards and regulations may not exist in some host 
countries for fulfilling those V & R requirements in a way that will promote sustainable 
development. Furthermore, the minimum standards or guidelines will address the issue of the 
varied ways in which these requirements are fulfilled by project participants, and, it will 
ensure that the V & R requirements are fulfilled effectively. Specific recommendations for 
the minimum standards and guidelines are discussed below. 
6.2.2 Internationally Acceptable Sustainable Development Criteria and 
Indicators for Assessing Proposed CDM projects  
Chapter 2 concluded that one of the key inadequacies of the CDM is the absence of minimum 
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standards and guidelines for the governance and implementation of sustainable development. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the requirement for written confirmation of sustainable 
development contribution by host countries concluded that the sustainable development 
claims of project participants are not assessed, using standard sustainability assessment tools. 
Consequently, this thesis recommends that internationally acceptable sustainable 
development criteria and indicators should be defined for CDM projects. Project participants 
must demonstrate clearly how the proposed CDM project contributes to sustainable 
development in the host country. This can be done, for example, by using a sustainability 
assessment matrix tool to score proposed projects based on sustainable development criteria 
such as local and global environmental sustainability, social sustainability and development 
and economic and technological development. For example, a possible indicator for 
environmental sustainability includes improved air quality, a possible indicator for social 
sustainability includes quality of employment, and a possible indicator for economic 
sustainability includes employment creation.
934
  
 
To implement this recommendation, using the table in Chapter 3 Table 3.1, project 
participants should assess how their projects score against a set of pre-determined sustainable 
development indicators. The indicators are assessed against the baseline scenario and can be 
scored positive, neutral or negative, depending on their impacts on the sustainable 
development indicator assessed. Therefore, indicators that have a negative impact are scored 
‘-‘although they can be remedied with mitigation measures, which changes the score to ‘0’, 
indicators that have a positive impact are scored a ‘+’ and indicators with neutral impacts are 
scored ‘0’. To be eligible for registration as a CDM project, proposed projects must 
contribute positively to at least two of the three indicators and be neutral in the third. If the 
                                                 
934
 See Chapter 3 for suggested sustainable development indicators. 
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project fails the sustainability assessment, the project should be refused registration except 
the project is altered or additional mitigation measures are established to mitigate the 
negative impacts.   
6.2.3 Comprehensive Framework for Stakeholder Participation 
With regards to the requirement for stakeholder participation, the analysis of its practical 
fulfilment and implementation by project participants and host countries concluded that 
because the CDM rules do not provide minimum standards and guidelines on how to conduct 
stakeholder’s participation process, its fulfilment and implementation has been ad-hoc and 
haphazard. This thesis recommends that as a minimum, the following framework should for 
established for fulfilling this requirement. The recommended framework consists of 
preparatory guidelines, before the stakeholder consultation takes place, and guidelines for 
conducting the actual consultation.  
(i) Minimum invitation standards and minimum list of stakeholders: there should be 
specific requirements with regards to the mode of invitation for stakeholders and 
the minimum list of stakeholder that should be invited for consultation. As 
minimum, local policy makers that regulate local industries that are relevant to the 
proposed CDM project, surrounding local communities and local people directly 
impacted by the project, local NGOs that monitor CDM projects or that are 
involved in related activities; and an official representative of the DNA, should be 
invited as stakeholders. This thesis acknowledges that the interest of the above 
suggested stakeholders will most likely be different, for example the impact of the 
project on stakeholders living in the local community where the project will be 
implemented will be different from that of the policy maker or the DNA. 
Therefore, this thesis further recommends that the DOE selected to validate the 
project should also be invited to attend the consultation process(es). Although the 
275 
 
DOE cannot be classified as a stakeholder, his involvement in the consultation 
process will ensure that there are checks and balances to protect the interest of 
stakeholders and also to ensure that project participants conduct the consultation 
process according to the minimum standards and guidelines stipulated by the EB.  
Furthermore, this thesis recognises that CDM projects are different and the way 
and level in which proposed projects affect stakeholders differ. For example, 
stakeholders of an end-of-pipe CDM project would most likely be less affected by 
its implementation than the stakeholders of a hydroelectric power project. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends that projects that are more likely to affect their 
surrounding environment and communities should have an expanded list of 
stakeholders such as the ones mentioned earlier.  
(ii) Two stakeholder consultations, one during the design stage of the project and the 
other during the validation and registration stages. The EB should also provide 
guidelines on how to organise the meetings, the minimum number of stakeholders 
that should be invited for the different types of CDM projects and the documents 
that should be made available during the meeting in a non-technical summary to 
stakeholders.  
(iii) This thesis further recommends that the rules should require that consultation with 
stakeholders is conducted in an appropriate local language(s), consultation should 
be jointly organised by the project participants and an independent representative 
of the local community.  
(iv) Grievance Mechanism: The decision to implement a CDM project invariably has 
an impact on stakeholders. As such, access to justice, which is one of the elements 
of participation, is important for achieving sustainable development and for 
successful project implementation. This thesis recommends that a grievance 
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mechanism should be established for stakeholders. The grievance mechanism 
should address unresolved issues that arise from the stakeholder participation 
process, the environmental analysis and the sustainability assessment.  
 
This thesis recommends a two level approach for the grievance mechanism. At the 
first level, the CDM rules should prescribe that all DNAs should establish a 
grievance mechanism where stakeholders can report grievances to the DNA, for 
example, where the project does not conform to national rules and regulations or 
the national requirement for obtaining host country approval for CDM projects. 
This recommendation will not necessarily lead to additional cost for the DNA 
because ordinarily, all DNAs have an appeal mechanism in place as part of their 
project approval procedure.  
 
At the second level, the CDM should establish a grievance mechanism for 
stakeholders to present their complaints to the DOE at first instance, and if the 
grievances remain unresolved by the DOE, stakeholders should be able to present 
same to the EB. The grievance presented by stakeholders at this level should relate 
to the V & R requirements, for example, a stakeholder may want to question the 
result of the sustainable development impact assessment or other issues that may 
arise from the result of the environmental analysis and were not properly resolved 
during the stakeholder participation process. This thesis further recommends that 
the DNA, the DOE and EB should suspend the approval, validation and 
registration of such projects, pending the determination of the issues raised.  
 
Furthermore, post-registration, the grievance mechanism will address issues such 
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as negative impacts developing during project implementation that were not 
visible or identified in the design phase. If the project is in the implementation 
stage, the EB should suspend issuance of CERs to the project until the grievance 
has been resolved. The grievance mechanism should be supervised by an 
independent body created by the UNFCCC Secretariat, independent from the 
project participant, the EB and the DOE.  
 
To implement the stakeholder consultation process, project participants should make a 
presentation of the proposed project to stakeholders and provide them with the results of the 
sustainability assessment and the ‘Do No Harm’ assessment.935 The aim of the consultation 
should be to inform stakeholders about the project and give them the opportunity to discuss 
the assessment results presented to them by the project participants. To enable stakeholders 
respond to the assessment results they should also be provided with a questionnaire on the 
possible environmental and social impacts of the project, during the initial consultation 
process. The issues that emanate from the presentation, the assessment results, and the 
answers from the questionnaires should be addressed during the initial consultation process. 
Furthermore, project participants should be allowed, if they wish, to go with the 
questionnaire, fill it out and bring it back during the second consultation process. The 
questionnaire will assist the project participants and the stakeholders narrow down the issues 
that require further discussion and explanation during the second round of consultations. The 
recommendation will improve the project design based on stakeholder comments and 
increase stakeholder involvement in the project. 
 
                                                 
935
 This is discussed in the following recommendation.  
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Lastly, as discussed in Chapter 3, the current definition of a stakeholder is vague and it does 
not clarify who is required to be consulted in the stakeholder participation process for CDM 
projects. This thesis therefore makes two complimentary recommendations, first that the 
meaning of stakeholder as defined in the CDM rules should be amended and made clearer. In 
the alternative, the CDM could adopt Brazil’s procedure. Rather than define stakeholders, a 
minimum list of stakeholders that should be consulted should be provided for CDM projects. 
The CDM can go a step further than the Brazilian procedure by prescribing the different 
stakeholders that should be consulted for different categories of projects.    
6.2.4 Replace Environmental Analysis with the Gold Standard’s ‘Do No Harm’ 
Assessment  
The fulfilment of the requirement for environmental analysis and EIA by CDM projects is 
unlikely to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. This is because the 
requirement for environmental analysis is unclear and as a result of this, the requirement has 
been fulfilled in a haphazard manner. For example, it is impossible to independently verify 
the result of the environmental analysis conducted by project participants. This is because 
most of the PDDs only contain confirmation that the project does not result in negative 
environmental impact without attaching the result of the analysis to the PDD. This thesis 
recommends that the GS’s ‘Do No’ Harm’ assessment should replace the environmental 
analysis requirement for CDM projects.
936
 This thesis further recommends that if the result of 
the self‐assessment indicates that negative effects, which cannot be remedied with mitigation 
measures, will arise from the project, then such a project should be eliminated from the 
CDM’s registration process. As such, this process should ideally be one of the earliest 
assessments that project participants conduct during the design stage of the project and it 
should complement the stakeholder consultation and the sustainability assessment processes.  
                                                 
936
 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3 for further discussions on the GS’s ‘Do No Harm’ assessment. 
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To implement this recommendation, project participants should conduct a self-assessment 
that questions if there is likelihood that the proposed project might breach any of the 
safeguarding principles.
937
 For example if the project participant identifies that the project 
might result in a breach of Principle 4 of the safeguarding principle, which states that the 
project should not involve in or is complicit in involuntary settlement, the identification of 
the likelihood of the breach requires that a mitigation measure, which will ensure that 
involuntary resettlement does not occur, is established for the project. This will ensure that 
when resettlement occurs, it is voluntary and it is done in an equitable, transparent, and fair 
manner. Table 6.1 below provides an example of the self-assessment required from project 
participants.  
Table 6.1: ‘Do No Harm’ Assessment Table 
Project Safeguarding 
Principle 
Description of 
relevance to my 
project 
Assessment of 
my project risk 
Mitigation 
measure 
Landfill gas 
capture 
Labour 
standards  
Unsafe handling 
of the captured 
gas  
High Organise  
training and 
only authorise 
trained  
personnel on 
site 
Off grid solar Environmental 
Protection 
Batteries used to 
store electricity 
end up in 
environment 
High Organise a 
recycling system 
for batteries at 
end of life time 
Source: GS Toolkit 
 
The ‘Do No Harm’ assessment can act as an EIA pre-screen checklist that helps to determine 
if an EIA is required or not. This thesis further recommends that the requirement for EIAs in 
the CDM should not be based solely on host country national regulations but on the result of 
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 The ‘Do No Harm Assessment’ and the safeguarding principle have been discussed extensively in Chapter 3. 
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the ‘Do No Harm Assessment’ of the likely environmental impact of proposed CDM projects.  
6.2.5 Monitoring Requirement for Sustainable Development  
It is not enough for project participants to make claims of sustainable development benefits 
without a monitoring, verification and reporting mechanism to ensure that such benefits 
actually occur. Therefore, in addition to the requirement for monitoring, verification, and 
certification of the emission reduction achieved by CDM project, it is hereby recommended 
that sustainable development monitoring plans that assess sustainable development benefits 
of CDM projects should be introduced. This will ensure that claims of sustainable 
development contribution made by project participants during the validation and registration 
stages are actually realised during the implementation of CDM projects. This will also ensure 
that the project does not result in negative impacts during its implementation.
938
 To 
implement this recommendation, project participants should be required to submit a 
sustainable development monitoring plan, in addition to the emission reduction monitoring 
plan required by the V & R requirements. All the indicators cited in the sustainable 
development assessment matrix should be monitored during the monitoring period.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis recommends that the result of the monitoring should be verified and 
certified by an independent assessor and it should count towards the award of CERs for 
projects. Although this recommendation might increase the implementation cost of the 
project for the project participant or the host country, it is the best alternative. This is because 
there are limitations in the viability of the other alternatives, such as the DOE or the host 
country conducting the sustainable development verification. First, the current lists of DOEs 
on the UNFCCC’s list are better qualified to verify emission reductions. This is because 
DOEs are usually auditing consultancy firms that provide CDM validation and certification 
                                                 
938
 This will serve as a follow-up to the recommendation for sustainable development assessment. 
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services and, as such, they are less qualified to monitor and verify the sustainable 
development impact of CDM project. Secondly, it is unlikely that developing host countries 
will have the capacity, such as funding and expertise to effectively conduct the sustainable 
development verification check. Furthermore, this will likely raise the same problems 
discussed in Chapter 5 with regards to confirmation by the DNA of sustainable development 
contribution of projects.  
 
In addition, where the verification check indicates that the sustainable development benefits 
were not achieved, or that the project results in negative impacts, the CDM’s institutional 
body should, in conjunction with the host country, decide on appropriate consequences for 
CDM projects that fail in this regard. For example, the projects could be penalised by making 
it pay a certain percentage of the CERs earned into a sustainable development fund 
established by host countries. The funds can then be used to finance sectoral programmes and 
policies that will promote sustainable development in the host country.  
  
6.2.7 The EB should choose and Pay for the Validation Services of DOEs 
This thesis reaffirms the recommendation of several research studies that the EB should 
remove the discretion that project participants have to select and pay DOEs for their 
validation services.
939
 This would remove the conflict of interest that is likely to arise when 
DOEs, although acting as agents of the EB in validating CDM projects, are appointed and 
paid by project participants for their validation duties. To implement this suggestion, this 
thesis further recommends that the cost of engaging DOEs to validate proposed CDM 
                                                 
939
 See the following: L. Schneider Is the CDM fulfilling its Environmental and Sustainable Development 
Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for Improvements, (Berlin: Öko-Institut, 2007), 7; J. 
Sepibus, ‘The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – a legal analysis of its institutional and 
procedural shortcomings’, 23; and E. Lokey, Renewable Energy Project Development Under the Clean 
Development Mechanism: A Guide For Latin America, (London: Earthscan, 2009), 123. 
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projects can then be added to the registration fee for CDM projects paid by project 
participants.  
Concluding Remarks  
This thesis has established that in their existing form, the V & R requirements that are 
regarded as tools for achieving sustainable development are not well-suited to promote 
sustainable development in CDM host countries. In addition, this thesis has also 
demonstrated that the process by which the V & R requirements are fulfilled by project 
participants, implemented by the DNA and supervised by the CDM’s institutional bodies are 
unlikely to promote sustainable development in CDM host countries. This thesis has also 
established through the analysis of the GS that minimum standards and guidelines are 
essential to ensure that the V & R requirements are fulfilled, implemented and supervised so 
as to promote sustainable development and foster policy reforms in developing countries.  
 
This thesis recognises that some of the recommendations above may touch on issues of 
sovereignty of CDM host countries, and that the host countries themselves may not be 
agreeable to standards or guidelines that may likely infringe on their sovereign rights. 
Nevertheless, this thesis anticipates that the above recommendations, borne out of the 
research findings in this thesis, would improve the fulfilment and supervision of the V & R 
requirements that are relevant for achieving sustainable development in CDM host countries 
and, in turn, enhance the ability of the CDM to achieve its sustainable development objective.  
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APPENDIX TO THESIS 
 
Appendix 1: List of Registered CDM projects assessed 
Project    Country  Sectoral scope 
1. 0028   Brazil    1 
2. 0079   South Africa   3 
3. 0024   Chile   4 
4. 0099   Korea   5 
5. 0672   Columbia  7 
6. 0770   China   8 
7. 1027   South Africa  1  
8. 0153   Mexico  10 
9. 0001   India   11 
10. 0008   Brazil   13 
11. 0547   China   14 
12. 0031   Chile   15 
13. 0045   Honduras   1 
14. 0123   India   3 
15. 0048   Bolivia  13 
16. 0120   Mexico  13 
17. 0159   Moldova  3 
18. 0382   India    10 
19. 0003   Korea    11 
20. 0051   Honduras  1 
21. 0105   Mexico  15 
22. 0160   Moldova  3 
23. 0490   Egypt   5 
24. 0840   China   8 
25. 0032   Chile   13 
26. 0078   Bangladesh  1 
27. 0115   India   11 
28. 0152   Vietnam   10 
29. 0183   India   4 
30. 0902   China   8 
31. 0116   Brazil   5 
32. 0361   India   4 
33. 0247   Malaysia  4 
34. 0557   Pakistan  5 
35. 0892   China   8 
36. 0496   India   10 
37. 0193   China   11 
38. 0097   Chile    13 
39. 0197   Mexico  13 
40. 0113   India   1 
41. 0173   Moldova  3 
42. 0473   India   4 
43. 0765   Korea   5 
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44. 1135   China   8 
45. 0616   Indonesia  10 
46. 0232   China   11 
47. 0140   Argentina  13 
48. 0379   Chile    13 
49. 0122   Columbia   1 
50. 0255   India   3 
51. 0717   India   1 
52. 0698   Brazil    5 
53. 1230   China   8 
54. 0605   Philippines  10 
55. 0011   China   11 
56. 0490   Egypt   5 
57. 0492   Honduras  1 
58. 0503   Malaysia  13 
59. 0253   India    1 
60. 0261   India   3 
61. 0847   India    4 
62. 0837   China   5 
63. 1250   China   8 
64. 0879   Mexico  10 
65. 0151   Mexico  11 
66. 0401   Brazil   15 
67. 0346   Chile   1 
68. 0340   India   3 
69. 1070   India   4 
70. 0752   South Africa  5 
71. 1080   Mexico  10 
72. 0306   China   11 
73. 0686   India   3 
74. 0945   India   15 
75. 0876   Argentine  4 
76. 0922   Korea   5 
77. 0553   Nigeria  10 
78. 0550   China   11 
79. 0605   Philippines  10 
80. 0194   Columbia  1 
81. 0499   India   11 
82. 0677   India   3 
83. 0767   India   11 
84. 0771   China   1 
85. 0832   India   3 
86. 0866   India   3 
87. 0868   China   11 
88. 0895   India   1 
89. 0935   India   13 
90. 0961   South Africa  5 
91. 1011   Brazil   5 
92. 1083   China   5 
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93. 1092   Brazil   15 
94. 1113   Israel   5  
95. 1127   China   1 
96. 1186   Malaysia  4 
97. 1188   India   3 
98. 1301   China   15 
99. 1332   Armenia  1 
100. 1372   Malaysia  3  
 
 
ADDENDUM: List of Registered CDM projects assessed 
 
Project   Country   Sectoral scope 
5626   Senegal   4 
5642   India   13 
4520   Vietnam  1 
5213   India   1 
5313   India   1 
5509   China   1 
4787   China    1 
5740   India   1 
5552   China   1 
5844   China   1 
5838   China    1 
5854   China   1 
5461   Pakistan   5 
5957   China   1 
5280   China   4 
5942   Guatemala  1 
5615   Viet Nam  1 
6059   China   1 
6051   China   1 
5021   China   1 
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Appendix 2: List of Rejected Projects Assessed 
 
Project   Country  Sectoral Scope 
1. 0221   India    1 
2. 0224  India    1 
3. 0311  Mexico   1 
4. 0317  Mexico   1 
5. 0400  India    1 
6. 0410  Brazil    1 
7. 0443  Argentina   1 
8. 0474  Brazil    1 
9. 0522  India    1 
10. 0683  India    1 
11. 0761  Brazil    1 
12. 0871  Panama   1 
13. 0951  India    4 
14. 0964  Bolivia   1 
15. 0977  India    1 
16. 0990  India    1 
17. 0997  India    1 
18. 1004  India    1 
19. 1014  Malaysia   1 
20. 1016  Malaysia   1 
21. 1022  India    1 
22. 1035  Honduras   1 
23. 1041  Brazil    4 
24. 1042  India    1 
25. 1043  Honduras   1 
26. 1044  Guatemala   1 
27. 1056  Honduras   1 
28. 1065  Brazil    1 
29. 1077  Guatemala   1 
30. 1109  India    1 
31. 1132  India    1 
32. 1148  India    1 
33. 1173  Sri Lanka   1 
34. 1184  India    1 
35. 1195  India    1 
36. 1201  India    1 
37. 1204  Sri Lanka   1 
38. 1215  India    1 
39. 1217  India    1 
40. 1235  Brazil    1 
41. 1252  India    1 
42. 1297  India    1 
43. 1331  India    1 
44. 1377  Republic of Korea  1 
45. 1383  India    1 
46. 1398  India    1 
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47. 1412  Republic of Korea  1 
48. 1447  Republic of Macedonia 1 
49. 1479  Brazil    1 
50. 1494  Brazil    1 
51. 1545  India    1 
52. 1611  China    1 
53. 1625  China    1 
54. 1669  China    1 
55. 1702  India    1 
56. 1707  China    1 
57. 1710  China    1 
58. 1718  China    1 
59. 1725  China     1 
60. 1846  Philippines    15 
61. 0454  India    1 
62. 0457  Chile    13 
63. 0715  India    1 
64. 0754  Brazil    4 
65. 0854  Brazil    4 
66. 0859  India    4 
67. 0861  India    4 
68. 0863  India    4 
69. 0929  India    4 
70. 0954  India    4 
71. 0972  Equatorial Guinea  10 
72. 0988  Brazil    3 
73. 1023  Brazil    3 
74. 1030  Brazil    3 
75. 1050  Brazil    3 
76. 1055  Brazil    3 
77. 1057  Brazil    3 
78. 1356  Mexico   4 
79. 1475  India    4 
80. 1058  Brazil    3 
81. 1060  Brazil    3 
82. 1084  Sri Lanka   4 
83. 1285  Malaysia   13 
84. 1735  Indonesia   13 
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Appendix 3: Thesis Assessment Data 
KEY 
 
1. MPSD – Monitoring plan for sustainable development 
2. PDD – Project Design Document 
3. MP – Monitoring plan 
4. VR – Validation report 
5. SD – Sustainable development 
6. CER – Certified Emission Reduction credit 
7. PP – Project participant 
8. EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment 
9. TT – Technology transfer 
10. CPSN - Comments By Parties, Stakeholders and NGOs 
11. EG – Employment generation 
12. SP – Stakeholders participation 
13. CDM – Clean Development Mechanism 
14. DNA – Designated National Authority 
 
 
Scope 1 – Monitoring Plan for Sustainable Development 
CDM Country MPSD 
0028 Honduras No 
0045 Honduras No 
0051 Honduras No 
0078 Bangladesh No 
0113 India No 
0122 Colombia No 
0253 India No 
0346 Chile No 
0492 Honduras No 
0194 Colombia No 
0606 Guatemala No 
0717 India No 
0771 China No 
0895 India No 
1127 China No 
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1332 Armenia No 
 
 
Scope 3 - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0123 India No 
0160 Moldova No 
0159 Moldova No 
0173 Moldova No 
0255 India No 
0261 India No 
0340 India No 
0686 India No 
0079 South Africa No 
0677 India No 
0832 India No 
0866 India No 
1188 India No 
1372 Malaysia No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 4 - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0183 India No 
0247 Malaysia No 
0361 India No 
0473 India No 
0847 India No 
1070 India No 
0876 Argentina No 
0024 Chile No 
1186 Malaysia No 
 
 
 
Scope 5 – MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0116 Brazil No 
0490 Egypt No 
0557 Pakistan No 
0765 Republic of Korea No 
0698 Brazil No 
0837 China No 
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0752 South Africa No 
0922 Republic of Korea No 
0099 Republic of Korea No 
0961 South Africa No 
1011 Brazil No 
1083 China No 
1113 Israel No 
 
 
 
Scope 7- MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0672 Columbia No 
 
 
 
Scope 8 - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0840 China No 
0902 China No 
1135 China No 
1230 China No 
1250 China No 
0770 China No 
0892 China No 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 9- MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
1027 South Africa No 
 
 
Scope 10 - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0153 Mexico No 
0152 Vietnam Yes 
0382 India No 
0496 India No 
0616 Indonesia No 
0605 Philippines No 
0879 Mexico No 
1080 Mexico No 
0553 Nigeria Yes 
 
 
Scope 11 (HFC 23) - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
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0003 Republic of Korea No 
0115 India No 
0193 China No 
0232 China No 
0011 China No 
0151 Mexico No 
0306 China No 
0550 China No 
0001 India Yes 
0499 India No 
0868 China No 
0767 China No 
 
 
Scope 13 - MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0048 Bolivia Yes 
0032 Chile No 
0097 Chile No 
0140 Argentina No 
0197 Mexico No 
0379 Chile No 
0503 Malaysia No 
0008 Brazil No 
0935 India No 
0908 Tanzania No 
 
 
 
 
Scope 14- MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0547 China No 
 
 
Scope 15- MPSD 
CDM Country MPSD 
0105 Mexico No 
0120 Mexico No 
0401 Brazil No 
0945 India No 
0031 Chile No 
1092 Brazil No 
1301 China No 
 
 
Scope 1 – Other Direct Benefits to Local Communities (Sustainable development) 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
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0028 Honduras Yes 
0045 Honduras Yes 
0051 Honduras Yes 
0078 Bangladesh No 
0113 India Yes 
0122 Colombia Yes 
0253 India Yes 
0346 Chile No 
0492 Honduras No 
0606 Guatemala Yes 
0717 India No 
0771 China No 
0895 India Yes 
1127 China No 
1332 Armenia No 
0194 Colombia Yes 
 
 
Scope 3 – SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community 
assessed) 
0079 South Africa Yes 
0159 Moldova No 
0123 India No 
0173 Moldova Yes 
0160 Moldova Yes 
0255 India No 
0340 India No 
0686 India No 
0677 India Yes 
0832  India No 
0866 India No 
1188 India No 
1372 Malaysia No 
0261 India No 
 
 
Scope 4 – SD 
CDM Country SD (Other Benefits) 
0024 Chile Yes 
0183 India No 
0247 Malaysia No 
0361 India No 
0473 India Yes 
0847 India No 
1070 India No 
0876 Argentina Yes 
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1186* Malaysia  Yes 
 
 
Scope 5 – SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0099 Republic of Korea Yes 
0116 Brazil No 
0490  Egypt Yes 
0557  Pakistan Yes 
0765  Republic of Korea No 
0698 Brazil No 
0837 China No 
0752 South Africa Yes, 
0922 Republic of Korea No 
0961 South Africa No 
1011 Brazil Yes 
1083 China No 
1113 Israel No 
 
 
Scope 7 - SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0672 Colombia Yes 
 
 
Scope 8 - SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0770 China No 
0840 China No 
0902 China No 
0892 China No 
1135 China No 
1230 China No 
1250 China No 
 
 
Scope 9 - SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
1027 South Africa No 
 
 
 
Scope 10 - SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0153 Mexico No 
0152 Vietnam No 
0382 India No 
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0496 India No 
0616 Indonesia Yes 
0605 Philippines No 
0879 Mexico No 
1080 Mexico No 
0553 Nigeria Yes 
 
 
Scope 11 - SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
   0001  India Yes 
0003 Republic of Korea No 
0115 India Yes 
0193 China No 
0232 China No 
0011 China No 
0151 Mexico No 
0306 China No 
0550 China No 
0499 India No 
0868 China No 
0767 China No 
 
 
Scope 13 – SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0008  Brazil Yes  
0048 Bolivia No 
0032 Chile Yes 
0097 Chile No 
0140  Argentina Yes  
0197 Mexico No 
0379 Chile No 
0503 Malaysia Yes 
0935 India No 
0908 Tanzania Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 14 – SD 
CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0547 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 15 – SD 
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CDM Country SD (Direct benefit to local community) 
0031 Chile No 
0105 Mexico No 
0120 Mexico No 
0401 Brazil No 
0945 India No 
1092 Brazil No 
1301 China No 
 
 
Scope 1 – Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
CDM Country EIA 
0028 Honduras Yes 
0045 Honduras Yes 
0051 Honduras Yes 
0078 Bangladesh No 
0113 India No 
0122 Colombia Yes 
0253 India No 
0346 Chile Yes 
0492 Honduras Yes 
0194 Colombia Yes 
0606 Guatemala Yes 
0717 India No 
0771 China Yes 
0895 India Yes 
1127 China Yes 
1332 Armenia Yes 
 
 
Scope 3 
CDM Country EIA 
0123 India No 
0160 Moldova No 
0159 Moldova No 
0173 Moldova No 
0255 India No 
0261 India No 
0340 India No 
0686 India No 
0079 South Africa No 
0677 India No 
0832 India No 
0866 India No 
1188 India No 
1372 Malaysia No 
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Scope 4 – EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0183 India No 
0247 Malaysia No 
0361 India No 
0473 India No 
0847 India No 
1070 India No 
0876 Argentina Yes 
0024 Chile No 
1186 Malaysia No 
 
 
Scope 5 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0116 Brazil No 
0490 Egypt Yes 
0557 Pakistan No 
0765 Republic of Korea No 
0698 Brazil No 
0837 China Yes 
0752 South Africa No 
0922 Republic of Korea No 
0099 Republic of Korea No 
0961 South Africa No 
1011 Brazil No 
1083 China Yes 
1113 Israel No 
 
 
Scope 7 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0672 Colombia Yes 
 
 
Scope 8 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0840 China Yes 
0902 China Yes 
1135 China Yes 
1230 China Yes 
1250 China Yes 
0770 China Yes 
0892 China Yes 
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Scope 9 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
1027 South Africa No 
 
 
Scope 10 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0153 Mexico No 
0152 Vietnam yes 
0382 India No 
0496 India No 
0616 Indonesia No 
0605 Philippines No 
0879 Mexico No 
1080 Mexico No 
0553 Nigeria Yes 
 
 
 
Scope 11 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0003 Republic of Korea No 
0115 India Yes 
0193 China Yes 
0232 China Yes 
0011 China Yes 
0151 Mexico No 
0306 China Yes 
0550 China Yes 
0001 India Yes 
0499 India Yes 
0868 China Yes 
0767 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 13 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0048 Bolivia No 
0032 Chile Yes 
0097 Chile Yes 
0140 Argentina Yes 
0197 Mexico No 
0379 Chile No 
0503 Malaysia No 
0008 Brazil Yes 
0935 India yes 
0908 Tanzania No 
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Scope 14 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0547 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 15 - EIA 
CDM Country EIA 
0105 Mexico No 
0120 Mexico No 
0401 Brazil Yes 
0945 India No 
0031 Chile No 
1092 Brazil Yes 
1301 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 1 – TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0028 Honduras Yes 
0045 Honduras Yes 
0051 Honduras No 
0078 Bangladesh Yes. 
0113 India No. 
0122 Colombia No 
0253 India No 
0346 Chile No 
0492 Honduras Yes. 
0194 Colombia Yes 
0606 Guatemala Yes 
0717 India Yes 
0771 China Yes 
0895 India No 
1127 China No 
1332 Armenia No 
 
 
Scope 3 – TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0123 India Yes 
0160 Moldova Yes 
0159 Moldova Yes 
0173 Moldova Yes 
0255 India No 
0261 India No 
0340 India No 
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0686 India No 
0079 South Africa No 
0677 India Yes 
0832 India Yes  
0866 India No 
1188 India No 
1372 Malaysia Yes 
 
 
Scope 4 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0183 India No 
0247 Malaysia Yes 
0361 India No 
0473 India No 
0847 India No 
1070 India No 
0876 Argentina No 
0024 Chile No 
1186 Malaysia Yes 
 
 
Scope 5 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0116 Brazil Yes 
0490 Egypt Yes 
0557 Pakistan Yes 
0765 Republic of Korea Yes 
0698 Brazil Yes 
0837 China Yes 
0752 South Africa Yes 
0922 Republic of Korea Yes 
0099 Republic of Korea Yes 
0961 South Africa Yes 
1011 Brazil No 
1083 China No 
1113 Israel Yes 
 
 
 
 
Scope 7 - TT 
CDM Country Technology Transfer 
0672 Colombia No 
 
 
Scope 8 - TT 
300 
 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0840 China No 
0902 China Yes 
0892 China Yes 
1135 China No 
1230 China No 
1250 China No 
0770 China No 
 
 
Scope 9 - TT 
CDM Country TT 
1027 South Africa Yes 
 
 
Scope 10 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0153 Mexico Yes 
0152 Vietnam Yes 
0382 India No 
0496 India No 
0616 Indonesia Yes 
0605 Philippines Yes 
0879 Mexico No 
1080 Mexico No 
0553 Nigeria Yes 
 
 
Scope 11 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0003 Republic of Korea Yes 
0115 India Yes 
0193 China Yes 
0232 China Yes 
0011 China Yes 
0151 Mexico Yes 
0306 China Yes 
0550 China Yes 
0001 India Yes 
0499 India Yes 
0868 China Yes 
0767 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 13 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0048 Bolivia Yes 
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0032 Chile No 
0097 Chile No 
0140 Argentina No 
0197 Mexico No 
0379 Chile No 
0503 Malaysia Yes 
0008 Brazil Yes 
0935 India No 
0908 Tanzania Yes 
 
 
 
 
Scope 14 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0547 China No 
 
 
Scope 15 - TT 
CDM Country Transfer of Technology 
0105 Mexico No 
0120 Mexico No 
0401 Brazil Yes 
0945 India No 
0031 Chile No 
1092 Brazil No 
1301 China No 
 
 
Scope 1 - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0028 Honduras Yes 
0045 Honduras Yes   
0051 Honduras Yes 
0078 Bangladesh No 
0113 India No 
0122 Colombia No 
0253 India Yes 
0346 Chile No 
0492 Honduras No 
0194  Colombia Yes  
0606 Guatemala Yes 
0717 India Yes 
0771 China Yes 
0895 India Yes 
1127 China Yes 
1332 Armenia Yes 
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Scope 3 - Employment Generation (EG) 
CDM Country EG 
0123 India No 
0160 Moldova Yes 
0159 Moldova Yes 
0173 Moldova Yes 
0255 India No 
0261 India Yes. 
0340 India Yes 
0686 India No 
0079 South Africa Yes 
0677 India No 
0832 India No 
0866 India Yes 
1188 India Yes 
1372 Malaysia No 
 
 
Scope 4 - (EG) 
CDM Country EG 
0183 India No 
0247 Malaysia No 
0361 India No 
0473 India Yes 
0847 India No 
1070 India No 
0876 Argentina Yes 
0024 Chile Yes 
1186  Malaysia Yes 
 
 
Scope 5 - (EG) 
CDM Country EG 
0116 Brazil Yes 
0490  Egypt YES 
0557 Pakistan Yes 
0765 Republic of Korea Yes 
0698 Brazil No 
0837 China Yes 
0752 South Africa Yes 
0922 Republic of Korea Yes 
0099 Republic of Korea Yes 
0961 South Africa No 
1011 Brazil No 
1083 China No 
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1113 Israel No 
 
 
Scope 7 – EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0672 Colombia Yes 
 
 
Scope 8 - (EG) 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0840 China No 
0902 China Yes 
0892 China Yes 
1135 China Yes 
1230 China Yes 
1250 China Yes 
0770 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 9 - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
1027 South Africa Yes 
 
 
Scope 10 - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0153 Mexico Yes 
0152 Vietnam No 
0382 India No 
0496 India No 
0616 Indonesia Yes 
0605 Philippines Yes 
0879 Mexico Yes 
1080 Mexico Yes 
0553 Nigeria Yes 
 
 
Scope 11 (HFC 23) - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0003 Republic of Korea No 
0115 India Yes 
0193 China Yes 
0232 China No 
0011 China Yes 
0151 Mexico No 
0306 China Yes 
0550 China Yes 
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0001 India Yes 
0499 India No 
0868 China Yes 
0767 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 13 – EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0048 Bolivia No 
0032 Chile Yes 
0097 Chile Yes 
0140 Argentina Yes 
0197 Mexico Yes 
0379 Chile No 
0503 Malaysia Yes 
0008 Brazil Yes 
0935 India Yes 
0908 Tanzania Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 14 - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0547 China Yes 
 
 
Scope 15 - EG 
CDM Country Employment Generation 
0105 Mexico Yes 
0120 Mexico Yes 
0401 Brazil Yes 
0945 India Yes 
0031 Chile No 
1092 Brazil No 
1301 China Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 1 - SP 
CDM Country Stakeholder Participation 
0028 Honduras Public meeting 
0045 Honduras Public meeting 
0051 Honduras Community opinion workshop 
0078 Bangladesh Meeting 
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0113 India National review 
0122 Colombia Meeting 
0253 India Meeting 
0346 Chile Meeting 
0492 Honduras Meeting 
0194 Colombia Meeting. 
0606 Guatemala Project Environmental and Social Review 
0717 India Meeting 
0771 China Questionnaire 
0895 India Meeting 
1127 China project public review and questionnaire 
1332 Armenia Meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 3 - SP 
CDM Country Stakeholder Participation 
0123 India None 
0160 Republic of 
Moldova 
Interviews and discussions 
0159 Moldova Interviews 
0173 Moldova Workshop 
0255 India Meetings 
0261 India Interview  
0340 India Interview 
0686 India Meeting 
0079 South Africa Meeting 
0677 India Meeting  
0832 India Not stated 
0866 India Meeting 
1188 India Meeting  
1372 Malaysia Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 4 - SP 
CDM Country Stakeholder Participation 
0183 India Meeting 
0247 Malaysia No 
0361 India Meeting 
0473 India Meeting 
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0847 India Meeting 
1070 India Meeting 
0876 Argentina Meeting 
0024 Chile Survey  
1186 Malaysia 
 
Meeting 
 
 
 
Scope 5 - SP 
CDM Country Stakeholder Participation 
0116 Brazil Meeting 
0490 Egypt Questionnaire 
0557 Pakistan Meeting 
0765 Republic of Korea Meeting 
0698 Brazil Meeting 
0837 China Meeting  
0752 South Africa Public information forum 
0922 Republic of Korea Meeting 
0099 Republic of Korea Meeting 
0961 South Africa Meeting 
1011 Brazil Meeting 
1083 China Public meeting 
1113 Israel Meeting 
 
 
Scope 7 – SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0672 Colombia Meeting 
 
 
Scope 8 – SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0840 China Survey 
0902 China Questionnaire 
0892 China Meeting 
1135 China Meeting  
 
1230 China Questionnaire 
 
1250 China Questionnaire 
0770 China Questionnaire 
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Scope 9 - SP 
CDM Project SP 
1027 
 
South Africa Meeting 
 
 
Scope 10 - SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0153 Mexico Meeting 
0152 Vietnam Meeting 
0382 India Brief interview. Employees identified as 
stakeholders.  
0496 India Meeting 
0616 Indonesia Meeting 
0605 Philippines Meeting 
0879 Mexico Meeting 
1080 Mexico Meeting 
0553 Nigeria Meeting 
 
 
 
Scope 11 - SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0003 Republic of Korea Meeting 
0115 India Meeting  
0193 India Meeting 
0232 China Meeting 
0011 China Public hearing meetings 
0151 Mexico Meeting 
0306 China 2 public consultation meetings and questionnaire 
based survey, Meetings with local residents, local 
council NGO’s 
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0550 China Same as above 
0001 India Meeting 
0499 India Meeting 
0868 China Questionnaire 
0767 Republic of Korea Questionnaire  
 
 
Scope 13 - SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0048 Bolivia Meeting 
0032 Chile Seminars and workshops  
0097 Chile Letter sent to environmental authorities 
0140 Argentina Meeting 
0197 Mexico Meeting 
0379 Chile Public announcements and letters sent to all the 
public authorities and neighbors  
0503 Malaysia Meeting 
0008 Brazil Meeting 
0935 India Meeting  
0908 Tanzania Meeting  
 
 
Scope 14 - SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0547 China PRA Methodology 
 
 
Scope 15 - SP 
CDM Project Stakeholder Participation 
0105 Mexico Meeting  
0120 Mexico Meeting 
0401 Brazil Meeting 
0945 India Comments sought from employees, customers, 
nearby villages, environmental conservations 
board  
0031 Chile Advertisement on webpage for many months, 
attended seminars and conferences in Chile to 
present facts about project 
1092 Brazil Meeting 
1301 China Public survey and questionnaire 
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Scope 1 – Further Analysis 
Project Country Reason for non-
registration 
0221 India Additionality test 
0224 India Additionality test 
0311 Mexico Additionality test 
0317 Mexico Additionality test 
0400 India Additionality test 
0410 Brazil DNA LOA 
0443 Argentina Project start date 
0474 Brazil Documentation 
0522 India Additionality test 
0683 India Additionality test 
0761 Brazil Baseline methodology 
0871 Panama Baseline & monitoring 
methodology 
0951 India Baseline & monitoring 
methodology 
0964 Bolivia Baseline and start date 
project 
0977 India Additionality test 
0990 India Additionality test 
0997 India Baseline methodology 
1004 India Baseline & monitoring 
methodology 
1014 Malaysia Additionality test 
1016 Malaysia Additionality test 
1022 India Baseline & monitoring 
methodology 
1035 Honduras Baseline methodology 
1041 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1042 India Additionality test 
1043 Honduras Baseline Methodology 
1044 Guatemala Baseline Methodology 
1056 Honduras Baseline Methodology 
1065 Brazil Additionality test 
1077 Guatemala Additionality test 
1109 India Additionality test 
1132 India Additionality test 
1148 India Baseline methodology 
1173 Sri Lanka Baseline methodology 
1184 India Additionality test 
1195 India Additionality test 
1201 India Additionality test 
1204 Sri Lanka Additionality test 
1215 India Baseline methodology 
1217 India Additionality  test 
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1235 Brazil Additionality test 
1252 India Additionality test 
1297 India Additionality test 
1331 India Additionality test 
1377 Republic of Korea Additionality test 
1383 India Additionality test 
1398 India Additionality test 
1412 Republic of Macedonia Additionality test 
1447 Republic of Korea Additionality test 
1479 Brazil Additionality test 
1494 Brazil Additionality test 
1545 India Additionality 
1611 China Additionality test 
1625 China Additionality test 
1669 China Additionality test 
1702 India Additionality test 
1707 China Additionality test 
1710 China Additionality test 
1718 China Additionality test 
1725 China Additionality test 
1846 Philippines Baseline Methodology 
0454 India Baseline Methodology 
0457 Chile Monitoring methodology 
0715 India Additionality test 
0754 Brazil Additionality test 
0854 Brazil Additionality test 
0859 India Monitoring plan 
0861 India Baseline & Monitoring 
methodology 
0863 India Additionality test 
0929 India Additionality test 
0954 India Baseline methodology 
0972 Chemical industries/Fugitive emissions 
from fuels/large 
Start date of project 
0988 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1023 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1030 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1050 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1055 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1057 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1356 Mexico Additionality test 
1475 India CDM consideration 
1058 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1060 Brazil Monitoring plan 
1084 Sri Lanka Additionality test 
1285 Malaysia Baseline methodology 
1735 Indonesia Additionality test 
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